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From the very beginning of its history, Placentia, Newfoundland was shaped by
the struggle between France and England . However, as is often forgotten in traditional
histories , the actions of colonial agents are not dictated solely by their own will, but also
by a host of other factors . By examining the archaeological and documentary record of
the British New Fort it will become clear that there are design features and construction
techniques present in its architecture which are the result of actions taken by the British to
address a variety of external influences , specifically environmental and military, which
were unique to Placentia . These adaptations to a particular colonial environment by a
colonial agent will serve a microcosm through which the wider history of colonial and
imperial conflicts can be examined . This paper will focus on outlining how these
influences can be indentified and examined as well as illustrating how they can be draw
together to create a much more nuanced understanding of how and why colonial agents ,
such as the British , attempted to reach their own goal of dominance while coping with the
numerous external factors unique to particular locations .
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Placentia is located on the sparsely populated, southwest coast of Newfoundland's
Avalon Peninsula, about 100 km southwest ofSt. John 's . Today it is a small, rural town
struggling to refocus its economy following the moratorium on the cod fishery in 1992
and the final closure of the American base at Argentia in 1994. Placentia is barely known
beyond its immediate region . There is little remaining of a physica l nature to indicate to
the uninformed visitor that this rural community was once a critical naval and economic
base in a global struggle between competing world powers. This competition for imperial
dominance not only influenced this settlement throughout its history but was responsib le
for its creation in the first place. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the
competing empires of England and France committed significant resources in manpower
and finances in their attempts to control Placentia and its harbour . Each sought to
monopolize Placentia's important economic and strategic assets. This valuable position in
the history of the colonial rivalries between England and France, both in terms of
Newfound land and the broader North American context is, sadly, often forgotten by
locals and, perhaps more disconcertingly , by the wider academic community . This is an
oversight that needs to be corrected . Such is one of the goals of the following ana ly sis.
There have been severa l attempts, since the I960s, to raise awareness of and to
reposition the important role of Placentia in the wider colonia l history of the region . The
most significant of these is an ongoing archaeological excavation and public
interpretation program at the Jersey side of the town. As well, there have been extensive
excavations undertaken by Parks Canada at a military site known as Castle Hill in the past
1
and Amanda Crompton wrote about another military site in Placentia for her doctoral
research, The Vieux Fort: The Archa eological Investigation ofa French Colony in
Newfoundland, covering the earliest French military occupation of the area . It is,
however , the ongoing excavation program, presently dedicated to working toward
preserving and presenting the valuable cultural resource of Placentia to the community
and the growing number of tourists , which otTers the best tool through which to educate
the public . That said, there is a distinct need for further academic analysis of the
archaeological remains which have already been recovered . It is the second goal of this
analysis to address that need.
The third goal of the following analysis goes beyond simply emphasizing the
importance of a specific site or working through the back log of excavated material
culture. Traditiona l histories of Placentia , of colonial settlements similar to it and of
imperialism and colonialism writ large, generally have concentrated on the stories of how
various European individuals and factions conquered the sea, subjected the land and
vanquished their enemies . Following the narrative accounts , these histories simply
outlined the implications of the imperial actions on the wider progression of history .
Today , such histories of colonialism and imperialism present historians with a number of
difficulties due to their close connections with such issues as racism, slavery and
exploitation (Conkl in and Fletcher 1999: 1). The final and most sweeping goal of this
analysis, therefore, is to illustrate how such a method of approaching the topics of
colonialism and imperialism through the introduction of archaeological evidence into
traditional historical discourse may provide the means of overcoming some of the issues
currently faced by such discussions .
1.1 HISTOR Y, ARCHEOLOGY AND COLONIALISM
Ever since the end of the age of European Colonia lism and Imperialism , historians
have struggled to come to grips with ways to discuss the history of these divisive topics .
Questions such as, whose history it is to tell, how does one recover ' lost voices ' and how
can one estimate the overall impact of European Imperialism and Colonialism , have
created and shaped new theoretical and methodological approaches (Conk lin and Fletcher
1999: 1-2). Many of these new approaches , however, have created new challenges as
they often contradict each other in their final ana lysis resulting in what appears to be
more in the way of consternation than consensus within the field (Conklin and Fletcher
1999: 2-4). These difficulties will be discussed in some detail later in this chapter , but
suffice to say for now that traditiona l historica l methods and approaches have yet to come
to terms with how to properly handle these sensitive issues . In light of these sometimes
seeming ly insurmountab le points of contention , perhaps an entire ly new approach to the
subject is required. It is the third and final goal of this paper to develop just such an
approach using the resources available to the historian and the archaeologist.
Specifically, this study will outline how the introduction of archaeological data
into historical narratives can provide new perspectives on some of the issues which have
plagued more traditional approac hes and, thereby, help in overcoming them . This will be
done by utilizing the colonial past of Placentia as a historical locus through which to
demonstrate how this can be achieved and by using the ongoing excavation project in
Placentia as a ready source of archaeological data. Placentia is an excellent location to
illustrate this proposed method of discussing imperialism and colonialism, as its history is
dominated by the competition between England and France to monopolize its vital
economic resource , the cod fishery . This struggle was just part of a much broader
competition for global dominance. As a result, the story of Placentia 's place in the
imperial struggle provides a perfect microcosm through which the wider history of such
colonial and imperial conflicts can be examined .
While this goal may sound extremely wide ranging and sweeping , its execution
will be considerably narrower in terms of the topics being discussed and the historical
period being covered . This study will focus on how a new approach to the subject can be
applied to a specific site and time period. Consequently, the following analysis should be
thought of as a case study or a proof of concept , to be utilized by others to assist in their
attempts to approach this daunting subject. That said, it is important to understand the
methodology and theoretical background of this new approach as well as some of the
broad principles that are necessary for its application .
The principal concept behind this approach is that the actions of colonial agents,
such as the English and French, must be localized within the geographical and historical
context in which these actions were undertaken . Only then is it possible to deduce from
the archaeological record and the available documentary evidence what were the
motivations and influences behind certain actions and decisions taken by these agents . Put
simply, this analysis will treat the actions of agents involved in imperial and colonial
activities as being the result of their desire to achieve their own goals in light of external
factors which stood as obstacles to these goals, rather than solely as the result of their
own motivation s and will . Doing so removes the traditional historical error inherent in
discussing the actions of such individuals within a conceptual vacuum, leaving the actions
of agents of empire and colonialism without the necessary context to fully understand
their motivations and goals. This means that rather than focusing on the narrative of the
competition between France and England for domination over this region and its
resources and on how this conflict thus shaped the development of Placentia , this thesis
will be concerned with how the efforts of other imperial agents as well as the land, natural
elements and resources of Placentia influenced the actions of those who sought to control
it.
1.2 WHY PLACENTIA?
While it is all well and good to make suggestions about how the introduction of
archaeological evidence into historical discourse may be able to overcome the difficulties
faced by historians when approachin g the topics of colonialism and imperialism , it is
another thing all together to justify why Placentia should be used as a case study to
demonstrate this hypothesis. Of course, the pedantic response to such a query is that
Placentia is as good as any other site of European Colonialism, so why not? There are,
however , more compelling reasons why Placentia is particularly well suited to its role as
the guinea pig for this nascent analysis.
The first reason is that Placentia was settled and occupied throughout most of its
history for two very specific, inter-connected reasons: firstly, for the economic
exploitation of the Newfoundland cod fish stocks and secondly , to serve as a military
outpost from which the men and vessels required for conducting the fishery could
operate , find safe refuge and be provided armed protection . These well documented
motivations for the existence of the colony mean that one of the requirements for this
historical/archaeological approach is satisfied , that there exists a clearly defined and
supported motivation on the part those involved in colonial activities .
The second reason that Placentia is a good choice for analysis is that since the
1960s, extensive excavations have been undertaken at a number of sites covering both
the French and English periods of control. The findings ranging from structural to
material items provide invaluable research material regarding the actions of the two
colonial powers in the interplay for imperial and economic control. Placentia , therefore ,
provides both documentary and archaeological supporting data.
The third reason for selecting Placentia lies in the parameters of this study itself.
Placentia offers several possible archaeological sites for consideration . The set confines
of this work and the principles behind its theoretical approach make it untenable to reach
for a sweeping interpretation of how the actions and decisions of all those who once lived
and worked at this site were influenced by external forces . Therefore , it is necessary
firstly to concentrate on a single site, within the larger confines of Placentia, which was
actively occupied during the years when the colony was a focal point of the colonial
conflict between France and Britain in North America. Secondly, it is necessary to focus
on a particular time frame during which there was a clearly defined range of motivations
for occupation at the selected site . Doing so will make it easier to explore the nuances of
how external influences affected the actions and lives of individuals living at the chosen
site and to examine the different ways in which the residents adapted to these influences .
Fortuitously , Placentia offers a site which satisfies these requirements perfectly : the
English New Fort.
Built during the mid-eighteen th century to re-establish British military dominance
in the region with the hope of securing the local fishing grounds and processing sites , the
actions and decisions of its designers and builders were subject to a number of external
influences . In particular , the architecture and construction techniques which these agents
of colonialism utilized in creating and occupying this site are of interest as they offer one
of the simpler items in the archaeological record for interpreting the effect of external
influences on the residents and the wider imperial situation. This is due to the fact that
eighteenth-century fortifications generally followed well documented principles and
standard techniques which have distinct purposes and uses. Therefore , by looking at
which of these principles and techniques were employed and how they were employed ,
and then cross referencing this information with the documentary record of what the
intended purpose of them was, one should be able to draw some conclusions about what
the intended goals of the New Fort's designers and builders really were. These findings ,
will prove the validity of the theoret ical approach utilised in this work as a means of
historical investigation and, as will be discussed in greater detail later, in doing so will
outline how it is possible to examine the motivations behind the actions of imperial agents
in such a way as to avoid the moralization and counterfactual debates which often
accompany such discussion in more traditional historical methods of doing so.
The New Fort is a relatively well documented structure and it has been
extensively excavated over the last several years yielding a great deal of archaeological
evidence for this discussion . Based on an examination of this evidence it is clear that
there are design features and construction techniques present in its architecture which are
indicators of decisions the English made in their attempts to successfully reach their goal
of securing the fishery. The evidence also reveals that there were several specific external
influences which shaped the ways in which the English made their decisions on how to
achieve their primary goal. The most obvious influences are the threat of aggres sion on
the part of others like the French and the harshness of the local environment of Placentia .
The presence of these easily identifiable external factors makes the execution of this
discussion much easier to conduct and, therefore , will provide the focal point for the rest
of this analysis .
When viewed together, the foregoing reasons demonstrate why New Fort at
Placentia offers an excellent microcosm through which the usefulness and value of
introducing archaeological evidence into traditional historical discourse on colonialism
and imperialism can be illustrated and the method of doing so can be demonstrated .
Beyond its conceptual usefulness , however , New Fort also presents itself as a site in need
of scholarly attention . Consequently , this study constitutes the first in-depth analysis of
New Fort. While the amount of published material on the military and colonial history of
Placentia itself is not insignificant , the site itself remains in relative obscurity despite its
importance to the development of Newfoundland during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries . As well, the majority of the published works dealing with the history of
Placentia and more specifically New Fort, such as Jean-Pierre Proulx's Placentia: / 7/3-
/ 8//, are several decades old. In light of the considerable amount of new archaeological
evidence which has been uncovered during multiple seasons of excavation over the past
decade , a new analysis is necessary.
1.3 ANALYSIS OUTLINE
The following examination is divided into chapters according to topic . Clearly ,
Chapter One, this chapter , serves as a general introduction to the rest of this work and,
therefore , does not require further discussion. Chapter Two will concentrate on providing
an explanation of the nuts and bolts of the theoretical underpinnings of the approach
being proposed in this work. This theory-focused chapter will provide a brief
historiography of the study of colonialism and imperialism and then outline some of the
recent developments in the field. Next, the chapter will examine some of the principal
concepts which are implicit in such a method of approaching these topics as well as how
they will be used in the rest of this analysis. As well , there will be a discussion of how
archaeological approaches, such as this one, can provide a valuable new perspective on
the study of imperialism/colonialism. Clearly , The discussion is wide ranging , but
because one of the goals of this analysis is to outline why archaeology should be
introduced into the imperialism/coloniali sm debate , it is important to explain why a new
approach is required and what, in particular , this approach has to offer which may help to
overcome some of the interpretative challenges currently faced by those attempting to
address these topics .
Following the theoretical background provided in Chapter Two, Chapter Three
will address the historical background of Placentia . Clearly , the scope of this chapter is
quite large, but there are a few areas which will be highlighted . The first is a summary of
Placentia's colonia l past, covering the history of the community as well as the particular
area of New Fort up until the current day. The bulk of this part focuses on the period
during which Placentia was at the centre of the struggle for dominance between England
and France . The second is a summary of the history of the current archaeological project
being conducted on the site of New Fort as well as some of the other related areas which
have been excavated . Finally, after the requisite historical and theoretical background is
covered , the work moves on to showing how this method can be put into practice .
The body of this work comprise s two chapters , each of which is broken down into
subsections . The two chapters are dedicated to a discussion of the design of New Fort and
its construction . Each of the subsections is dedicated to interpreting , based on the
documentary and archaeological record , how two crucial external influences , namely the
threat of hostile enemy attack and the harshness of the local environment , affected the
actions and decisions of the agents involved in these activities . The objectives of these
two chapte rs are threefold ; first, to outline the primary concerns each influence presented
to the English at Placentia ; second , to analyze historical sources and the available
archaeo logical data regarding the design and construction of the New Fort to find possib le
manifes tations of how the English adapted to these difficulties; and third, to draw
comparisons with contempo rary British fortifications and historica l works on the design
and construction of fortifications as a means of outlining how standard technique s of
design and construction were adapted to the particular needs of those at Placentia . By
addressing these questions it is possible to examine the motiva tions of the agents
responsible for creating the New Fort as well as providing an example of how a similar
analysis could be conducted at other colonial sites. These two chapters will then be
followed by a final, concluding chapter.
1.4 THE END OF THE BEGINNING
In summary , two things stand out. Firstly , the current study of imperia lism, as it is
carried on by historians , often casts those persons being studied , both colonizer and
colonized, as acting wholly independently of the environment in which they existed .
Secondly , within the history of colonialism in North America , the important role played
by the town of Placentia , Newfoundland, is often forgotten . The story of the microcosm
provides a small, but valuable addition to the larger story of colonizer and colonized . This
research study addresses three needs . First, it constitutes an original work on a subject
which is worthy of study . Second it seeks to provide a new conceptual approach for
studying colonia lism and imperialism through the introduction of archaeological evidence
and analysis into this discussion as a way to overcome some of the sometimes
contradictory and generally heated debate that currently exists in the field. Third, on a
more practical level, it will hopefully draw greater academic and public interest to the
area of Placentia itself; an important region in the history of Newfoundland and Labrador
that, today, often receives scant recognition . Overall , this study of the New Fort in
Placentia seeks to meet three goals; to bring to light the forgotten importance of Placentia
in the history of colonialism in North America, to conduct and encourage others to
conduct in-depth archaeological analysis of the evidence being provided by the ongoing
excavations in Placentia , and to outline the value of introducing archaeological evidence
into the colonialism/imperialism debate.
Chapter 2: Of Agency and Imperialism
Matthew Johnson has commented that, "historical archaeology ...refuses to fit into
the neat theoretical boxes that have very often been defined by prehistory archaeologists "
(Johnson 1999: 192). The fact remains, nonetheles s, that to achieve academic legitimac y,
it is necessary to have some kind of recognized methodology and theoretical approach
when conducting archaeological research . However, far beyond this ' cut and paste '
approach to achieving legitimacy , theoretical approaches offer advantages to the
historical archaeologist. This is especially true if they are used as a means of focusing
research and analyses and not simply woven into an early chapter of a work primarily to
ensure academic respectability and not reappearing as part of the final analysis . A
theoretical approach , therefore , will form the framework for this thesis, as it should in any
quality academic work.
While it can be difficult to utilize a pre-existing theoretical approach which can
cover any eventuality that may arise during the course of one 's research, it is possible to
develop a general approach that is as adaptable as possible . To do so, however , requires a
clear understanding of what are the primary goals of one 's research . Only then, can one
adopt a relevant theoretical approach . What follows is a statement of the primary goal of
this thesis and its connection to the larger topic of imperialism /colonialism , a summary of
the various theories which were considered and an explanation why the theories of
agency and intersectionalit y have been adopted .
This chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the concepts upon which this
entire thesis is based . It comprises three sections: an outline of the ongoing historical
debates over European Colonialism/lmperialism, including past approaches and some of
the present day interpretative trends; an explanation of the role that archaeology has
played in this debate ; and, finally, a discussion of the established archaeological
approaches with an emphasis on the concepts of agency and intersectionality , how they
have been utilized by archaeologists in the past and how and why they are employed in
this thesis.
2.1 HISTORY AND COLON IALISM/IMPERIALISM
The primary objective of this thesis can be simply stated . It is to use the case of
New Fort, Placentia, as an example of how, through the prisms of History and
Archaeology , the actions of individuals involved in European imperial/colonial activities
can be interpreted as being largely the result of their desire to achieve their own goals and
of the differing external factors which influenced the ways in which these players
attempted to attain these goals. This approach differs in some ways from the more
traditional, predominantly historical approaches to discussing the age of
colonialism/imperialism into which the story of New Fort falls . To understand the
difference , one needs to know something of the more common approaches that have been
employed in the past and how they continue to influence the writing about
colonialism/imperialism today.
The earliest histories of European Empires were usually devoted to illustrating
the glories of imperial conquest and the richness of the various European nations. A
prime example of this kind of imperial glorification is William Collier 's History ofthe
British Empire published in 1859 (Collier 1859). Historical works , like Collier 's , were
not critical examinations of the role of empire and the impact of imperialism, but rather
reinforcements of what the authors perceived to be the progressive , positive nature of
European imperial ambitions and the rise of Europe to world dominance in the modem
era . More recently, and especially since the end of European imperialism in the twentieth
century , historians have shifted their focus from the glorification of imperialism to a more
sober and critical analysis of the long term impact of colonialism and imperialism on
human society . Nevertheless , the more traditional trumpeting of the benefits of Empire,
even in light of its acknowledge short comings and negative effects , still exists and the
debate between those who defend colonialism and those who criticize it distinguishes the
historical literature of the present day.
The proponents of colonialism and imperialism , such as Niall Ferguson in his
Empire : The Rise and Demise ofthe British World Order and the Lessons ofGlobal
Power, released in 2003, usually argue that the long term benefits of colonialism to the
development of modem global society outweigh the modestly acknowledged ill effects of
colonialism on many peoples (Ferguson 2004). Their logic is that, despite the evils of
slavery and cultural oppression , the spread of European style laws, economies and values
were generally a good thing, in the long term, for those who were colonized and so
impacted .
In contrast , the critics of colonialism and imperialism , such as Adam Hochschild ,
author of the famous (or perhaps infamous) King Leopold's Ghost , published in 1998,
espouse almost exactly the opposite position. Their arguments generally focus on
outlining the impact of colonialism from the perspective of those individuals who were
colonized and then discuss the long term, negative effects that these influences imposed
on these groups, their cultural habits , beliefs, languages and relationships (Hochschild
1998). As well, these detractors of colonialism often undertake a quest, " to recover the
voices and lives ofthose ....who rarely appeared in the officia l records" in the hopes of
reinstating the voices of these individuals into the colonialism/imperialism debate
(Cannadi ne 2005) .
Recently, this quest for lost voices has begun to be applied to the colonizers as
well as the colonized . Linda Colley in her 2004 book, Captives: Britain , Empire, and the
World, /600-/850, focused on the stories of individua ls involved in colonial activities
who were captured by "Others" (Colley 2004) . This refocusing of the quest for lost voices
has had the benefit of creating a much more balanced discussion about the personal
experience of those involved in all aspec ts of colonialism. In embracing a discussion of
colonialism in terms of the contemporary dialect between colonizer and colonized ,
aggressor and defender , self and other, this approach facilitates an analysis of how the
contrasting parties influenced and changed one another, something that the traditional
historical approach did not enable , or even consider.
Yet, even the personal experience approach to interpreting the role and place of
colonialism and imperialism in world history often appears to ignore that the interactions
between colonizers and colonized were set in the real world . This approach has been
primarily concerned with the influences different colonial agents had on each other and
has largely discounted the environment in which these agents operated . Furthermore,
beyond the overly used concepts of the "White man's burden" and the quest for economic
gain, the motivations behind the actions of colonial agents are often not discussed at all.
Has any historian attempted to do otherwise ? The answer is yes.
In her 1995 publication , Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial
Contest, Anne McClintock adopted what has been called an intersectional approach to
studying several aspect s of the history of colonialism. Intersectionality does not have its
roots in the colonial debate , but rather in feminist sociological theory . It has, perhaps ,
been best summarized by Leslie McCall as, "the relationships among multiple dimensions
and modalities of social relationship s and subject formations " (McCall 2005:1771). It was
precisely this ability to examine the relationships among multiple factors which enabled
McClintock to discuss how the interactions of many different factors affected the shaping
of colonial identities, values and practices (McClintock 1995). It is this principle of
considering the points of intersection of different factors as being formative in shaping
the actions of agents of colonialism/imperialism which forms the theoretical framework
of this thesis .
Why this choice of theoretical approach ? The purpose of this work is to provide
an example of how the actions of individuals involved in colonial activities can be
interpreted as the result of their desires to achieve their own goals in light of the presence
of external factors which influenced the ways in which these individuals attempted to
attain their goals. In other words, this examination is concerned with identifying the
points at which the goals of imperial agents and the influences of external factors
intersected and how the interactions at these points of intersection affected the decisions
and actions of these agents. While McCall and McClintock's use ofintersectionality is
valuable , it lacks a set of ground rules for establishing how various factors actually
interact at points of intersection . Therefore , intersectionality can be thought of as a way to
conceptualize the broadest aspect of the approach which is being utilized in this thesis,
namely the existence of multiple factors , all of which contribute to a final outcome . This
may not be an earth shattering assert ion, but it is important to keep it in mind when trying
to discuss how individuals interacted with each other and their environments .
Later, a more in-depth discussion follows describing how this thesis will
conceptualize these points of intersection and which archaeological theories were
formative in shaping the approach being utilized . First, however , it is necessary to outline
some of the contributions archaeologists have made already to the study of colonialism
and imperialism . The following section, therefore , provides a basic historiography of the
topic and outlines why these approaches have, so far, proven to be inadequate to the task
of truly grappling with the wider issues of colonialism/imperialism.
2.2 ARCHAEOLOGYAND COLONIALISM/IMPERIALISM
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of colonialism which archaeologists
are presented with when approaching the topic is the fact that their field of study is
intrinsically linked with the colonial past. As Claire Lyons and John Papadopoulo s
pointed out in Archaeology of Colonialism, the origins of Archaeology and Anthropolog y
are deeply rooted in colonial mentalitie s (Lyons and Papadopoulo s 2002: 2). Evidence of
this linkage can be seen in the active interest of European powers in retrieving artefacts
from the past of the regions that they once dominated . It is the process of recovering
which contributed to the creation and early development of both disciplines (Lyons and
Papadopoulo s 2002). Furthermore , Archaeolo gy and Anthropolo gy actually served a key
part in how historians structured their examinations of colonialism and imperiali sm. This
was because the studies conducted by anthropologists and archaeologi sts of past
civilizations and ' primitive' cultures often legitimized the colonizer ' s position of
dominance by drawin g similarities with the so-called great civilization s of the past and
continuously reiterating the European "se lf' versus the uncivilized, backward , non-
European "other" (Lyons and Papadopoulos 2002: 5-7). This role in the academic pursuit
of ju stifying the institutionali zed racism against colonized people - which many would
today deem to be one of the mostly morally reprehensible aspects of colonial ism - does
not prevent historians from addressing the issues of colonialism and imperialism . Nor
does it stop the archaeolo gist.
Some of the earliest attempts to create a comprehensive archaeolo gical approach
to colonialism and imperialism are found in Stephen Dyson 's collection of essays
Comparative Studies in the Archaeology of Colonialism released in 1985 (Dyson 1985).
For Dyson, the purpose of this work was to encourage the development ofa wider array
of archaeological scholarship focusing on colonialism. He believed that, "the time seems
ripe to...develop a discipline of comparative colonial archaeology" (Dyson 1985: 2).
Dyson maintained that this new field of comparative colonial archaeology should be
based on the examination of material culture ranging through many different historica l
and geographical contexts . Also, he indicated that it should focus on discussing the
process by which material goods were disseminated throughout the world and how the
meanings associated with such items changed over time due to the interactions of
different colonial communities (Dyson 1985: 2-4).
Despite Dyson 's own stated goals, his articles in Comparative Studies in the
Archaeology of Colonialism do not present a unified analysis of the greater significance
of colonialism. Instead, they are largely stand alone essays concentrating on sites which
just happened to be associated with colonialism. Consequent ly, Dyson 's suggestions ,
made in 1985, for a comprehensive archaeo logical approach to the study of colonialism
and imperialism did not, initially, take hold within the archaeological community . It was
not until sometime later that archaeologists began to grapple more deeply with the impact
of colonialism or became involved in considering the divisive issues which historians had
already begun to acknowledge . Even a decade later, archaeologists continued to struggle
with the idea of delving into the deeper , more worrisome issues of colonization . This fact
is evident in Timothy Champion 's 1989 collection of articles , Centre and Periphery:
Comparative Studies in Archaeology. The essays contained in this compi lation, as with
past archaeological studies , dealt with colonialism in a peripheral sense , more as a setting
for the subjects that the writers were studying than as the principal, core topic of interest
(Champion 1989).
Slowly the focus did begin to shift. By 2002, there was evidenceof some
advancementin the ability of archaeologists to address more directly the issues of
colonialism. A collectionof essays, th e Archaeology of Colonialism, edited by Claire
Lyons and John Papadopoulosprovidesone example. In the introduction, the editors
indicated that they believed that archaeologistsshould follow the lead of the historians
and become more concernedwith the aspect of recovering lost voices and studying the
impact of colonialism on indigenouscommunitiesrather than focusingon simply
examining the broader contexts of imperialismor colonialism(Lyons and Papadopoulos
2002). In fact, they even went so far as to state that they supported the views of Nicholas
Thompson,an anthropologistwho had written that colonialismcould only be effectively
assessed at a localized level by exploring its influencesand effects withina limited area,
timeframeand population group (Lyons and Papadpoulos2002:1I). Furthermore, some of
the articles in The Archaeology of Colonialism supported this shift in focus. By and large,
the authors concentratedon examining the impactof colonialismon particulargroups of
individuals. The shift in focus to the impactof colonial activities on particular groups of
colonized individuals is evident in articles such as Peter Van Dommelen's "Ambiguous
Matters: Colonialismand Local Identities in Punic Sardinia" and Tom Cummins' "Forms
of Andean Colonial Towns, Free Will and Marriage" (Lyons and Papadpoulos2002).
Despite these examples of archaeologistsfinally beginningto grapple with the
deeper impactof colonialism,the majority of the articles in The Archaeology 0/
Colonialism did not address the most divisive issues of EuropeanColonialism. Instead,
they used examples of colonialism from classical history. What makes this strange is the
fact that the cover image of the collection portrays a typical nineteenth-century photo of a
colonial setting , with the apparently civilized white man with his rifle, cravat and pith
helmet posing with two apparently non-European ' savages' (Lyons and Papadopoulos
2002). Perhaps the editors had no say in the cover image or, perhaps , they knew the topic
that they really wanted to confront was that of European Colonialism , but the material
submitted to the collection did so only indirectly . It does appear that the intention and the
reality were not quite in sync. This may indicate how little research had been done from
the new perspective but it also seems to indicate a degree of nervousness within the
archaeological community about becoming embroiled in the ongoing, controversial
debates on colonia lism being waged within the discipline of History.
These concerns continued in Gil Stein's 2004 collection, The Archaeology of
Colonial Encounters: Comparative Perspectives (Stein 2004). While the articles in the
collection illustrate the ability of archaeologists to address the same kinds of questions
about the oppression , racism and discrimination associated with the historical debate
about colonialism and imperialism, the time periods with which most of the authors dealt,
as in previous essay collections, were not those related to the contentious issues of
European Colonial ism. It is true that the research presented in this collection is very
interesting and that the time periods, mostly pre-contact South American and classical
European, are just as worthy of study . What seems strange, however, is that an anthology
addressing colonial encounters was predominantly based on research connected to the
ancient past rather than the well documented and contentious near past, namely the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . Ironically, once again, the cover image of this text
relates to the more " modern" past. It features an image of a European colonial scene, the
Chapel and Russian well at Fort Ross built in 1812 in California. The juxtaposition of this
cover image and the contents within seem to imply a reticence on the part of the
mainstream academic archaeologica l community to get involved in the sometimes rather
unbecoming debates about coloniali sm and imperialism which have been waged by many
historians. Nevertheless, by 2004, there were some fine examples of archaeologists who
were bucking the traditional approaches of their discipline .
In his book The Archaeology of the Colonized, published in 2004, Michael Given
was very direct about his approach , one in which he endeavoured to relate the experiences
of those individuals most directly affected by colonialism . In his opinion, all colonial
powers were , "alien, external and they survived by extracting food and labour from their
subjects" (Given 2004: 3). From this vantage point, Given went on to outline how to
examine and reconstruct the experiences of colonized peoples using archaeological data ,
specifically material culture. He provided examples from several time periods of how this
could be done . Michael Given clearly was willing to address head-on the uncomfortable
issues of European Colonialism . This is not to say that Given based his work entirely in
the field of European Colonialism . In fact, he did not, but his several examples of doing
so represented a positive step toward archaeologi sts becoming fully engaged in the
modern colonialism/imperialism debate .
While the moral backlash against the evil agents of European colonization had,
by the early twenty-first century, led both historians and archaeologist s to concentrate on
looking toward the colonized to provide fodder for their research and discussions , the
pendulum ironically was about to shift. Some historians were already beginning to look
back toward the colonizers and away from the colonized. An example of this developing
trend was Linda Colley's 2002 book, Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600-
J850. In this historical account, Colley set out to offer what she argued was a more
complete image of the nature of colonial interactions based on the experiences of
Europeans captured by ' others' while engaged in a range of colonial activitie s (Colley
2002) . It was on these stories of the colonizers rather than the colonized that Colley based
her analysis. What is interesting is that while the agent focus might be different, Colley 's
work does not preclude the use of her agents-based theoretical approach to discuss the
experience of a wide range of individua ls regard less of their role in the colonial
phenomenon .
2.3 ARCHAELOGY , COLO NIALI SM AN D AGENCY
The primary archaeological theory which this thesis will utilize is that of agency.
Thomas Barfield broad ly defined agency theory as an approach which holds, in all of its
many interpretations , that people do not merely react to changes in the external world but,
"play a role in the formation of the social realities in which they participate " (Barfield
1997: 4) . This seemingly simple concept has caused, and continues to cause, a great deal
of scholarly discussion not only in the realm of Archaeo logy, but also in the wider
community of the Social Sciences and Humanities .
Agency is not an entirely new concept. Many h'Teatthinkers of the past, ranging
from Aristotle to Adam Smith, have addressed it. It has, however , only risen to
prominence relatively recently in the Social Sciences and Humanities. Over the last thirty
years , agency has been at the heart of much of the research done in these fields and it
continues to generate disparate and varied methods of approaching its study (Doman
2002 : 303-4) . The particular approach utilized in this thesis draws heavily from many of
these methods and the rationale behind their use is best understood through a quick
history of the recent developments in the field of agency theory itself as well as how it
has been applied to Archaeology .
The emergence of the modem agency theory began during the latter half of the
twentieth century and can be attributed in large part to two thinkers, Pierre Bourdieu and
Anthony Giddens (Doman 2002 : 305). It was the writings of these men which shaped our
understanding of the relationship between ' agents' , that is individuals capable ofaitering
larger structures , and ' structures', that is the larger setting and state of the relationships
between individuals (Doman 2002 : 305). It is from their occasionally conflicting theories
about the nature of agency that some of the most important concepts for this thesis were
gleaned .
Pierre Bourdieu outlined his views on the subject in his 1977 publication Outline
a/a Theory a/Practi ce. In this he stressed the importance of humanity's ability to offer
resistance or acceptance to larger social patterns , specifically those which lead to
inequality (Bourdieu 1977). In effect , Bourdieu was working from a Marxist view of
society and, much like Marx, did little to recognize the ability of individuals to act
creatively (Doman 2002: 306-307) . Giddens and many others viewed Bourdieu 's concept
of agency as far too limited and insisted that the actions of individuals were not dictated
just by unconsciously assimilated social norms, but instead were open to innovation and
personal motivation (Trigger 2007:496) .
Expanding on Bourdieu 's views, Giddens put forward his theory ofStructuration
in his 1979 work, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and
Contradiction in Social Analysis and again in his 1984 The Constitution of Society . It is
Gidden 's view of agency in which this thesis' approach is rooted . Specifically, there are
two primary points of interest in Giddens' theory which have been adopted . The first is
that of "tacit knowledge, " which is the cognitive abilities actors are able to apply through
their own initiative , but which they themselves do not necessarily " formulate
discursively " (Giddens 1979: 57). The second is that of "practical consciousness ," which
Giddens defined as the "non-discursive, but not unconscious, knowledge of social
institutions" that all individuals possess (Giddens 1979:24). Through these two concepts
Giddens was able to discuss the agency of individuals within structures , not just as the
result of internalized social practices or "practical consciousness" as Bourdieu had, but
instead, as being partially contributable to the goals, wants and emotions , or "tacit
knowledge " of the individuals themselves . Giddens ' himself summed the net result of
these two concepts up best when he said, "human beings are neither to be treated as
passive objects , nor as wholly free subjects" (Giddens 1979: ISO).
Many archaeologists have attempted to utilize these concepts of agency in their
studies of the past, some adopting Bourdieu's limited views of personal initiative and
others a more Giddensian approach . These two schools of thought have spawned their
own ever evolving set of sub-theorie s as archaeologists attempt to modify and alter pre-
existing approaches to suit the needs of their own personal research subjects and fields . In
fact, this analysis continues to do just that, and there are a number of examples of
archaeological approaches utilizing agency theory which shape the methods being used
here as will be discussed .
Some of the first archaeologists to utilize an agency-based approach were
Michael Shanks and Christopher Tilley. They attempted to use it as a means of discussing
the development of beer bottle aesthetic s and advertising as being representative of the
meanings attributed to beer and its consumption in England and Sweden (Shanks and
Tilley 1987). There is little question that their work represents , as Jennifer Dornan put it,
the earliest "move within archaeology toward an inclusion of collective action in notions
of agency " (Doman 2002:310) For that reason, their contribution is worth mentioning
(Doman 2002: 310). Nonetheless , their approach was criticized by many for treating the
individuals they were studying as being far too likely to simply act as they were directed .
In 1989, Matthew Johnson went so far as to state in his Conceptions of Agency in
Archaeological Interpretation, that Shanks' and Tilley's agents were no more than
"cultural dopes ," and that their approach to agency left individuals dependent on social
groupings in order to function (Johnson 1989). Since this thesis is firmly rooted in a
Giddensian approach , the work of Shanks and Tilly appears to offer little guidance . Their
efforts, however , represent one of the earliest archaeological works utilizing agency as a
means of theoretical discussion and must be recognized for blazing a trail for other such
archaeological discourses.
The first major concept that influenced the development of a theoretical approach
for this thesis is that of the Rational Actor . This concept was first presented by James
Bell in his 1992 work On Capturing Agency in Theories about Prehistory (Bell 1992).
According to Bell, it is, " the ideas and decisions of individuals [which] explain change",
but beyond knowing this, the variations in what motivates individuals to make the
decisions they do are very difficult to uncover through the lens of Archaeology (Bell
1992: 39) . This is due, Bell says, to the fragmentary nature of the archaeological record.
Therefore , he suggests agency approaches should only be used by archaeologists when
the motivations of the individuals being studied are widely shared and understood (Bell
1992). Expanding on this argument , Bell believed that his Rational Actor Theory , as well
as agency in general, was only applicable to prehistoric societies in which individuals
undertook activities that were largely the same and conducted under similar condition s
(Bell 1992).
This concept of having to understand the motivations of the individuals in
question has been adopted into the theoretical approach of this work, although Bell's
belief in its application to only prehistoric archaeology has been discarded . The relevance
of this application is clear . The motivations behind the creation of the New Fort are well
documented and understood ; it was there to defend the settlement of Placentia which , in
tum, was there to give the English acces s to the Newfoundland cod stocks . This clearly
understood motivation satisfies Bell' s requirements for the application of his theory , at
least in general. Furthermore, by combining Bell 's belief that, "the ideas and decisions of
individuals explain change " (Bell 1992: 39) with Giddens ' view that the actions of
individuals are goals-based and neither totally free expressions of personal will nor
completely constr ained by social norms , this analysis is able to recognize that the
designers and builders of the New Fort operated within the standards of military
architecture of the day and were capable of deviating from these standards to suit their
particular needs in Placentia .
The emerging approach to agency is still inadequate, however. What is missing is
a way of conceptualizing what constrained the individuals who designed and built the
New Fort from achieving their goals and why they took the actions they did in their
efforts to reach them. Fortunately , Martin Byers has proposed a way of doing this . In his
1999, Intentionalit y , Symbolic Pragmatics, and Material Culture: Revisiting Bindford 's
View ofthe Old Copper Complex, Byers stressed the importance of what he called
" Intentionality" (Byers 1999). This was a concept that Byers borrowed from the
psychologist John Searle (Searle 1983). Byers defined the concept as, "the mental
property of directedness or "aboutne ss" that our cognitive states and events have when we
are attending to and acting in the world"(Byers 1999: 266 .) Put more simply , it is an
"approach dealing with action as rule-governed pragmatic behaviour " (Byers 1999: 266) .
Byers believed that intentionality, which in its simplest form seems to be an evolution of
Giddens ' view of agency , served as, "the human interface actively linking the world and
cognitive human agency " (Byers 1999: 266) . In light of this , he said, archaeologists
could utilize , "material culture as the expressive pragmatic medium of this interface "
(Byers 1999: 266). To do so, however, Byers stated that it must be analysed from the
view of four "States of Consciousne ss" : beliefs , wants, intentions and perception s (Byers
1999: 267).
While these "states" were originally proposed by Searle, his rigid expression of
them in formulas seems, on the surface , far too inflexible for general application (Searle
1983). Byers , however, offered an excellent summary of this concept and what it meant
within any discussion of the agency of individuals . It is this summary which has
influenced the choice of theoretical approach for this thesis :
...a human never simply thinks, feels, intends, hopes, fears , sees, hears, and so
on. Rather, shelhe thinks about X, while hoping for Z, and fearing that such and
such may happen to prevent her/his intention of getting Y, which shelhe intends
to achieve by way of doing M, while all along monitoring both herlhis
perceptual experiences , i.e., seeing, hearing, and tasting, and herlhis acting inion
the world and its states and events. In continually attending to and acting in the
world, we sustain an ongoing, multiple, and modifying flow of Intentional states
and events, a mental directedness or aboutness that links our cognition to the
world through the physical agency of our bodies. (Byers 1999)
Interestingly, Byers concept of Intentional ity and States of Consciou sness can be
combined with McClintock 's idea ofIntersectionality . Doing so provides a means of
illustrating the various points of intersection between an individual and hislher
surroundings as well as a means of understanding how that individual managed these
interactions. This combined concept has the additional bonus of utilizing an established
historical approach to colonialism . Perhaps , as a result, it can help to convince more
traditional historians to accept the approach presented in this thesis and to accept the
value of archaeological evidence to what many believe is their field. This
interdisciplinary approach can benefit those researching and writing in both discipline s.
As noted earlier, the goal of this chapter is to outline how an agency based
method of approaching colonialism /imperialism in the context of the story of Placentia 's
New Fort, was developed . The idea was, through the discipline of Archaeology , to
identify and contextualize the actions of agents of empire within the historical and
environmental conditions which had been defined as the entirety of the external
influences the agents experienced. The external influences in this instance are the actions
of other individua ls than those responsible for constructing and designing the New Fort
and the environment of Placentia . When applied to other sites any documented influences
could be utilized instead . What is vital, however , is not just that these influences are
incorporated into investigations of colonialism/imperialism, but that one recognizes that
the individuals being studied were actively managing the impact of these influences in the
ways they believed were best suited to their particular situation . So, to fill in the variables
identified by Byers in the context of the designers and builders of the New Fort:
They thought about the threat of attack , while hoping to successfully
defend Placentia, and fearing that the harshness of the climate and scarce
resources of construction materials and manpower may happen to prevent
their intention of getting unlimited access to the cod fisher which they
intended to achieve by way of building a fort.
By combining this final theory with the theories of Giddens and Bell, the theoretical
approac h for this thesis has been developed . The question now is, exactly how will these
combined theories be applied in this analysis and why? Clearly some basic parameter s
for the overall analysis have to be estab lished.
The first parameter is that the actions of agents involved in imperial and colonial
activities were the result of the agents ' own abilities to decide what course of action was
most likely to best meet their own goals given the existence of external factors which
could help or hinder their efforts to do so. This is very much a Giddensian goal-based
approach .
The second parameter is that the broad motivations behind the actions of these
agents must be understood through means other than archaeo logical data, since the
archaeological record is too incomplete to be a reliable source of doing so. This
requirement , based on Bell's writings, is satisfied in the case of this analysis as the
reasons behind the settling and defending of Placentia by the English are well
docume nted in primary sources .
The third parameter , also coming from Bell's work, is the concept that the
activities undertaken by the agents in question must be broadly similar . This rule is
satisfied in this analysis by the fact that there was considerab le regularity and similarity in
the methods of military architecture utilized during the eighteenth century . These methods
are well documented and any deviations from them will be visible in the archaeological
record .
The final parameter is that all of the discussion about the actions undertaken by
these colonial/imperial agents must be localized within the geographical and historical
context in which they took place . This is to satisfy Byers ' concept of States of
Consciousness because these states are directly linked to the time and place in which the
agents being examined existed . This also fits with McClintock's concept of
Intersectionality , which established that various factors actually interact at points of
intersection and that it is these interactions which contribute to the shaping of a result.
In summary , the concept of agency as understood by Giddens , which conceives
the actions of individuals as being neither completely free nor completely constrained , is
goals- based . It provides the foundation for the entire analytical framework used in this
thesis. From Bell comes the idea that the reason for change in structures lies in the ideas
and decisions of individuals, but what the motivations behind these ideas and decisions
were can only be known in circumstances when evidence other than archaeological data
is available . Lastly, based on a reading of Byers and McClintock , this analysis holds that
to utilize material culture as evidence through which to examine the links between the
world and human agency, it is necessary always to be mindful of the States of
Consciousness of the individuals being discussed as well as how their States of
Consciousness intersected with the environment in which they lived.
The four core parameters must be kept in mind when attempting to apply this
method to archaeological investigations of the actions of colonial agents . They will be
ever-present in the following analysis of the design and construction of the New Fort in
Placentia , Newfoundland .
2.4 CONCLUSION
In summary , three primary points must be remembered . The first is that , at
present , traditiona l historical approaches to studying colonialism/imperialism are making
little headway in finding methods of overcoming many of the contentious issues
associated with the topic despite a great deal of scholarship in the last three decades.
Second, some archaeologists have already made attempts to work their way into the study
of colonialism /imperialism and to present their own interpretations of how best to
approach the topic, but these approaches have had varying degrees of acceptance and
success . Lastly, by modifying several different theories about the nature of agency which
have already been utilized by archaeologists to suit their own studies of the actions of
agents of empire , this analysis will provide a new, less contentious method of coming to
understand why certain actions were taken by agents of empire and what the motivations
behind them were . That said, it is possible to move on and actually illustrate how this
method can be applied by discussing how the design and construction of the English New
Fort were influenced by the threat of enemy attack and the environment of Placentia
itself.
Chapter 3: Historical Overview
The history of Placentia is one of struggle and conflict. From the very beginning
of its existence , the settlement was at the centre of a European struggle for global
economic and military dominance . It is, therefore , only natural that its development was
significantly influenced by these conflicts . The following historical overview will provide
the broad historical context in which subsequent analysis of the New Fort fortifications at
Placentia will take place . Consequently, rather than outlining specific details regarding
the New Fort's design and construction and how these were impacted by external
influences, this chapter will comprise a general historical narrative of Placentia 's
development, concentrating on its military character.
Before diving into the early history of Placentia , one should note that while a
number of secondary sources were consulted including Nicholas Landry 's 2008
Plaisance, Terre-Neuve 1650 - 1713: Une colonie fran caise en Amerique and Frederick
J. Thorpe's "Fish, Forts and Finance: The Politics of French Construction at Placentia
1699-17/0 ", CHA Historical Papers, 1971, there are three which constitute the lion 's
share of the English language scholarly research on this topic : Jean-Pierre Proulx 's 1979,
The Military History of Placentia: A Study ofthe French Fortifications; D. W. Prowse 's
1895, A History of Newfoundland from the English, Colonial and Foreign Records and
Michael McCarthy 's 1973, A History of Plaissance and Placentia 1501-1970. Since the
principal focus of this thesis is the later, post 1713 English occupation of the site, these
secondary sources should suffice to outline the earlier French presence at Placentia . Later ,
when discussing the history of the English military occupation, there will be a heavy
reliance on the primary documentary record, largely from the Colonia l Office .
Unfortunately, these three sources pose some challenges . They sometimes
disagree on details such as dates and interpretations . Even more frustrating is the fact that
it is difficult to weigh the reliability of the individual contradictions because the
information is often not documented , such as in the case of McCarthy who provides no
in-text citations at all. As a result, when different facts and perspectives are presented by
these sources, each will be noted for the sake of completeness and accuracy. That said,
Proulx, as well as being the most recent study, is by far the best cited of these works and
is, therefore , taken to be the most reliable of the three. Clear ly, the early history of
Placentia is still in need of some devoted academic attention but this is not the purpose of
this thesis .
3.1 THE EARLY YEARS
The first record of European visitation to Placentia was in 150I by the Portuguese
brothers and explorers Gaspar and Miguel Cortreal (McCarthy 1973: 43). Impressed with
its proximity to large fish stocks , its protective harbour and the large cobble stone beach
(see Appendix I) perfect for drying their fish, Placentia quickly became a favourite site
for seasonal fishermen . The climate was milder than that on either Newfound land's
western coast or the eastern shore of the Avalon Peninsula and the local waters provided a
ready supply of herring for bait fish (Lynch 1976: 4). In addition to its favourable climate
and location, the cobble beaches located on either side of Placentia 's Harbour Gut
provided an excellent area to split and dry fish (Lynch 1976: 4) . With such natural
advantages to offer seasonal fisherman , it is no surprise that Placentia readily became a
popular centre of the industry .
Newfoundland fish quickly found its way into the marketplaces of Europe. For
example , by 1507, a tax had been placed in Portugal on imported cod and records from
1509 show that fish from "Newland", namely Newfoundland , was selling in Rouen,
France (Proulx 1979: 7-8) . By the end of the sixteenth century , large fleets of seasonal
fishing vessels were gathering in the harbour at Placentia to land and process their catches
as evidenced by a report given by two English Captains , Whyte and Jones , in 1594. It
stated that over sixty vessels crewed by French and Spanish Basques, Frenchmen and
Portuguese sailors had gathered in Placentia harbour to set up their seasonal bases of
operation of catching and processing cod fish (McCarthy 1973a: 42). All of these fishing
vessels , at the time, were operating independent of any government , but with a fortune to
be made from the Newfoundland fishery, that soon changed (Lynch 1976: 5).
The first country to take an interest in establishing a permanent settlement in
Placentia was France. As early as 1603 Samuel de Champlain had suggested building a
colony to monopolize the fishing industry, the profitability of which was by then well
known in Europe (McCarthy 1973a: 43). Shortly thereafter, M. de Sainte-Catherine
proposed a system for colonising North America which relied on using Placentia and
Cape Breton as ports to which supplies and people could be shipped and then
redistributed to inland settlements (Proulx 1979: 9-10). Aside from providing an
excellent harbour, which was also ice free, Placentia offered a good location for a military
base from which the French could work to force the English out of the Newfoundland cod
trade (Proulx 1979: 10-11). It was vital to secure the Newfoundland fishery from the
English as France 's local seas no longer could meet the demands of the predominantly
Roman Catholic fish markets in France, let alone the rest of Europe . As well, the
Newfoundland fishery represented the best available "nursery for seamen" for the French
navy to call on in times of war (Thorpe 1971: 2). These very early arguments in favour of
settlement appear to have fallen on deaf ears as there were to be no official attempts to
establish a French colony in Placentia in the first half of the seventeenth century .
By the mid 1600s, the English presence in Newfoundland posed a serious
challenge to the French fishing interests . Following the granting ofa royal charter to the
Newfoundland Company in 1610, the English fishing interests had started to focus
attention on settling the eastern shore of the Avalon Peninsula in order to protect their
access to the fish stocks in the area . Facing the prospect of the English taking control of
Newfoundland , which by 1651 had an official English Governor and small settlements in
places like Cupids , Conception Bay, Ferryland , St. John 's and Renews, the French
resolved to colonize Placentia and to establish their dominance in the region (proulx
1979: 9). This need was highlighted by a number of English attacks on French fishing
vessels in the area . As a result, in 1655 Le Sieur de Kereon began an abortive campaign at
the French Court to establish a permanent settlement at Placentia to consolidate France 's
various territorial holdings on the island of Newfoundland. This effort failed due to
reports of the harsh climate and poor soil conditions of the region as well as domestic
protests in St. Malo, political pressure and intrigue at the Court (Proux 1979: 12).
However , with such favourable qualitie s for, "defence against the enemy...and [the]
practical advantage as a trading and fishing port" it was only a matter of time until the site
would be utilized as an outpost of empire (Prowse 1895: 181).
By 1660, Louis XIV was convinced that a permanent French settlement at
Plaisance (placentia ) was a necessity . That year, he named Nicholas Gargot de la
Rochette the first and, as it turned out, only, Comte de Plaissance . He also appointed him
Governor of Newfoundland. A grizzled veteran of colonial combat in Acadia , the one
legged Gargot , who had visited Placent ia in 1651 onboard the French Privateer "
Leopard", was given the responsibili ty of establishing a settlement (McCarthy 1973: 44-
45). This initial attempt , however , failed due to political squabbling at the French Court
and pressure from many well to do merchants referring to themselves as, "corps de
marchands , superbes et riches" and resulted in only a small group of settlers being
transported to Newfoundland , the fate of whom is unknown (Proulx 1979: 13). In 1662,
the King personally endorsed Gargot , removing political pressure from him, which in tum
allowed the beleaguered Comte de Plaissance to send a second expedition to Placentia
(Proux 1979: 13).
3.1 A TROUBLED COLONY
Amid political outcries from the English, a colonizing force left France for
Newfoundland in 1662 (Proulx 1979: 13-14). This force consisting of two ships "Aigle
d'Or " and "Fluste Royale", 30 soldiers and about 50 settlers , was under the command of a
Breton Nobleman , Le Sieur Thalour Du Perron who acted as Lieutenant-governor under
the authority of Governor Gargot (McCarthy 1973a: 46-47) . The goals of this expedition
were nothing less than to establish a permanent French presence through which to possess
the land, to contro l the fishing trade, to produce as much revenue as possible and,
hopefully, to limit the influence of the English (Proulx 1979: 13-14).
When the expedition arrived in Placentia harbour, it discovered that two
Englishmen , Isaac Oethick and a Mr. Mullins , had already established their own private
"plantations." They were quickly removed from their lands to make room for the French
colonists (Prowse 1895: 178-179). In addition to these unofficial colonizers , the French
found a small fort, built by either Basque and English fishermen around 1655 (Lynch
1976: 9) or by the French colonists sent two years earlier by Gargot in his first failed
attempt at colonization . Du Perron quickly took possession of that structure as well
(Proulx 1979: 13-14). Once Perron and his soldiers were sheltered in the most basic of
fortifications and a fledgling comm unity established on the southern side of the Placentia
Gut, the French finally had their colony (Proulx 1979: 14). Survival, however , was
dependent on a number of factors including sufficient supplies, soldiers and money
supplied by France to keep the colony growing .
As in the past , nothin g seemed to go quite as planned at Placentia . Before 1662
was out problem s began to surface. The details of the events between the fall of 1662 and
the arrival of reinforcem ents in the spring of 1663 are unclear . What documentary
evidence is available provides, at best, a sketchy picture of what happened and at worst a
complete fiction. M.J . McCarth y offers a colourful narrative of what befell the
beleaguered residents that winter in his 1973 work A History of Plaissance and Placentia
1501-1970, but does not cite his sources (McCarthy 1973: 3-4). It is possible , however ,
that he based it on the acco unts provided by the historian C. Millon in Aventure du
Rochelais Nicolas Gargot dit "Jambe de Bois " publi shed in 1928 which , accord ing to
Jean-Pierre Proulx , are themselve s based on, " ...fictionalized ...data in his (Millon's)
possession and presented ...as Gargot ' s notes " (Proulx 1979: 14). In the interests of
completeness, however, a summary of these supposed events follows.
From the start of his term as Lieutenant-Governor Du Perron ' s youth affected his
judgement and rankled his subordin ates . After arriving in Placentia , he appar ently took
little interest in the runn ing of his nascent colony, preferr ing to hike into the wood s to
hunt for game with his younger brother and the expedition' s chaplain (McCarthy 1973b :
3-4). The result of this lack of leader ship was a growin g sense of discont ent amon g the
rank and file soldiers who, in late fall of 1662 mutinied . Waiting until the governor had
gone hunting , the soldier s then murdered their officers and took contro l of the fort. When
the governor returned he and his broth er were cut down without warnin g by a volley of
musketry from the rebels. The chaplain, who was wounded by the surprise attack , fled to
the woods . He eventuall y died of his wound s and exposure and when his body was
recovered by the rebels they mutilated it so they could blame his death on natives so as to
ward off any anger on the part of the civilian settlers (McCarthy 1973: 4b).
The winter of 1662-63 saw the colony fall into a state of total anarchy as the rebels
spent their time drinking wine, raping women and murdering any man who attempted to
stop them (McCarthy 1973: 4b) . The spring brought the possibility of retribution as
reinforcements were due from France and being keenly aware of this fact, the soldiers
attempted to flee to the English . Nevertheless, some of them were eventually captured
and sent to Quebec for trial (McCarthy 1973: 4). Regardless of the veracity of this story,
what is clear is that some kind of major rebellion occurred at Placentia during this time
and the colony was effectively destroyed as a result (Proulx 1979: 14).
Because of the mutiny and the subsequent abandonment of any serious efforts at
permanent settlement during the winter, the actual date of continual occupation of
Placentia by the French is better set as 1663 when reinforcements from France arrived
(Proulx 1979: 14). In the spring of 1663, Gargot, sent new soldiers and supplies under the
command of a temporary Lieutenant-Governor, a line officer named Bellot dit
Lafontaine, who governed "badly " between 1663 and 1666/7. At that point he was either
recalled or also murdered by the colonists (McCarthy 1973: 46-47a). Proulx notes that
Lafontaine was recalled on December 8, 1666 as a result of the, "negligence and the abuse
of his power" (Proulx 1979: 14). This appears to be the more likely of the two
possibilities. Sadly, it appeared that despite the king making special allowances for the
colony and even offering to accept any English settlers who would swear allegiance to
France, the colony, now ostensibly in its fifth year, continued to flounder (Proulx 1979:
14).
With the colony in desperate shape, desperate action was required . Louis XIV now
took a personal interest in making sure that Placentia would develop into an economic
and military base secure and strong enough to challenge the English in the region. To that
end, a new governor , La Palme, was sent to Placentia with instructions from the King to
do just that (Proulx 1979: 14-15). Louis XIV made it clear to him that, in particular ,
colonists were to be encouraged to work the soil so that the colony might become self-
sufficient and the fishermen were to be defended . To achieve these goals 150 soldiers ,
weapons and supplies were sent to Placentia (Proulx 1979: 15). Little else is known of La
Palme's time in Placentia although he seems to have restored a degree of calm. It was his
successor who truly turned the small colony into a success .
3.3 THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCCESS
In 1670, the new governor , Sieur de la Poippe, arrived from France (McCarthy 1973:
47-48a) . Poippe had a long and relatively successful term, taking pains not only to
promote the economic growth of the colony, but also to build a functioning societal
hierarchy to bring order and structure to the settlers ' everyday lives (Proulx 1979: 19-20) .
Unfortunately , his fourteen year stay in Placentia coincided with war with Holland (1672-
1678) with the result that much of the promised support from France never arrived
(Proulx 1979: 20). Worse still, Prowse claims that the settlement was attacked at least five
times by English "buccaneers" who stripped the inhabitants of their possessions and
ruined what buildings and agricultural cultivation existed (Prowse 1895: 182). In spite of
these setbacks, the fishing trade continued to grow and by 1684 was prospering in the
area (McCarthy 1973 : 51-52a) . Sadly for La Poippe, any part he played in the success of
the fishing industry was overshadowed by accusations made by the colonists that he was
illegally collecting "le tiers", a tax on trade with New England merchants. Consequently,
he was recalled to France that year (McCarthy 1973a: 51-52) . With yet another
ignominious end to a governor 's rule, it was time for another man to have his turn.
The next governor, Antoine Parat, proved to be even more unpopular with the locals
than his predecessors . Immediately after his arrival in 1685, he took it upon himself to
instigate a strongly anti-English policy aimed at ending the successful trade with New
England . The local people of Placentia were not at all supportive of this position and even
the French Government went so far as to reprimand him for his questionable treatment of
a Boston merchant in 1687 (McCarth y 1973a: 52). This unpopularity continued to grow
throughout his time as governor. According to McCarthy, it reached a climax in 1689
when it was revealed that Parat was openly living with the wife of one of the settlers and
that he endorsed the local priest's desire to take a mistress (McCarthy 1973a: 53).
When not busy beating up New England merchants or sleeping with settlers ' wives,
Parat did attempt to make improvements in the economy and defences of the colony . His
success can be judged by a 1690 report submitted by a group of London merchants in
which they claimed that the French had beaten them out of the Newfoundland trade and
that France now totally dominated the European fish trade (Canada 1962: 45). By this
time, the Newfoundland fishery was as important to France's economy as were Caribbean
sugar, slaves , furs and the Mediterranean-Levant trade . It was, therefore , a valuable asset
to be defended, something that Parat did well (Thorpe 1971: I).
In terms of defence, Parat 's success was more modest. He began in 1685 by
constructing a small fortification , little more than a battery, called "le fort de Plaissance ",
on the northern side of the Gut (Lynch 1976: 12). Two years later, a small military force
arrived under the command of the King's Lieutenant , Louis de Pastour de Costebelle ,
who was to act as Parat 's second in command (McCarthy 1973a: 52). Aside from the
soldiers and their personal equipment which arrived that year, an engineer and heavy
ordinances also arrived with orders from the Court instructing Parat, with the assistance
of the colonists , to improve "le fort de Plaissance " (Proulx 1979: 21-22) .
The motivation behind this increase in military force was the War of the Grand
Alliance (1689-1697) in Europe, known in North America as King William 's War.
Beginning in 1689, this war brought France and England into direct conflict on the
continent and made official the hostilities which had already existed in the colonies for
some time (Canada 1962:45). In light of its now relatively strong military presence and
solidification as the centre of France 's lucrative Atlantic fishing industry, it was
becoming increasingly likely that if a major armed conflict took place, Placentia would be
at its heart (Proulx 1979: 21) . All that remained to be seen was whether the little colony
could survive such a conflict.
The inhabitants of Placentia did not have to wait long for war to arrive on their
doorstep . In 1690, the French were taken by surprise when English attackers , who
ironically had been guided by a number of men whom Parat had uncharacteristically
welcomed a few weeks earlier, came overland and stormed the small colony (Proulx
1979: 24-25) . Parat's previous kindness was not exactly reciprocated by the English as
they later tortured him to learn the location of any valuables the garrison and settlers
might have hidden before the attack (McCarthy 1973: 62-63a) . Aside from the wounds
Parat received in the course of his torture, the human cost of the attack was quite minimal
as only two soldiers were killed . Constabelle was wounded (Proulx 1979: 24).
The material losses, however , were terrible . After occupying Placentia for
approximately six months the English left, carrying off anything of value including food,
furniture , fishing equipment and personal belonging s (Proulx 1979: 24-25) . Before they
left, they took the time to destroy the rudimentary defences and then sailed away in two
vessels they had captured in the harbour , thus leaving the inhabitants to the mercy of the
harsh climate and their own devices (McCarthy 1973: 62-63a) . It was only through the
assistance of the Basque fishing fleet which arrived in the spring that the colony survived
(Gordon 1969: 4-5). Despite this much needed assistance , it was not long before trouble
surfaced as animosity grew between the colonists and the Basque fishermen .
The Basque were angered by the presence of a military authority in a region once free
of government meddling . As well, conflict emerged between the colonists and the
Basque, who were annual visitors rather than permanent residents , over the ownership of
beach plots . The disputes came to a head in August 1691 (Proulx 1979: 35). Although the
46
"mutin y" quickly died down, Governor Parat had had enough and returned to France ,
ostensibly to argue his case against the Basques, but much more likely to simply escape
the madness which had overtaken the colony (McCarthy 1973: 64). As it turned out,
Parat's decision to return home foreshadowed his official recall as his replacement ,
Jacques-Francois de Monbeton De Brouillon had already been appointed and dispatched
with the goal of taking office in June (Proulx 1979: 26-27). Brouillon ' s departure ,
however , was delayed and with Parat gone, de Costebelle became the de-facto governor
of Placentia for a year (Gordon 1969: 5).
Faced with continuing civil strife and bereft of any recognizable defences, it was only
through Costebelle 's own hard work that Placentia managed to survive the year. After
patching up relations with the Basque, the interim-governor re-established order among
the inhabitants by executing a particularly obstinate individual named Doyen as a warning
(Proulx 1979: 26). With civil order re-establi shed, Costebelle then turned his attention to
defending his little colony. He ordered new fortifications to be built around the town
(McCarthy 1973: 64) . This decision proved to be a wise one for less than a month after
the palisade around town was completed ; a party of Englishmen arrived with the intent of
sacking Placentia once again. On seeing the rudimentary wall, they decided not to attack
(Proulx 1979: 26). Finally, with the arrival of reinforcements from France (Proulx 1979:
26-27) and Acadia (McCarthy 1973: 64a) , Constabelle was able to report in December of
1690 that the conditions , both social and military, had improved (Proulx 1979: 34-35).
In 1691, the new governor of Placentia, Le Sieur de Saint-Ovide de Brouillon , finally
arrived in Placentia and quickly went about his ordered task, to establish Placentia as a
military strong point (McCarthy 1979: 64-65a) . Situated on the northern side of the
harbour's entrance (see Appendix I), Brouillan' s Fort Louis became the single largest fort
to be built by the French in Placentia (Prou lx 1979:35-36). That said, the fort was still too
small and too low to defend the approaches to the harbour (Lynch 1976: 12).
Nevertheless, it was able to render the Gut nearly impassable to any ship (Proulx 1979:
35-36). In 1692, a visiting nobleman, Baron LaHontan , described Fort Louis as, " ...nearly
300 paces in circumference and the fortification is both bad and irregular . It consists of
four curtains of stone plied up between stakes ...[and]...Only two bastions , built the same
way as the stone curtains"(McCarthy 1979: 65). While not a magnificent piece of military
architecture , it was at least superior to any previous defensive structure built in the
colony.






Figure 1.1:PlanDu Fort De PlaisanceEt Des Environs, TerreNeuve 1709
These new fortifications were soon tested for in 1692 Placentia was under attack yet
again . This attack was not a surprise like the one in 1690. In fact, the residents had prior
knowledge of the intended confrontation . In response to the threat that Placentia 's new
found military strength posed to their access to the fishery, the English had delivered a
notice in the dark of night a few months prior stating "Avec Ie temps, je me veux
m'establir icy" (Proulx 1979: 27) . The attack carne in the fall and was led by Commodore
Williams who arrived with five ships. He made it clear his intention was to take the town
(McCarthy 1973a: 64). Faced with an attacking force of between 700 and 800 English
soldiers waiting to come ashore and with only 50 soldiers in the garrison, Brouillan was
forced to tum to the community for help (Proulx 1979: 28-29) .
49
LaHontan, the same man who provided the above description of Fort Louis, gathered
together a "Fishermans' Brigade" and successfully fended off an English landing at La
Fountaine which today is known as Freshwater (McCarthy 1973a: 65). This abortive
landing, however, was only the beginning of the attack and after a day of negotiations
between the two sides, Williams brought his fleet into cannon range of Fort Louis (Proulx
1979: 28-29) . The following bombar dment did significant damage to the town, but the
fort remained relatively unscathed . Not wanting to risk his ships or men in a further
attack, Williams withdrew by the end of September (Proulx 1979: 29).
Despite having successfully repelled Commodore William 's attack, the incident had
made it clear that Fort Louis was situated too low for its guns to reach The Road, the
approach to the Gut, when its guns were at their proper elevation (McCarthy 1973a:66).
While the English had been successfully prevented from entering the Gut by cables strung
from Fort Louis to the southern side of the channel which were defended by the very
effective southern facing guns of the fort, Brouillon realized that something had to be
done to prevent ships from sailing into bombardment range of the fort (Proulx 1979:36) .
To this end he began construction of a four gun battery on the south shore of the Gut as
well as a battery on Castle Hill (See Appendix 1) to the north, which he called the
"Gaillardin", This was augmented by the addition of the Royal Redoubt in the same area
in 1693 (Thorpe 1971:4).
These structures , including Fort Louis, were meant solely to serve as temporary
positions while masonry structures were built along a more traditional French continental
style (Thorpe 1971: 3). However , they served the French well when in 1692 another large
English fleet arrived . This attack, consisting initially of 19 ships and expanded with the
arrival of five more shortly after , was commanded by Admiral Francis Wheeler . Again,
the English were forced to depart, this time without even attacking Fort Louis or making
an attempt on the harbour (Proulx 1979: 29-39) . While this can be partly attributed to
poor weather and Wheeler 's unwillingness to risk his ships in light of the losses the Royal
Navy had experienced elsewhere that year, the fact that Brouillon was able to fire on his
enemy from Castle Hill certainly contributed to the English Admiral's retreat (Proulx
1979: 29-30) .
The English attacks between 1690 and 1693 led to a recognition by the French that
they needed to secure Placentia as it was the only defended port from which their fishing
fleets in Newfoundland could operate and place where naval vessels could safely stop for
repairs during an Atlantic crossing (Thorpe 1971: 3-4) . Between 1694 and 1695
Brouillon , assisted by Jacques L'Hermitte a former engineer corps member , put his
efforts into doing just that (Canada 1962:45) . Part of his efforts focused on rebuilding
Fort Louis using stone and wood. The goal was not only to improve the defensibility of
the fort, but also to cope with the constant erosive forces of the sea (Thorpe 1971: 4).
Despite these efforts , a lack of supplies, the poor quality of his soldiers and the
uncooperative nature of the inhabitants made the task of putting the colony's defences in
order very difficult (Proulx 1979: 30-32).
3.4 ON THE OFFENSIVE
Following this period of relative calm, Brouillon finally was able to reverse the trend
and take the fight to the English ; after all, the War of the Grand Alliance was still
underway . In 1696, two attacks were launched against St. John 's , the main English centre
in Newfoundland . The first, under the sole command of Brouillon , was successfully
repelled by the English (McCarthy 1973a: 67-68). This attack, however , had been meant
to be part of a much larger offensive which was to include forces from Canada under the
command of Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville. This situation was largely Brouillon 's own
fault. The attack was jointly funded by d'Iberville, the King and Brouillon who was
underwritten by the ship owners of St. Malo (Williams 1987). Brouillon , however , had
second thoughts and in an attempt to cut d'Iberville out of the expected profits of the raid,
he had gone ahead without the Canadians . Nevertheless , although his business partner
was furious, the two agreed to re-Iaunch the operation , this time together (Williams
1987).
This joint attack succeeded not only in the taking and burning St. John 's , but also in a
series of fruitful raids all along the coast of the Avalon Peninsula inflicting an estimated
200 casualties , taking 700 prisoners , wiping out 27 outposts and completely destroying
the English Newfoundland fishery (Proulx 1979:32-33). Despite this impressive victory ,
the French were unable to hold St. John 's as they lacked the necessary resources and men.
Knowing that retribution would be soon in coming, they decided to return to Placentia to
protect it in the event of an attack (Proulx 1979: 33). Fortunate ly, the War of the Grand
Alliance ended in 1697 with the signing of the Peace ofRyswick and the threat of an
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English attack on the colony quickly diminished . With the official end of hostilities , the
pugnacious Brouillon retired due to failing health (McCarthy 1973a: 69) . Despite keeping
the title of governor, Brouillon 's duties were taken over by Joseph de Monic, who
effectively commanded the colony for several years (McCarthy 1973a: 69).
The new peace did not, however , mark an end to French ambitions to fortify
Placentia . The raid on St. John 's and the defeat of two English attacks had proven that the
colony was a valuable military asset and the fish trade continued to pay dividends ,
making the prospect of losing Placentia unpalatable (Thorpe 1971: 4). As such, increased
funds began to become available to the colony and a new drive to establish Placentia as a
stronghold was initiated during this time of relative peace . This program concentrated
mostly on improving the already existing structures, such as raising the ramparts of Fort
Louis, building additional outer works for the Royal Redoubt and linking all of the
positions with palisaded entrenchments to improve communication and mobility (Proulx
1979: 39-40) .
By 170I, the defences of Placentia appeared to be in an acceptable state. Fort Royal
Redoubt , or Fort Royal , was completed except for a few coverings. Fort Louis, although
constructed almost solely of wood and earth, mounted 28 cannons and there were a
number of outlying batteries all linked by trenches or palisades (Proulx 1979: 41-42). By
1702, however, conditions began to quickly deteriorate due to a lack of proper
maintenance and the harshness of the climate . The relentless force of waves and weather
had weakened Fort Louis so badly over time that it finally collapsed in a storm that year
(Thorpe 1971:4). This disaster finally convinced King Louis to order the fort to be rebuilt
of stone and during the summer of 1703 efforts continued to accomplish this task while
the old earth and palisades walls were allowed to continue to deteriorate (Proulx 1979 52-
53). That same year, de Monic was relieved and a new governor, Daniel Auger de
Subercase, arrived to take command of the colony (McCarthy 1973a: 69) . No one could
have known then that Placentia was entering its last days as a French possession .
3.5 THE COMING OF THE END
After taking his post, Subercase reported that the palisades around Fort Louis had
rotted through . There was no time to waste in strengthening the defences as the War of
Spanish Succession had once more brought England and France back into open contlict.
Subercase set out immediately to tackle the challenge . Nevertheless, McCarthy insists
that these efforts mounted to little owing to a lack of funds, available material and
suitable labour (McCarthy 1979b: 4) As well, he accuses both de Monic and de
Subercase of utilizing what stone, lime and masons were available for their own housing
purposes rather than to repair the defensive works (McCarthy 1973b: 4).
A number of firsthand accounts , however, seem to contradict this assessment. Two
provided by French deserters found by the English stand out. The first dates from
September 1703. It comprises depositions of two men, Laville and Belrose, who stated
that there were 38 guns in the lower fort and over 3000 soldiers and sailors in the town
and on two men of war in the harbour (Hussey 1703). The second account comes from
John Grimma and Guilliaume Lassuse, who claimed that a new battery had been built at
the mouth of the bay (Anonymous 1703a). Clearly , these statements , coming from
disenchanted French men, even today must be considered with some suspicion . The
English evidently were suspicious for they sent a party of spies to verify these statements.
Returning from their excursion on November 19, 1703, the English spies reported that
indeed the fortifications had been improved , including the addition of two new watch
towers near the upper fort (Fort Royal) and the construction of masonry walls, measuring
16 feet in height and 8 feet in width, at the upper fort (Anonymous 1703b). A second
party of spies was dispatched . Returning on March 23n1 1704, it too confirmed the
statements of the deserters and the earlier party of spies (Anonymous 1704a). Regardless
of how prepared , or unprepared , the French were for an attack in 1703, the defences
proved at least sufficient to scare off two English warships in March of that year,
although the presence of two French naval vessels probably also contributed to their
withdrawal (Proulx 1979: 45).
Not one to resort to the defensive , Subercase retaliated by organizing an attack on St.
John 's , the principal English military base and port. In October 1703, he and his troops
occupied the town for over a month, although they failed to seize the Fort (Proulx
1979:45-46) . Upon returning to Placentia , Subercase decided to focus even more attention
on improving its defences . The efforts lavished on Fort Louis in the summer of 1704
included extending it to the east and the south and rebuilding its southern facing wall
completely in stone (Proulx 1979: 52-53) .
Throughout this period spies and deserters from Placentia continued to relay
information to the English and their accounts illustrate the results of this large rebuilding
project. For example , the returned prisoner Edward Pickering stated on September 6,
1704 that there were, "continually masons working in order to build the lower fort with
stone" (Anonymous 1704b). Neverthele ss, the work must have progressed slowly as two
French deserters who arrived at the end of September claimed that the walls of the fort
were still only palisades on the landward side and that the seaward walls were simply sod
works (Anonymous 1704c). Another deserter , arriving on November 25111 stated that very
shortly a wall of "lime and stone" was soon going to be built and that the lower fort now
mounted 35 pieces of artillery (Anonymous 1704d). All of these accounts appear to
confirm that work on rebuilding the walls of Fort Louis with stone progressed at a snail' s
pace . Proulx states that this stone work was still underway in 1707 and by 1709 no real
work was being undertaken to further improve Fort Louis or the defences of Placentia as
a whole (Proulx 1979: 56-57).
Even if the French intentions of making Placentia a stronghold were hampered by a
lack of masons and stone, the English were still very concerned by the threat the French
colony posed to them. As early as 1704, there was talk in English circles of the
importance of taking Placentia to prevent it from being used as a staging ground for
attacks against the fishery and St. John's , as it had been in 1696 (Merchants Trading to
Newfoundland 1704) . These calls for action were echoed throughout 1705 as many
English officials believed that it was of the "greatest importance [that] the place be
reduced for the good of England 's fishery" (Merrett 1705). Finally, in 1708, the English
decided to blockade the entrance to Placentia. Rather than speeding up reinforcement of
the defences , this offensive move resulted in the French effectively terminating any work
on the fort at Placent ia (Proulx 1979: 47). They had other things on their mind.
In 1706, Subercase had retired and been replaced by Constabelle and it would be his
sad task to eventually tum the colony over to the English (McCarthy 1973a: 70). The
English naval blockade of Placentia not only limited the ability ofConstabelle to build his
fort, but also to feed his people who, along with nearly 500 returned prisoners of war,
were beginning to starve as early as January of 1708 (Proulx 1979: 48). Despite these
terrible conditions , Constabelle lead a surprise attack on St. John 's on January 1st, 1708
(McCarthy 1973a: 70). Although successful , this offensive, like its predecessors , was not
sustainable and after destroying the fortifications and pilfering anything of value, the
French were forced to return to their garrison in Placentia (Proulx 1979: 48-49).
Short on supplies and reinforcement s, Constabelle could do little but sit in Placentia
and wait. From 1709 onwards , as war raged in Europe over the succession to the throne of
Spain, and French - English hostilities continued in North America , Placentia was
relegated to acting as a passive threat to the English. Even when reinforcements finally
arrived in 171I, after the fall of Acadia at Port Royal, the French at Placentia chose not to
undertake any further attacks against the English (Proulx 1979:50-51). Despite the ever
increasing impact of the English blockade , the French did manage to repel English attacks
in 1711 and 1712, but finally were forced to tum the colony over without a fight (Gordon
1969: 5).
War finally came to an end with the signing of the Treatyof Utrecht in 1713. France
had lost the war in Europe and England was determined to gain some spoils in North
America including the complete cession of Newfoundland and Acadia. This effectively
ended the French presence in Newfoundland other than limited fishing rights in coastal
waters from Cape Bonavista to Pointe Riche. In the case of Placentia, the French agreed
to remove the civilian and military population by the end of 1714 (Proulx 1979: 51-52) .
The French regime in Placentia was over. In July 1713, Governor Constabelle was
instructed by the king to run up the English flag at all French forts and to defer to any
English officer who came to Placentia (McCarthy 1973b:15). By September of 1714, the
governor had finished preparations for the evacuation of the colony and on the 23n1wrote:
We are here the 23n1 of Sept. The wind in to the N.N. east. Monsieur Ie
Chevalier de Saujon is ready to leave the port. This will be at the latest
between four and nine tomorrow morning . Everything of value is loaded for the
voyage and the entire evacuation of the troops and inhabitants .
(McCarthy 1973b: 16)
After more than half a century of occupying Placentia , the French were gone.
"Plaissance" was no more; the English had come to stay.
3.6 MUDDLING THROUGH: THE EARLY ENGLSIH YEARS
The French occupation of Placentia had been fraught with difficulties resulting
from international armed conflicts, interpersonal conflict and greed and the nature of the
local environment. The result of these realities was that, despite the extensive efforts
made to turn Placentia into a military stronghold , the colony 's forts were never reaIly up
to the task of repeIling a major attack . This assessment is borne out by a report dated
December 4, 1713 written by an English Captain , Cyprian Southack , shortly after the
English took possession of the colony. In this report he stated that both Fort Louis and
Fort Royal on Castle Hill were badly degraded and in poor repair at the time the English
took possession of Placentia (Southack 1713). Despite the poor conditions of the old
French forts, the English envisioned Placentia to be their new seat of military might in the
region. With the lessons of the last war demonstrating that St. John' s was vulnerable to
attack even at the hands of relatively weak French forces, the English moved their
headquarters from the thrice captured settlement to their newly acquired port at Placentia
(Fry 2009). With this move a new chapter began in the military history of Placentia ; one
which would prove more peaceful than the last, but equally fraught with difficulties ,
failures and fortifications .
The first man appointed to command the new English colony of Placentia was
John Moody, who arrived at his post on June the 5th, 1714 (Proulx 1971b: 120). Despite
being entrusted with the command of Placentia , Moody was not the governor but rather a
Lieutenant-Governor as Placentia had been placed under the jurisdiction of the Governor
of Nova Scotia . This remained the case until 1729 (Prowse 1895: 285-287). Moody 's
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term as Lieutenant-Governor can be summarized as abusive and corrupt. His attention
was dedicated primarily to the pursuit of enriching himself and his friends and leaving his
responsibilities for the garrison and the people of the town seriously wanting , all leading
to his recall in 1717 (Proulx 1971b: 120-121) .
Despite this rather dismal assessment , Moody did attempt to protect his new
colony as best he could in the face of England 's apathy towards the construction of
fortifications, having spent so much over the past decades on wars in Europe and North
America (Proulx 1971b: 128). Forced to work with what limited resources were available
to him, Moody resorted to pillaging the remains of Fort Royal on Castle Hill for stone in
order to rebuild collapsed sections of Fort Louis, which continued to serve as the military
and civil headquarters of Newfoundland (Proulx 1971b: 128). Such stop gap measures
were the order of the day, even after Moody's requests for action finally convinced the
Office of Ordnance to approve , in 1715, the construction ofa new fort to replace the now
truly decrepit Fort Louis (Proulx 1871b: 128). Despite plans to construct this new fort
upon land on the southern side of the Gut, opposite Fort Louis, land which Moody had
purchased in 1714 in anticipation of a new fortification , no construction took place during
his term of office (Moody 1722).
The situation on the ground in Placentia was terrible at best. Worse than the
absence of any proper fortifications was the fact that the garrison, swollen to over 300
men with the arrival of the withdrawn St. John's garrison, was bereft of proper shelter and
supplies . In 1714, these conditions resulted in a revolt by almost half of the soldiers
stationed at Placentia . Lieutenant- Governor Moody just managed to convince them to
return to duty, thereby preventing an escalation of the frustration (Campbell 1715). By
1715, the situation faced by the garrison was so poor that Moody wrote home to his
government begging for supplies and money, going so far as to plead, " for God 's sake,
don 't let me be made a meal of by the hungry soldiers" (Proulx 1971b: 131). Some relief
followed that pitiful cry, when shortly thereafter many soldiers were transferred to other
garrisons . Nevertheless , the problem of supplying Placentia continued to haunt the
remainder of Moody's governorship and for sometime thereafter . By 1717, criticism of
Moody's local real estate dealings and garrison discontent resulted in his recall . One
would expect that with such an explosive body of men present , Moody must have felt at
least some degree of relief when he was quietly replaced by Commodore Martin Purcell
(Proulx 1971b: 121).
Very little is known about Purcell. His impact on Placentia was minimal due to his
brief governorship . Before a year had elapsed, Samuel Gledhill was appointed as his
replacement and, "by the aid of the Duke of Argyle , the Earl of Islay and the assistance of
J.M, JB., &c., he kissed His Majesty 's hand as Lieutenant Governor of Placentia with
two companies offoot and Commander-in-Chiefin Newfoundland" (Chippindall191O :
114). This auspicious beginning to Gledhill's governorship was marred somewhat by the
fact that he and his family were almost killed in a shipwreck ofTFerryland in September
1719 enroute to his new post (Chippindall 1910). This near disaster somewhat
foreshadowed the rest of his time as Governor. Despite having been appointed to replace
Moody in the hope of establishing ajust administration at Placentia , Gledhill's time as
Governor proved to be just as corrupt.
Gledhill quickly became embroiled in a number of financial controversies . In his
own memoirs he speaks of issues with a William Toshack , whose land and home were
annexed in 1720 for the personal use of Gledhill and to make way for new fortifications
(ChippindaIl 19 IO: 16-17). On top of this, Gledhill appears to have been grappling with
his predecessor , Colonel Moody, over certain property and money the former governor
had left behind when he had been recalled (Chippindall 1910: 17). Proulx states that the
claims against Gledhill, which began to reach London in 1723 and led to his eventual
recall in 1728, were totally justified (Proulx 1979b). Gledhill , not surprisingly , viewed
them as a continuation of a long chain of politically and personally motivated attacks
against him and his family (ChippindaIl1910). Admittedly , such a claim is not totally
believable when it comes from the accused man's memoirs especially when they were
edited and published over a hundred years later by one of his direct descendants , but it is
within the realm of possibility. His real estate dealings aside, what is relevant to this
discussion is whether Gledhill made any significant contribution to the defences of
Placentia during his nine years in command .
Without question the most significant development to the fortifications of
Placentia during Gledhill' s stint as Governor was the construction of Fort Frederick (see
Appendix I) . Six years after the original proposal for its construction , work finally began
in 1721 and the fort was occupied shortly thereafter , taking over as the English
headquarters for Newfoundland (penny 2009 : 23) . Fort Frederick , however , was a far cry
from being a fortress. Instead, it was "a little picketed work with a stone semicircular
battery , barracks and brick guardhouse " (Richardson 1962: 6). Nonetheless , with the
condition of Fort Louis worsening by the day, this small , enclosed battery was likely an
improvement in the overall capabilities of the colony 's defences .
Despite the apparent strengthening of Placentia 's defences with the addition of
Fort Frederick , its small size and simplicity was, in some ways, a portent of the relatively
low level of effort the English were to commit in the future to defend the colony . The fort
was quite small and really only able to garrison about 50 men during peace time (Penny
2009: 19). This represented a major decrease in the strength of the garrison , a decrease
that Gledhill ascribed to the negative influence of his political enemies . He wrote in his
memoirs that, "for the Finishing Stroke Removing All the Troops Excepting his own
Company ...Impair ing the Number of the Troops from 300 to 30" (ChippindaIl 191O:
155). Additionally , the governor stated that it was due to these same "adversaryes" that
the garrison of Placentia was reduced to a defenceless state by "perferting the Current
Channel of the Governments Pay and Subsistance , Cloathing , Provisions" away from his
command (Chippindall 1910: 155). Whether these allegations of politically motivated
neglect of the garrison are true or not, it is clear that the soldiers were in a continuous
state of need and suffered from constant supply difficulties , just as they had under
Moody . Gledhill even reported that in, " the first Year of his Government (Glehill's), the
Garrison was reduc 'd to very Great want of Provisions, Parly Occasion 'd by the Loss of
his Majestyes Storeship" (Chippindall 1910: 114).
Despite these difficulties in readying the defences of Placentia and the
unscrupulous administrations of Moody and Gledhill , there were signs by the 1720s that
the former French colony was once again beginning to playa major role in the society
and economy of the region. The completion of Fort Frederick appears to have signal1ed a
renewed confidence within the civilian population . Shortly thereafter , a new wave of
settlers from the British Isles established a number of businesses including a shipyard
which helped to make Placentia a major hub for vessels traveling from North America to
Europe or trading among the North Atlantic colonies (Proulx 1971b: 122). Gledhil1
clearly felt largely responsible for these improvements as he made clear in a letter in
1727, sent while in garrison at Fort Frederick to the King; "Since the Erecting FORT
FREDERICK .. . this Fishing Port, a few Years agone at loest Ebb in Repute, Can 't now
be justly stil'd Second to no one Fishing Port in al1Your Majestyes Dominions"
(ChippindaIl1910: 123). In fact, Gledhill was so proud of his contributions to the colony
he even went so far as to name one of his daughters Placentia Gledhill (Chippindall 1910:
121). With its regional, economic and logistical significance increasing one would expect
to see the efforts to defend Placentia increase proportionally . This was not the case . The
political and administrative arena for Newfoundland was to shift leaving Placentia on the
periphery .
With Gledhill removed in 1729 amidst accusations of corruption and the memory
of Moody 's similar misconduct stil1fresh in people 's minds, the English government
decided that it was time to tighten governmental controls and responsibility in the smal1
colony as wel1as in Newfoundland as a whole. The decision was made to create a new
government for Newfoundland , one based out ofSt. John's, under which Placentia would
be placed (Proulx 1971b:122). The man appointed to head this new government as
governor and commander-in-chief was Captain Henry Osborne of the Royal Navy.
Osborne quickly went about establishing justice and order in the colony and in a letter
dated October 14, 1729 he recorded that he was taking great measures to punish petty
crimes , appoint justices and ministers of the peace and even returning property in
Placentia "unjustly dispossessed for several years" by Colonel Gledhill to its original
owners (Prowse 1895: 287) .
As for the military situation in Placentia , little transpired to improve the
conditions for the men or the fortifications . Although focused on shoring up the justice
system in Newfoundland, Osborne was not ignorant of the problems in Placentia . He
recognized the need to improve the living conditions of the colony 's garrisons , including
those of the men at Placentia (Proulx 1971b: 123). These men were largely of retirement
age and under the command of a bedridden officer and themselve s. They certainly were
oflittle value in case of an attack (Proulx 1971b: 131). Before he was able to achieve
much in this regard, however , Osborne was recalled in 1731 to be replaced by a quick
succession of other governors who played little role in the development of Placentia or its
defences . Attention had shifted to St. John 's .
Even before Osborne was recalled, there is evidence which speaks to the poor
condition in Placentia . According to a report , duplicated by Osborne and originally
drafted by the garrison 's storekeeper , Edward Hopley, dated the 25th of September 1730,
the garrison comprised , "one Company of Foot consisting of Captain , Lieutenant , Ensign,
Two Serjeants , two corporals , one drum Thirty four Private Men" (Osborn 1730). Of this
company the Ensign was absent, the company 's commanding officer, Captain
Hollingsworth was "confined to his Bed by age and infirmities " and only 10 privates were
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listed (Osborn 1730). Furthermore , the surgeon , the Chaplain, the "Fort Major" and the
Lieutenan t-Governor "Gladhill" are marked as being absent from their posts (Osborn
1730). It is no surprise that the garrison was in such poor condition given the years of
neglect. As Proulx notes this was the same company that originally arrived under the
command of Samuel Gledhill in 1719 and which was by this time commanded by his son
Joseph Gledhill (Proulx 197Ib :13I ).
Fort Frederick appears to have been in an equally run-down state as the men who
were stationed there. Osborne reported in 1730 that, "the Rowball (redoubt?) withoutside
the Garrison is very much damaged by the sea", that the palisade and the storehouse were
"much decayed " due to the lack of a carpenter and the "Parapet of the Redoubt and
Chimney very much Decayed for want of masons , or Brick layer" (Osborn 1730). To add
insult to injury, he added that the entire fort was almost destroyed the following year
when a fire ravaged the small community (Gledhi ll 1731b). In the same year as this near
miss with an inferno , Joseph Gledhill implored the Duke of Newcastle to commit more
resources to the defences of Placenta as it was, "y' most considerable fishing port in
American " (Gledhill 173Ia). Despite this appeal, the sad state of both the garrison and
fort generally continued throughout the 1730s.
There were some modest improvements . In 1732, another report on Placentia
revea ls that all the previous ly absent officers were now present and that 32 men and one
Sergeant were present in the colony. As well, there was a detachment of the Royal
Regiment of Artillery numbering 14 men which had been assigned but had not yet arrived
at the time the report was drafted (Falkingham 1732). The document also included a
claim for money to pay the masons who had conducted work on the garrison which
implies that some form of maintenance was being performed on Fort Frederick
(Falkingham 1732).
Sadly, this momentary encouraging picture of the state of the defences of
Placentia quickly evaporates after further examination of other sources . In 1735, a
Commandeer Lee reviewed the garrison which had reported 32 serviceable men but,
when mustered only 17 appeared , six of whom he said belonged in a retirement hospital,
"[I]could not find above seventeen [who] could appear , out of whom about six were quite
unserviceable thro ' Age, and ' tis a pity they are not provided for in Chelsea " (Board of
Trade 1735). Lee also reported that even these few men were essentially unarmed as the
small arms in the garrison 's stores were "so bad that very few of them are serviceable "
(Board of Trade 1735). At least it seems that some maintenance had been done on Fort
Frederick as the Commander found it be in good condition, but did emphasize that it was
"so small a one" (Board of Trade 1735). It seems that Lee recognized that a larger
fortification was needed to hold Placentia in case of an attack.
There is no evidence that the garrison improved at all over the next two years
despite these disparaging reports . After another review of the garrison in 1737, Lee found
that the soldiers were now "entirely unprovided with small arms" (Philips 1737). The
return for Joseph Gledhill 's Company in that same year reported 36 men ready for
service, 4 of whom were new recruits "not yet arriv 'd " (Gledhill 1737). What this reveals
is that in the two years following Lee's first inspection in 1735 nothing had changed .
The garrison was still reporting 32 active men; the same 32 men of whom 15 did not
67
appear when the company was mustered and a further 6 of whom were too old to be of
service . If this is indeed the case , the garrison of Placentia during those two years
consisted of no more than II men fit for service none of whom was properly armed.
Furthermore , this company , having arrived with Samuel Gledhill , had by this point been
in Placentia for almost 20 years !
Lee's reports may have garnered some positive action . According to a report from
later in 1738 on the condition of the garrison prepared by Captain Philip Vanbrugh , the
new governor of Newfoundland , for the English government , the men were "in good
order, and properly cloathed and armed (Vanbrugh 1738). The report on the fortifications
was much less encouraging . Captain Vanbrugh stated that Fort Frederick had decayed
quickly over the last few years and was now, "in a wretched and defenceless condition ;
the lodging for officers and men very indifferent , and, by no means fitted against the
severe cold of the winder season" (Vanbrugh 1738). Clearly, little had changed in the
garrison or the fort since the beginning of the decade and what had changed had
deteriorated , not improved . This deterioration appears to be almost completely due to
neglect on the part of the English government and such neglect, combined with the rising
spectre of a new war with France , eventually led to cries by the populace for action .
Interestingly enough it was the security of the fishery , not fear of military
aggression that prompted demands for improvements to Placentia 's defences . These
demands came not from the inhabitants of the colony, but from, "the Corporation of
Dartmouth together with the Merchants and Principal Traders therefore in behalf of
themselves and all other Fishing and Trading to Newfoundland " (The Corporation of
Dartmouth n.d.). The petition , which appears to date from 1739 or 1740 was addressed to
"the Kings of Excellent Majesty in Council" and outlined that the merchants believed
that, "the whole trade and fishery of that Country (Newfoundland) is in the utmost
Danger there being only one small fort at Placentia with a few cannon" and that "being so
defenceless it will become as easy Prey to any Enemy who shall attack it." They cited the
precedent of the French raids of the I690s (The Corporation of Dartmouth n.d.). As a
result, they asked that new defences be built, "for the security of so valuable a trade and
nursery of seamen at such place or places as to your majesty shall see most proper" (The
Corporation of Dartmouth n.d.).
This petition to improve not only the defences of Placentia , but Newfoundland as
a whole, appeared to indicate the adoption of a new perspective and resulting initiative on
the part of the British to better defend their colonial holdings in this area . In 1744, Europe
became embroiled in another military conflict with the beginning ofthe War of Austrian
Succession . It was not long before England and France were once again enemies in
Europe and North America . In the years leading up to the conflict there was the renewed
threat of an attack on Placentia, as well as other English colonial possessions . England
became more interested in taking steps to secure its North American garrisons . These
steps were not, however , entirely successful as far as Placentia was concerned but they
did represent a shift in focus and a commitment to its defences , a shift which differed in
character from the preceding two decades of blatant neglect.
3.7 THE 'GLORY' YEARS
This new vigour to defend Placentia did not begin to bear fruit instantly.
Certainly , there is no evidence that the garrison was any stronger in 1740 than it had been
two years previously . The returns for Gledhill's Company still showed only 32 men in
Placentia and the arrival of the four recruits listed in 1738 was still pending (Medly
1740). At least the previously mentioned artillery detachment had arrived on site by this
point (Med ly 1740). That said, three years after this return was written , there is evidence
that the English were beginning to take genuine steps to improve the fortifications of the
colony , including at Placentia .
The first documentary evidence of this new fortification program is provided by
an Order in Council from May of 1741, just 3 years before the outbreak of war in Europe
(Sharpe 1741). This records that an engineer had been dispatched to assess the scale of
repairs necessary to make Fort Frederick serviceable again and that, on his
recommendation , a number of artillerymen , who were previously to be transferred to St.
John 's were , instead , to remain in Placentia (Sharpe 1741). Furthermore , instructions
ordered that the Man-of-War was to remain stationed at Placentia until its repairs were
completed in case the French made an attempt on the fort (Sharpe 1741). Of even greater
import is a letter sent by Governor John Byng to the English governme nt which provides
evidence for the most significant developme nt for the defence of Placentia during the
1740s. This document refers to the "Forts" at Placentia (Byng 1743). It is possible that
this usage of the plural represents the first documentary evidence of the construction of a
new fortification in the colony.
That new fortification is known only as the New Fort and despite being quite well
documented in terms of its design, little is known about when its construction began. This
lack of knowledge had occasionall y led to misinterpretations of the Fort by historians. For
example , Morris Lynch stated that it was just Fort Frederick renamed (Lynch 1976: 3).
This is clearly not the case as the two structures were built on opposite sides of the
harbour Gut. In terms of when the New Fort was begun, Elaine Mitchele states in her
1986 paper Placentia:BuiltHeritage that New Fort was built in 1743, although she did
not cite the source of this date (Mitchele 1986: 23). Certainly construction of the New
Fort must have been underway , because in November 1743 Thomas Smith, now the
Governor of Newfoundland , reported that Captain Gledhill had, "by the assistance of the
Inhabitants ...begun some works , at The Old Fort at Placentia , the Better to Defend the
Place, till the new Fort is perfected which his Majesty has ordered to be created there"
(Smith 1743a). Clearly there was construction underway in Placentia prior to that report .
Regardless of when construction of the New Fort actually began, what is
important is that Placentia was regarded as significant enough an outpost to warrant the
construction ofa considerable masonry fort. This New Fort, constructed on
approximately the same area as the old Fort Louis on the northern side of the Placentia
Gut (see Appendix 1,4 and 5) and , was a much larger fortification than Fort Frederick .
The construction of such a large stone structure represented a major commitment in terms
of manpower and resources . Yet, despite the threat of war and the apparent desire to plan
for and construct such a structure , once again Placentia encountered a problem with
acquiring the necessary resources .
In spite of the Governor Smith's report in November 1743, sometime that fall
construction had stalled due to a lack of financial support from the home government. On
October 3n1 , 1743, Smith instructed Gledhill to cease all construction of the New Fort as
it was nowhere near completion . Instead, he was to shift his attention simply to putting
Fort Frederick into a defensible state (Smith I743a) . That said, in a letter sent by Smith to
Gledhill that same year it is clear that Smith expected this cessation of construction to be
a temporary measure as he also instructed that the repairs to Fort Frederick should only be
made sufficient to "stand...till the New Fort is finished" (Smith 1743b). Exactly how long
these temporary repairs would need to last in order to remain serviceable until replaced by
the New Fort was not specifically mentioned and may have proven to be a much longer
time than Smith had ever anticipated.
In 1744, the year the war officially began, there was no evidence that the New
Fort was any closer to completion. In a letter that year to the English government ,
Gledhill reported that the Fort Frederick was still in poor shape . He did not even mention
the New Fort (Gledhill 1744). An Order in Council from that year outlines that the
defences all around Newfoundland needed to be rushed into service and that those at
Placentia needed to be "completed as soon as possible" (Sharpe 1744). With the New Fort
still under construction and the rush to repair Fort Frederick revealed in these documents
one would imagine that similar efforts were made to reinforce the garrison . That does not
appear to have been the case .
In an undated letter, most likely from 1745 or 1746, Gledhill stated that, " the few
men under my command who are but forty privates , have neither arms, clothing , bedding
nor provisions as yet. I am heartily sorry, this place is so much neglected" (Gledhill n.d.).
In another letter from 1746, he echoed this again claiming that he had yet to receive any
supplies or equipment for over three years . He even went so far as to say that, " It is hard
in such a dismal climate as this where nothing grows to see the king's troops naked"
(Gledhill 1746). In light of the continued neglect of these men it is not entirely surprising
that the necessary resources to build a major fortification like the New Fort were not
forthcoming .
The continued weakness of the defences of Placentia caused consternation among
the civilians who lived there. In August of 1744, they sent a petition to Gledhill outlining
that they had little confidence that they or their possessions were sufficiently protected
from roving French privateers and requested that further actions be taken to shore up the
feeble defences of the colony (Traders and inhabitants of little and great Placentia and the
boatkeepers in adjacent harbours 1744). This petition appears to have elicited little
response as even by the end of the decade a report written by Governor Charles Watson
recorded that the New Fort was "now erecting" and not yet complete (Watson 1749).
Even after almost a decade of renewed attempts to improve the fortifications at Placentia ,
the English had little more to show for their efforts than a broken down old stop gap Fort,
an under construct ion New Fort and a garrison made up of old, ill equipped men.
The reasons for this lack of political will to tackle the defence issues at Placentia
partly lie in the military activities taking place in England 's other Atlantic colonies . In
June 1745, an expedition from New England captured Louisbourg , thereby removing the
closest French threat to the small colony. The Royal Navy controlled the Atlantic
waterways between Newfoundland and New England. Hostilities terminated in 1748
with the Treaty of Aix-Ia-Chapelle . Ironically both sides returned their conquests during
the war and Louisbourg was, to the consternation of New Englanders and
Newfoundlanders , returned to France . Nonetheless , the French presence on Ile Royale no
longer posed the threat it once had been. Consequently, the building efforts and
reinforcement of the Placentia garrison which had been underway essentially ceased. The
reality was that even when the threat of attack had been imminent, the efforts of the
English to prepare Placentia had proven mostly ineffective . This continued to be the case
into the 1750s.
There does appear to be some evidence that the English, at a minimum, attempted
to keep what work they had done at Placentia serviceable and that the colony was better
defended at the start of the 1750s than it had been at the start of the I740s. This is borne
out by a 1751 report on the state of the fortifications at Placentia drafted by an Engineer
Officer , Leonard Smelt. Possibly one of the most important documents for studying this
period in Placentia 's military history, its opening statement does not paint a positive
image of the colony 's defensive abilities and it sets the tone for the rest of the report :
The Fortifications of Placentia (if they deserve that name) have every defect
of design , situation & execution and notwithstanding their great expenses , are
scarce capable of being made sufficient against a privateer (Smelt 1751).
Smelt then continued to say that the still incomplete New Fort was already starting to
collapse , its completed walls already starting to bulge and its two unfinished sides only
recently enclosed by palisades (Smelt 1751). Further in the report he notes that while Fort
Frederick was in much better shape than the New Fort, it was still "yet capable oflittle
defence" (Smelt 1751). Some construction had been undertaken. Smelt reports that a
"lobby and laboratory" were constructed in the New Fort just that year, thus indicating
that some efforts were being made to keep the defences in good order (Smelt 1751).
Despite this, Engineer Smelt concludes that considering the continued difficulty in
building proper fortifications at Placentia , the English would be better off to abandon
these efforts altogether and, instead, rely on the Royal Navy to defend not only Placentia ,
but the whole of Newfoundland (Smelt 1751).
As strange as it may seem, Smelt 's report depicts a significant improvement in the
overall capabilities of the defences of Placentia. Previous to this report there had been no
evidence that the New Fort was being utilized at all. Smelt's report implied that it was in
use to some degree . Now enclosed fully by palisades and housing a "laboratory", namely
a powder storage and preparation area , New Fort, in the event of an attack , would have
been capable of providing ammunition for any soldiers garrisoned there. Smelt also seems
to indicate that Fort Frederick was in decent repair , indicating for the first time since the
French built Fort Louis and its supporting battery, that the harbour Gut was once again
protected by two forts .
Furthermore , the return of the company at Placentia in 1751 shows an increase
from 40 men in 1746 to 56 infantry and 21 artillerymen (Hamilton 1751). While this still
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represents a relatively small number of men garrisoned at Placentia, it does indicate that
since 1744 there had been a significant increase in its relative strength . As well , it appears
that this increase was not just a temporary measure as a return from September of 1754
reported the presence of 57 privates and 18 artillerymen (Hamilton 1754). Another return
from 1755 reported the same number of men on strength , with the exception of one
Gunner (Dorrill 1755).
This increased and apparently sustained improvement to the strength of the
garrison at Placentia was well timed . The fickleness of European and colonial politics was
not yet done with Placentia. Far away in the Ohio Valley the clash of British and French
trading interests led once more to war, dragging all Engl ish and French colonial
possessions into the conflict. On November 14, 1754, King George II announced to the
British Parliament his determination to protect his possessions in America . Then in May
1756, Great Britain declared war on France and the next month France returned the
favour . The Seven Years ' War had begun. Since Louisbourg had once again arisen
following the siege of 1744, the English were well aware that Placentia , along with the
rest of Newfoundland , was a potential target of the enemy . It clearly needed better
defences. While an improvement in the strength of the existing garrison at Placentia
certainly would have been valuable in the event of such an attack, it did not represent the
most significant development made to the defences of Placentia during this period .
Instead, it was the construction of yet another fort, bringing the total of major defencive
structures in the tiny colony to three . Unable to maintain two forts, the British apparentl y
decided to add a third . Perhaps it would fare better than its predecessors.
The idea for a third fort lay in Leonard Smelt' s report . True, he had suggested that
the static defences at Placentia should be abandoned . In the event that idea was rejected
and it was determined that the colony was to remain garrisoned , however , Smelt had
provided a number of recommendations to improve the current fortifications . In these
recommendations , he had mentioned modifications to the New Fort. More importantly , he
had indicated that the old French Fort Royal on Castle Hill should be reoccupied and a
new redoubt constructed outside of it in order to command the seaward approaches to the
harbour and to prevent an attacking enemy from capturing the high ground and firing
down into the New Fort and Fort Frederick (Smelt 1751). This suggestion appears to have
received some traction because in 1757 exactly what Smelt had proposed was taken up by
others .
In August of that year Richard Dawson, an Engineer, wrote to the Lords of Trade
echoing Smelt's earlier recommendations . In his report, he outlined that it was imperative
that Castle Hill be occupied as, "an Enemy should make themselves Master of [it], with a
few guns they would oblige the Garrison to surrender , having no shelter from their Fire"
(Edwards 1757). Also, in 1757, Richard Edwards , now Governor of Newfoundland ,
repeated this plea that resources be committed to rebuilding Fort Royal saying that, "some
small fortification on the said Hill where the Castle formerly stood, which is now in
ruins would if repaired and a battery with prevent any ship from coming into the
road The expense of which would be trifling in Comparison to the Advantage "
(Principal Officers of the Garrison at Placentia 1757). Edwards also recommended that a
new barracks should be built in the still half finished New Fort, making new quarters for
the garrison "in case an Enemy, should suddenly Land in the night time" (Principal
Officers of the Garrison at Placentia 1757). This proposed refocusing of the defences of
the colony onto the northern side of the Gut represented a major change in the tactics
employed at Placentia . As sound as the arguments were, it was not until a major
catastrophe befell the English in Newfoundland that these recommendations were
transformed into action .
In the interim, Louisbourg fell again in 1758 to the English. Anxious to take
control of all New France, General Wolfe pushed on into the St. Lawrence the next year,
taking control of Quebec City, followed the next year with the capitulation of Montreal.
In the other theatres of the war in North America the French did little better. But, the
larger European Seven Year's War was not over. After the fall of Montreal , France made
a fresh attempt to regain some of those territories she had lost to Great Britain. The first
point of attack was not Louisbourg or Montreal or Quebec City. It was St. John 's .
In the spring of 1762 the unthinkable happened . The French captured the poorly
defended St. John 's , making Placentia once again the capital of Newfoundland . With St.
John 's in enemy hands, the English, under the direction of Governor Thomas Graves ,
were faced with the task of having to quickly prepare the decrepit defences of Placentia in
case of further French attack . Graves left a record of his plans of how to accomplish this
feat. The most important passages follow:
...Fort Frederick where the garrison is, stands on the south side of the entrance to
the harbour on a Tongue of Sand, it has an irregular front towards the Sea where
is some good 18 pounders mounted , but the back is only piqueted, and can make
but little Defence against the Land...
...On the other side of the entrance is the foundation of a New Fort which was
never finished, it had two very good ramparts next the sea which only want
Platforms to be fit for Cannon . The other two sides for it is square has only
Piqueting and might soon be made more defensible than Fort Frederick. There is a
magazine and three pretty good Barracks in it, with room enough to erect as many
as will quarter four companies , and as more barracks should be erected to contain
the Troops within ye Fort it will cost no more to erect these in the New Fort than
in Fort Frederick. ..
..J would propose to remove the Garrison to the other side and destroy the old
Fort. The garrison would then be stiIl mutually to aid and receive protection from
a eminence which must at all events be maintain'd as it commands both Forts
(Graves 1762).
This plan to abandon Fort Frederick and concentrate on preparing the New Fort
and Fort Royal , now caIled Castle Graves in honour of the Governor , does not appear to
have been carried out as planned and certainly did not result in the destruction of Fort
Frederick (Proulx 1979b: 142). What it does seem to indicate is that all three forts at
Placentia were still being utilized at this time. That said, the sudden attention paid to the
defences of Placentia was short lived, as the English retook St. John 's later that same
year. The threat once again vanished , which may account for why the full extent of
Graves ' plan was not carried out (Proulx 1979b: 142). With the signing of the Treaty of
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Paris in February of 1763, the Seven Year's War came to an end and the defences of
Placentia began a long, slow descent into total neglect and eventual abandonment.
3.8 DECLINE AND FALL
Beginning as early as 1764 calls were made for Placentia to be abandoned by the
military and although these voices remained on the periphery for the time being they
eventually lead to the end of Placentia 's military life (Penny 2009: 29). Initially it
remained occupied but the garrison was clearly allowed to slip into a rapid decline . In
September of 1764, Sir Hugh Palliser , the new Governor of Newfoundland, found the
garrison at Placent ia to be in total disarray and reported to the Lords of Trade that:
When I came to Placentia I found eleven Men at large, part of that Garrisonhad
deserted a few days before, with their arms , accouterments & regimentals ,
supposed to be gone to St. Pierre. I found one man in Irons for traisonable
expressions , & positively refusing to do duty; such Behaviour in old soldiers ,
who have served with reputation in War, is very extraordinary (Smelt 1751).
The reason for this misbehaviour seems to be general neglect and a lack for
supplies. Palliser also stated that, " On landing I received the inclosed petition from the
soldiers of the Garrison ...for the want of food in the most inclement Post in His Majesties
Domain" (Smelt 175I).This neglect seems strange as there was at least enough interest in
defending Placentia that the prewar increase in the strength of the garrison had been
maintained , the returns for that year listing 52 men of the 45th regiment and 23 more from
Captain Dovers ' Company of the 2nd Battalion , Royal Regiment of Artillery (Smelt
1751).
Despite the continued presence of the enlarged garrison, the decline ofthe
defences continued rapidly . By 1769, the Principal Officers of the Ordinance reported to
the Master General of Ordinance that the, "Fortress of Placentia is oflittle or no use"
(Smelt 1751). He went so far as to recommend that the post be abandoned asking ,
"whether you have any, and if any...objections to that fortress being dismantled and the
stores removed to St. John 's (Smelt 1751). This report may not be entirely trustworthy as
it insinuates that no work had been conducted to maintain the defences of the colony
since Smelt 's 1751 report , which is clearly inaccurate . Indeed, through the 1750s and
1760s various efforts had been made to make the New Fort defensible and Fort
Royal/Castle Graves had been rebuilt in 1762 (Smelt 1751).
By 1772, the condition of the forts as well as the state of the garrison were even
worse than three years earlier. In his Report of the State and Condition the Fortifications
of Placentia, together with my opinion of the Utility thereof, Governor Molyneux
Shuldham provided a detailed outline of their condition :
Opposite Fort Frederick ...a new Fort was begun some years ago, two sides of
which were _ _ finish, & one Barrack , before the impropriety of
its Situation was pointed out to Government , when after a very great Expense
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all further proceedings were suddenly countermanded; The Inhabitants of
the town of Placentia have plundered at different times the Barrack floors,
Doors & Windows, & the walls of the fort are now beginning to tumble down...
I do not think that this Garrison, or any other that may be erected [will be as
effective as] a Moveable fortification . Therefore while Great Britain preserves
her superiority at Sea I shall be sorry to see the Public Money squandered away
...where from the intenseness of the Frosts and Severity of the Climate the Repairs
must be infinite (Shuldham 1772).
Worse yet, Shulham also found the soldiers in the garrison to be totally ineffective as
"Troops cannot act above Five Months in the Year, and the other seven totally useless and
by Idleness, Drunkenness and Irregularity rendered unfit for further Service (Shuldham
1772).
What is interesting to note is that, despite the poor condition of the defences,
Shuldham did comment that Placentia still represented a site of major strategic value to
the English :
...Placentia , from the Convenience of the Road and the safety of the Harbour ,
has assumed the superiority of a Capital over the many smallHarbours and Coves
in the extensive Bay of the name and others situated further to the westward .
Custom and Confidence in the Fortifications, have confirmed this pre-eminence,
and now all the Fishery carried on at this side of the Island is supplied from this
Magazine with stores and Provisions and while the Trade runs thro this Channel it
appears reasonable that the Adventurers ought not to be disappointed in their
confidences nor by a total neglect of the Fortifications their Property be suffered
to be Exposed and undefended .... (Shuldham 1772).
How the decrepit and poorly manned forts of Placentia encouraged confidence in the
locals is beyond our knowledge today. Neverthele ss, this summary of Placentia 's
importance to the local economy and the defence of the population does illustrate why, in
spite of the many calls for its dismantling , the garrison was still in place. Regardless , what
small efforts were being made to maintain some kind of military presence in the colony
soon came to an end.
The year 1775 began badly for the garrison. On September 25th a strong gale blew
in and did significant damage to Ford Frederick with :
Both Gates being Blown down, and shivered to pieces, with several
scores ofPalisadoes and Carried fairly out to Sea, and the Barracks
half-full ofwater.. .Our Flag Stagg was likewise blown down, and
broken to pieces , with everything belonging to it. The Buildings have
not suffered but in the shingling, but the Ordnance Stores, and the
Victualling Storehouses lay now so open to the sea, that we are afraid
the heavy seas in Winter , and the Floating Ice in the Spring, will
undermined their Foundation and carry the whole away"
(Jervais Gossard and William Baker , Quoted in Penny 2009: 31)
There was some hope that this damage would lead to new improvements being
made to the fortifications as once again war broke out, this time between the New
England colonies and England . There were renewed cries for permanent fortifications to
be built. The Engineer Officer Robert Pringle stated just a month after the gale that
damaged Fort Frederick that, "The defenceless state of every harbour in this Country
except St. John 's exposes them without the smallest prospect of assistance , to every
piratical attempt-however inconsiderable from the continent " and that due to the
"impracticaltibility of blocking up the whole cost of North America , so as to prevent an
armed sloop of 10 guns from escaping thro 'the fogs that surround it," defences had to be
built in the major settlements throughout Newfoundland (Pringle 1776).
Pringles ' assessment of the tactics needed to keep the coastal communities of
Newfoundland safe, clearly differed from those espoused by Smelt and numerous others
who argued that the Royal Navy was the best solution for defending the colony. Although
Pringles ' reasoning appears sound, and was proven correct based on the subsequent
French raid in 1796 on Bay Bulls, it does not seem to have gained much traction with the
English government. The defences of Placentia continued to decline (Proulx 1979b: 155)
A half-hearted attempt was made to make Fort Frederick more defensible in 1776
(Canada 1962) but this work was very limited . Pringle reported that same year that Fort
Frederick had no gunpowder , as "the magazine at Placentia cannot be kept dry" and noted
once again that, " the Fortifications are not in a State of Defence" (Pringle 1776, Quoted
in Penny 2009 :31). By the end of the decade , not only were the forts essentially useless ,
but the garrison was also reduced to just 40 men (Proulx 1979b: 155). The writing was on
the wall for Placentia as a military outpost.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century , the military presence at Placentia was
truly entering its last days . In 1805, Captain George Ross drafted his Report Up on the
Defences of Placentia Newfoundland and made it clear just how minimal the military
presence was:
Of the numerous traces of fortifications at this place - the old fort called Fort
Frederick alone is at present occupied . The others are scarce to be discerned . The
expense attending this Post seems to exceed its utility; and upon its present
establishment it is far from being effective ...A Corporal & four men of the Royal
Artillery are stationed here - and there is occasionally a recruiting party of an
officer and a few men from the Regiment at St.John 's ...This battery not more than
thirty feet above the sea is surrounded by commanding heights & is therefore to be
considered barely serviceable for the protection of the Town and harbour against
shipping - which I presume is as much as is necessary to provide for the fishery
should it in the event of an American War become a place of refuge (Gower
1805).
With such a pathetic garrison it is not surprisin g that Governor Gower recorded that, " I
am clearly of[the] opinion that a fortification so ineffective ... be attended with no
advantage whatsoever" (Gower 1805).Gower and those before him who had wanted the
military to leave Placentia soon had their wishes granted . In April 1811, the British began
the dismantling of the garrison and the following year the land was rented out for civilian
use (Proulx 1979b: 156).
By 1811, Placentia had been the site of European military occupation for almost
150 years. Both the French and the English had struggled to build fortifications adequate
to the task of defendin g the settlement and both had met with only moderate success at
best. Soon the memory of Placentia ' s important place in the colonial military history of
Newfoundland was forgotten and the colony became jus t one of the many small fishing
communities on the Avalon Peninsula . Only in recent years has the importance of
Placentia's military history again become a topic of interest. This is surely a good thing .
3.9 THE DEFENCES TODAY
Today the defences of Placentia are little more than banks of earth, noticeable
only to those with a knowledge of the colony's military past. Castle Hill has undergone
extensive excavation and stabilization and is now a Parks Canada National Historic Site.
Fort Frederick is essentially invisible marked only by a small plaque and soon may be
threatened by the construction of a new bridge across the Placentia Gut. The site of Fort
Louis and the New Fort is approximately 50 meters off Main Road in Placentia and is
marked by signage . The area is owned, in majority, by the Town of Placentia though
some areas of known occupation are under private ownership. What land the town does
exercise ownership over was most recently utilized as a softball field. Today it is vacant
land, left aside by the historically and culturally conscious Town Council.
Archaeo logical excavations have been undertaken at the site of Fort Louis and the
New Fort since 2002, with the exception of2005 and work was supervised by, in order of
succession, Amanda Crompton, Steve Mills, David Fry and Matthew Simmonds . These
excavations , funded jointly by Services Canada, the Province of Newfoundland and
Labrador and the Town of Placentia , have uncovered a great deal of the New Fort,
including its powder magazine , the Governor 's Quarters and several parts of the bastions
and walls (Fry 2009) . Much less of Fort Louis has been positively identified and further
excavation is required before its outline and internal buildings can be identified. Today
the project continues under the supervision ofMr. Simmonds and future field seasons as
well as additional funding opportunities are planned .
Chapter 4: The New Fort as Designed
To the average observer all forts serve the same basic function : to act, for their
builders , as defensive structures to ward off possible attack by an enemy . While this
simple understanding ofa fort's purpose is essentially correct , it is very much an over
simplifica tion. Function , design and various external factors are intertwined . All must be
considered when examining the physical elemen ts of a fortification . By the eighteenth
cent ury, the des ign and cons truction of fortifications in Europe had taken on the
charac teristics of a science with complex rules and theories. That said , these principle s
were app lied with a great deal of situational flexibility , especially by the English who
genera lly lagged behind their European counterparts in this field.
The following discussion of the design of the New Fort is, in part , devoted to
describing these standardized methods of fortification and to examining how they were
implemented in this particular case . However , such an examination of the technical
design features of the New Fort is not provided solely to establish factual details. It also
provides a framework in which a discussion can take place about what the design features
may reveal about factors influencing the decisions and actions of the English designers
who were responsible for the fortifying of Placentia in the 1700s. This approach to
interpreti ng the externa l factors that influe nced the actio ns of the desig ners of the New
Fort is possible because of the high degree of standardization that distinguished
eighteenth-century European fortification design and construction and the fact that the
Englis h generall y subscribed to these standards .
To achieve a clear and logical description and analysis of the New Fort ' s design ,
this chapter is divided into several subsections. First, there is an overview of the history
of European fortification s in the 1700s, providing a basic understanding of the models
upon which forts like the New Fort were based during the age of imperialism . Next , there
is a detailed description of the New Fort in terms of how its design would have been
understood by contemporary military engineers and commanders. This section examine s
a number of roughly contemporary texts on military architecture and tactics and then
applies this information to historic maps and archaeological evidence from the New Fort.
As well , a number of more recent academic texts on modem era European military
architecture have been consulted . The objective is to produce a description of New Fort
utilizing language and definitions common to the period of construction.
It is worth mentioning that the majority of these plans of the New Fort were
actually created after construction had begun . However , they may still serve as
representation of what the English had planned before construction had begun as the New
Fort was never completed. As it was never completed , the plans must represent the
intended ' as completed ' form of the fort and , therefore , in the absence of any plans dating
before the construction process began are our best available source for exactly what the
English had had in mind when they began construction .
The next section is devoted to interpreting the New Fort design in terms of what
the structural information reveals about the factors which influenced the decisions made
by those agents responsible for creating it in the age of British imperialism . Within this
section , there is a discussion of the distinct factors which influenced the design of the
New Fort. Broadly speaking these are twofold: militaryconsiderations and environmental
realities. It should be noted that an ideal discussion of these factors would included some
details regarding the Royal Engineers who were involved in the New Forts construction
as it would have been their task to actually execute the design and construction of
fortificationsin the field. Sadly, no evidence regarding the identity of the individual or
individuals responsible for the initial construction of the New Fort are available and as
such a discussionof the influence of the Royal Engineershas been omitted from this
examination.
In closing, there is a brief conclusion summarizing what the design and
construction of New Fort reveals to modern day historians and archaeologists about the
construction practices and military objectives of the 1700s, about the external factors that
influenced the various agents who planned and carried out the plans for New Fort and the
defence of Placentia and about the motivations of not only the designers and builders but
also the governmentsand the military officialsof the day in terms of the place of
Placentia in the complex history of British Imperialism and Colonialism.
4.1 EUROPEAN FORTIFICATIO A D SOU RCES FOR ITS STU DY
The introduction of heavy ordinanceonto the battlefields of Europeduring the
fifteenth century began a revolution in fortificationand combat throughout Europe, one
that sparked ongoing innovation and adaptation in methods of fortificationover the next
200 years (Brice 1984: 101-102). By the seventeenthcentury, there was much talk about
the need to codify the standards for the use of heavy ordinance such as siege guns and
cannons and the resulting methods of defending a fortified place against the increasingly
heavy bombardments . Military engineers , mathematicians and philosophers put forward
views on how fortifications could be better built to handle the advances in heavy artillery
such as new combustible propellants and ignition mechanisms , as well as the rapidly
ballooning size of professional infantry-based armies (Brice 1984: 115). By the
eighteenth century , an age marked by Newtonian Science and Scientific Methodolo gy,
some standardization had occurred and a plethora of technical terms, definitions and
theories for designing and constructing fortifications emerged . Martin Brice has gone so
far as to say that, " from now on the story of military architecture becomes a babel of
technical terms and bizarre geometry" (Brice 1984: 115).
One of the most important names associated with seventeenth-century European
fortifications is that of the Marquis de Vauban . One of France 's foremost military
engineers , Vauban was well known for involvement in numerous fortification
construction projects under the rule of Louis XIV of France. His contribution to the field
was not so much in the area of innovation , but rather in promoting the widespread
standardization of practices , terminology and design (Brice 1984: 119-120). Combining
his knowledge as an engineer and his practical military experience on the ground, having
participated in many sieges , Vauban suggested and systematized ways fortresses could be
constructed to better prolong resistance and ward off frontal attacks . To this end, he
advocated things such as tower bastions and parallel trenches at approaches . In fact, many
modem day writers regard Vauban 's ideas and teachings to have remained central to the
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discipline of military architecture until the mid-nineteenth century when the introduction
of more powerful rifled and breach loading guns caused a new wave of innovation in the
field of military architecture (Hughe s 1974; Hogg 1975; Brice 1984). Vauban 's role as
the touch stone for military engineers in the eighteenth century is also clear in numerous
texts on the principles of military architecture written by contemporary authors like
C.W. Pasley , H. Straith and J. Muller , who went out of their way to mention that their
works were essentially new interpretations ofVauban's (Muller 1757; Pasley 1822;
Straith 1833).
The principles of fortification design and construction put forward by Vauban ,
while capable offending off the bombardments of massed artillery and of surviving
prolonged sieges , showed little regard for expense (Brice 1984: 121-122) . War was a
costly undertaking for any country and many simply were not capable of funding the
kinds ofreinforced works Vauban proposed . His successors, in France , for example ,
were far more constrained in terms of the scale of their proposed defences because their
budgets were critically under stress by the early 1800s (Brice 1984: 120-122) . In light of
the often limited amount of money , construction material and man power usually
associated with the early stages of a colonial settlement and protection , the reality was
that no matter how strong Vauban 's ideas were in principle , the complex rules of
European fortification that he and others proposed generally needed to be simplified when
put into practice (Hughes 1974: 145).
While the French of this period appeared to be advancing in the areas of military
engineering innovation and the implementation of new fortification systems , the British
generally lagged behind their continental contemporaries. This was largely due to the fact
that Britain , becau se of her natural water walls that surrounded the island , had little need
for the massive land locked style fortresses which dominated the European landscape
(Hughes 1974: 145) . In some ways this deficiency in the ways fortificatio n construction
evolved proved to be beneficial when it came to constructing forts in overseas colonial
territorie s like Canada and Newfoundland. Having never truly undertaken grand scale
project s utilizing all the principles of fortification put forward by those such as Vauban ,
the English did not feel bound by such conventions. Conseq uently , they were probably
more flexible about adapting quickl y to the realitie s of building fortification s on the
colonial periphe ry where limited resource s and man power necessitated resortin g to
simplified defen sive systems (Hughes 1974: 145). It is this kind of adaptation to the
particular needs and environmental conditions of specific colonial settings which are of
interest in the design and construction of the New Fort at Placentia .
Before detailin g the design of the New Fort, it is important to understand
something abou t the source s which have been relied upon for informa tion on the
fortification terminolo gy used at the time and the function s of the variou s feature s which
will be identifi ed . Althou gh written after the designing and construction of the New Fort,
one of the most valuable resources for discussin g English fortifications of this period is
the work of John Muller written in the second half of the eighteenth century . Muller was a
Professor of Artiller y and Fortification at the British Milita ry Academ y in Woolwich . His
numerous writin gs ranged from such important topics as theories for measurin g the
amount of black powder in a cylinder to calculatin g the thickness ofa masonry wall
required to hold back set amounts of earth. However, for the purposes of this discussion
his most important works are A treatise containing the practical part offortification
published in 1755, A treatise containing the elementary par t of for tification. regular and
irregular reprinted 1799 and The attack and defence of fortify 'd places released in 1757.
While Muller was writing after Vauban , he made it clear that much of the original
material for his writ ings was drawn from Vauban ' s theorie s and practic es. It, therefore,
seems reasonable to use both Mueller 's and Vauban ' s works to derive example s of
contemporary European fortification technique s.
In addition to Muller ' s works, two documentary sources from the first half of the
nineteenth centur y have also been consulted. These are the 1822 publicati on, A Course of
Elementary Fortification , by Lieutenant-Co lonel C.W. Pasley of the Royal Engineers and
the 1833 public ation, A treatise on Fortification: with observatio ns on the increased
effec ts of artillery by Major Hector Straith, Professor of Fortification and Artill ery at the
Honourabl e East India Co mpany's Military Semina ry at Addiscombe. These works,
although published respectively some 80 and 90 years after the New Fort was
constructed, are still well suited as referen ces for describin g the design of the New Fort
for two reasons. The first is that the terminolo gy and technique s of fortification had
changed very little dur ing the decades between the design of the New Fort and the
publication of Pasley' s and Straith ' s books . In fact, both writers made explicit mention of
their continued debt to the ideas ofVauban and Muller (Pasley 1822, Straith 1833).
The second and somewhat more pragmatic reason is that the writin gs of Pasley
and Straith are better organized and more clearl y written than those of their seventeenth
and eighteenth-century predecessor, Muller. With the many complicated technical terms
and distinctions which define the numerous component s of European fortifications during
this time, the abi lity to quic kly comprehend the differences between and the particular
purposes of each is very importa nt. These sources are simply better suited for allowi ng
the modem reader to do so . That sa id, Straith's work did make reference to some of the
changes which were starting to occur in fortification during his time, but these reference s
are explicit to particular situations and, therefo re, can be easi ly discounted for the
purposes of this discussion. It should also be noted that there are a number of modem
sources available for determi ning the exact meani ng of the many military architec tural
terms from this period, terms which will be used in this study.
4.2 THE NEW FORT AS DESIGNED
In the very simp lest terms the New Fort can be described as a having a rectangular
outline and five interior buildings . However , this description falls short of providing any
insight into why this fort was built, where it was built or why it was designed the way it
was . To answer these questions and to add ress what the motivations behind the decisions
made in terms of these questions require a much more detai led descri ption of the New
Fort .
The New Fort's exterior measuremen ts were approxima tely 102 m by 80 m,
produci ng a rectangu lar outline. This horizonta l profile is properly referred to as " the
trace", a term basically synonymous with the modem concept ofa buildin g' s footprint
(Last 1998: 17). The actual physical walls corresponding to the trace, referred to as "the
enceinte" , can consist of several different components , but in the case of the New Fort
only two were present. These two components are called "bastions" and "curtains" (Geier
2011 : 233). Bastions are projections of the enceinte and are a staple of sixteenth- ,
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century fortifications . The New Fort had four, one at each of
its corners (Pasley 1822: 5). Connecting these bastions are long straight walls which are
properly referred to as curtains, of which the New Fort also had four (Pasley 1822: 5).
These two components , bastions and curtains , were present in most European
fortifications of this period and formed the core around which all military architecture
was constructed (Pasley 1822:5). These features , however , in and of themselves , reveal
nothing about the vertical nature of the New Fort. To gain that perspective one must look
to the ramparts .
4.3 THE CURTA IN RAMPARTS
The vertical profile of the enceinte is called "the ramparts", a term which applies
to both bastions and curtains (Pasley 1822: 3). All of the available information about the
ramparts of the New Fort is specific to the fort's long curtain walls . Therefore , for the
remainder of this section the tenn ramparts will be used to refer exclusively to these
defensive elements . The ramparts of the New Fort are best discussed as two matching
pairs . The first pair was the much thicker pair and faced south and west. The second ,
thinner pair faced north and east. Eighteenth-century military engineers conceived
ramparts as being made up of severa l different components. A plan of these components
is presented in profile format below (Muller 1799: 46). These profiles are essentia lly
cross-sec tions of the ramparts showing the relative size of each component. Just such a




Figure 4.1: Cross Section of a curtain wall showing important f eatures
The most important sections of the rampart are the talus, the terreplein , the parapet
and the scarp , each indicated on the above tracing (Pasley 1822: 15) The "talus" is the
interior slope of the wall as it descends from the top of the rampart to ground level,
usually at at least a 45 degree decline . It was usually made of earth (Last 1998: 16).
Above this was the "terreplein", the flat area on the top of the rampart where men and
artillery rested in order to fire out of the fort at an enemy (Pasley 1822: 16). On the
outward facing side of the rampart, the terreplein gave way to a raised section of the wall
designed to provide cover from enemy fire for the men and equipment located on the
rampart . This area was called the "parapet" (Last 1998: 14). Finally, the outward face of
the rampart, from the bottom of the parapet down to the level of the exterior ground was
called the "scarp" (Pasley 1822:24). Scarps were often made of stone and in such cases
the name for the stone wall of the scarp was a "revetment" (Pasley 1822:24). Each of
these defined sections comprised numerous other related parts that were found in a
varie ty of sizes determined by their relationship to one another.
The southern and western rampar ts of the New Fort are better documented in the
availab le plans of the New Fort than those to the north and east. These two ramparts
appear to have been essentially the same in terms of their constructions and overa ll
dimensions. Below (figure 4.2) is a copy of the only known profile of these ramparts as
well as a modem tracing provided above the profile to help make it easier to distinguish
the different interior components.
Figure -1.2 : Original and tracing ofthe New Fort's Rampart drawn from "Plan ofthe
New Fori AI Placenlia Now Erecting At Placentia, Njld. "(See Appendix 2)
These ramparts were very substantial in size, being just less than 13.5 m thick at
their base and almost 3.5 meters from their base to their highest point. The exterior faces
of these ramparts were intended to have a masonry scarp revetment sloped at
approximately 15 degrees and about 1.4 m at its thickest point. The interior slope of the
wall or talus was also to intended to be revetted, but with a much less severe slope of
approximately 7 degrees, which mean that this area of the wall is not a talus proper. As
such it should be thought of simply as a place holder for a talus or as a kind of proto-talus.
Regardless of what terminology is used to describe this area, it was to have been much
thinner than the scarp, measuring at just less than I m in thickness at its base.
Between the interior and exterior walls the usual practice was to pack in
compressed layers of earth and occasionally small sticks . This filling was designed to act
as backfill for the rampart . The available plans for the New Fort do not explicitly call for
this kind of backfill , but based on the common British practices of the period, it seems
likely that this was the intention of the designers. Also, one can make the same
assumption based on the fact that the interior of the rampart shown in the profile is shaded
differently than any of the other components, thus suggesting a change of some kind in
the compositi on (Duffy 1996: 52).
The foundat ions of these revetments were also very substantial and appear to have
been designed in three distinct courses. The scarp revetment' s foundations are larger than
those of the talus. This was probabl y due to the larger size of the structure. It was to have
been offset to the exterior of the revetment by about. 12 m and was designed to descend
1.2 m below ground level. In addition , the exterior side of the foundation was very
slightly sloped outward , while the interior side appears to have been left perpendicular to
ground level. Similarly, the smaller talus revetment foundation was to be slightly sloped ,
but on both the interior and exterior sides . This talus appears to have been much
shallower, as well, as it was only to project .35 m below the ground . The thickness was
much less than that of the scarp revetment foundation , measuring just 1.2 m in width with
an offset of .12 m on both the interior and exterior sides .
There is one further point of interest regarding the design of the ramparts .
According to one set of plans, at least some areas were intended to have casemates , or
vaulted bombproof chambers, in their interior as seen in the below image (Last 1998: 5).
However , the intended location of these proposed casemates is not clear nor is there any
indication of how many there were to be constructed.
Figire 4.3: Casemates shown in "Plan of the New Fort At Placentia Now Erecting At
Placentia, Njld. "(See Appendix 2)
Atop these quite massive ramparts there was to be a parapet and a terreplein . The
terreple in was about 5.25 m wide and about 2.7 m above ground level at its outward
facing edge, although it did slope toward the interior of the fort at about 5 degrees.
Directly in front of the terreplein, on the exterior side of the rampart was the parapet. The
New Fort's parapet was not very high, appearing to rise only about .7 m above the
terreplein. The interior of the parapet , usually called the interior slope, was to be
constructed of masonry and was designed to stand 90 degrees to the ground level and to
be about 0.5 m thick (Pasley 1822: 19-20). From the exterior edge of the interior slope,
the parapet descended at about 9 degrees to the top edge of the scarp revetment. The plans
suggest that this was intended to be built of earth .
It is worth noting that it is in the design of the parapet that the southern and
western ramparts notably differ (See Appendix 2). The western rampart ' s parapet was
essentially a continual , unchanging slope of earth with no distinguishing features, over
which a battery of 12 guns was to be sited. The southern rampart ' s parapet was very
different. It had eight narrow openings, or "embrasures", through which cannons were to
be sited and fired (Geier 2011: 233). It seems likely that the southern parapet was
intended to be taller than the western one because at just 0.4 m in height there appears to
be no purpose for there to have been embrasures cut into such a low feature. However,
there are no available plans illustrating the proposed height of this embrasured parapet,
thus making it impossible to know for certain whether the southern parapet was designed
with the intent of being taller than the unembrasured western parapet. Also, it is
interesting to note that some plans of the New Fort do not show these embrasures on the
southern parapet at all (See Appendix 3).
Unfortunately, the northern and eastern ramparts of the New Fort are not as well
documented as the larger southern and eastern ramparts. No profiles of these ramparts are
available. The trace plans of the fort (See Appendix 2 and 3), however, do provide some
valuable information. As already mentioned, these two ramparts were designed to be
much smaller than those to the south and west. In fact, j udging from the available plans
of the New Fort, they were to bejust 3.4 m thick . Despite their comparatively diminuti ve
size, it seems likely, based on a comparison of how they are represented on the plans with
how the other ramparts were, that they both had a parapet, a terreplein and a kind of
proto-talus, just as one would expect. Of course, these features were much smaller than
those on the southern and eastern ramparts, the terreplein being just 1.7 m wide and the
parapet and talus both being about .85 m in width. Also, while not express ly clear, it
seems likely that these ramparts were envisioned as being roughly the same height as
their much wider counterparts. Unfortunately, again there is no way of knowing this for
certain. One feature of particular note, however, is the gate placed in the centre of the
eastern rampart . This gate is represented differently on almost all of the plans so it is
difficult so say much about the details of its design. However, the fact that it was placed
in this location it worth noting for later discussion.
4.4 THE BASTIONS
Unfortunately , the designs for the bastions of the New Fort are not depicted on
available plans in the same amount of detail as are the rampart s. In fact, there is no
information perta ining to their height and nothing about the vertica l features.
Neve rtheless, it is possible to asce rtain some informat ion about a number of important
horizontal measurements from what plans are available (See Appendix 2 and 3). In
particular, it appears that all of the bastions had a parapet of just under 0.2 m in width and
a scarp revetment similar in thickness to the northern and eastern rampart s .
In additi on to these limited details, there are several features that are unique to
bastions which can help in developing a better pictu re of the bastion at the New Fort . In
particular , three sets of measurem ents of the bastions can be ascerta ined from the
available plans (See Appendix 2 and 3) . These include the lengths of the walls, the angles
of their salients and the size of their interiors . In general, the walls of a bastion are
divided into flanks . These walls connect to the curtain walls of the fort. The faces connect
to the flank walls . The curtain walls and flank walls then meet each other to make the
point of the bastion (Pas ley 1996: 8-9). All bastions have a left and right flank and a face .
The angles at which these walls meet each other and meet the curtain walls are given
specific terms. The angle where the left and right face meet is called the "salient angle" or
the point of the bastion. The positions at which the faces meet the flanks are called the
"shoulders" of the bastion . The points at which the flanks meet the curtain of the fort are
ca lled the "ang les of the flank" or the re-e ntry angle (Pasley 1822: 7-9). Finally, the
interior measurements of a bastion are referred to as the "gourge" , which is the distance
betwee n the two flank ang les, and the "capi tol" , whic h is the distance fro m the centre of
the gourge to the salient ang le (Pas ley 1996 : 9) .
All of these measure ments are avai lable for the New Fort's bastions. Although
there are small discrepancies in the measurements found on the var ious plans, they are so
minor that they do not really impact one's understand ing of the overall desig n of the fort.
All of the bastions had left and right flanks measuring about 5.7 m in length . All met the
flank angle at about 90 degrees . The left and right faces of the bastions were abou t 11.75
m in length which resulted in the shoulde rs of the bastions measurin g abo ut 95 degrees
and the sa lient ang les abo ut 80 degrees. The gourge of all the bast ions was abo ut 2.5 m
long and the capi tol was about 12.6 m long . While these meas ureme nts are very
important, they unfortunately represe nt the extent of the factual details that can be derived
from exis ting plans with respect to the design of the New Fort's bas tions .
4.5 INTERIOR STR UCT URES
Finding details abou t the interior struc tures is eve n more difficult than the exter ior
feat ures. The interior buildings are the least we ll docum ented . This is interesting as it
may she d some light on the relative importance in which the New Fort 's builders held the
cons truction of the encei nte compa red to the interior structures , Some things are known ,
howeve r abo ut the interior. It is clear fro m all of the avai lable plans (See Appendix 2 and
3) that the New Fort was to have five building s clustered into two groups , one to the
North and other to the South , placed around a large open parade ground . In the north were
to be the quarter s for the keeper s and gunners as well as the storehouse and the powder
magazine . In the south were to be built the soldiers ' barracks and the quarter s for the
Governor and officer s. Beyond this basic foot print and layout of these structure s, it is
difficult to ascertain much more about their design . However , it is worth mentionin g that
all of the structures designed for human habitation were to have very large hearth features
for heating and possibl y cookin g. Also, the storeh ouse along with the quarter s for the
Governor and officer s and those for the storekeeper' s and gunner 's all appear to have
been designed with two stories as indicated by the presence of stairca ses in their floor
plans.
There were also some variation s in the intended designs of the interior structure s
as there are some noteworth y differenc es between the various plans for the New Fort. For
example , some plans show a small guard house located directl y north of the soldiers '
barrack s while other s have no indication of a guard house . In another example , there is
one plan that shows completely different designs for the soldiers ' barracks and the
Governor's and Officer s ' quarter s than appear in any of the other available document s .
One distinctive feature of most of the plans for the New Fort is that there is little
indication of what materi als the various structures were to be built . One has to rely
somewhat on the general practice s of the period. For instance, contemporary military
architectural thought was that when possible powder magazines and barrack s should be
built of stone in the hopes of protecting the garrison from the dangers of incomin g enemy
ordinance as well as to provide dry storage and ventilation of the powder they were to
hold (Duffy 1996). Howe ver, the constructi on of such masonry buildin gs was often one
of the factors which contributed to the huge expenses associated with fortification
projects of this period , so it is possible that in the case of the New Fort they may been
destined to be built of wood or altern ativel y some could have been built of stone and
other s of wood (Duffy 1996: 29) . The plans themselves are not at all helpful in addressing
this aspect of construction,
4.6 ANALYSIS OF THE NEW FORT'S DESIGN
Now that the design of the New Fort has been described in a way in which
contemporary military engineers would have understood it, it is possible to analyse its
features to see what they can tell us about what military concern s were paramount in the
minds its designers. While doing this it is important to keep in mind that the creation of
New Fort was inextricably intertwined with that of Placentia and its place in the imperial
struggles between France and England in eighteenth-century North America. As such, for
the purposes of this analysis , military concerns are defined as the threat of force from a
group of individuals foreign to the local commun ity and the efforts made to prevent the
application of such force from causing harm. Specifically, this refers to the threat of an
armed attack by an enem y, whom the English likely envisioned to be the French, while
designing and constructing the fort .
In order to conduct this analysis , traditional military thought regarding the
purposes of various military architectural features in the event of an attack is applied to
the specifics of the designs for the New Fort. This analysis starts with a brief outline of
the reasons why the fort was designed in the first place and why it was determined it
should be built in the location that was selected . Next there is an assessment of the
particular features in terms of military and imperial motivations , expectations and
common practice .
In general , European forts of the 1700s were built in locations which allowed their
occupiers to control routes of passage and trade and/or to serve as protection for local
communities and their economic resources . These sites usually included mountain passes ,
river fords and harbours (Duffy 1996: 25-26) . The motivations to control routes of
passage and to protect imperial or domestic settlements are referred to as "strategic
considerations". These considerations include things like valuable economic resources ,
imperial land possession and the ability to defeat or, at least, manage competition or more
importantly military threat. Strategy , therefore , was the ' big picture ' of warfare and
permanent forts , which required considerable time, effort and resources to construct and
maintain , were generally only built after considerable premeditated strategic thought had
deemed them necessary (Duffy 1996: 25) .
In terms of the strategic reasons behind the fortification of Placentia , the available
documentary evidence really does seem to speak for itself. In 173I , Governor Gledhill
referred to Placentia as "y' rnost considerable fishing port in American" (Gledhill 173 la) .
While this may have been somewhat of an exaggeration, there is no doubt that the
revenue from Placentia and from Newfoundland's fishing industry in general was a huge
strategic asset for the English . Certainly , the English believed that the French , their
historic enemy both in Europe and North America, would have liked to retrieve their
former fishing colony . In fact, evidence shows that even the local inhabitants seemed to
share this opinion , stating in a letter written to the governor in 1755, "we are truly
sensible that the French are jealous of the possession we have of this place , will attempt
to make themselves masters therefore" (Traders and inhabitants of little and greater
Placentia and the boatkeepers in adjacent harbours 1744).
Aside from the economic strategic reasons for the fortification of Placentia , the
port itself was considered to be a very valuable military asset. In the early J700s , when
the French still occupied the site, Beron de Lahonton reported on the value of the harbour
not only to fishing fleets but also to naval vessels :
One could easily draw up 800 ships which the smallest cable could
be sufficient to hold in any storm ...there is sufficient water from the
largest ships in this little strait as well as in the harbour. ..The fishery
is very prolific ...the cod dried there wonderfully well..Placentia is
the route of the ships that come from France to Canada ...so then, in
case of need of supplies of masts or of repairs , they can be run into
that harbour to remedy them (Lahonton in Gordon 1969)
While the strategic reasons for the English decision for the fortification of
Placentia are clear , the reasons behind their particular choice of site and design for the
New Fort are much Jess so. Just because military and/or government officials determined
that a particular site needed to be fortified, did not mean that each and every site was
fortified on the same scale or in the same way ; not every pass , inlet, harbour or ford
warran ted a massive fortress . Simi larly, not every small fort was capable of protecting a
community, depend ing upon the size of the settlement or its strategic significance . When
the powe rs that be decided that a particu lar location was importan t eno ugh to require a
garrison , it was often the tactical or local operation level whic h dictated the shape those
fortificat ions would take (Duffy 1996: 28-29) . Questions of ava ilable resources, the
projec ted size of the garriso n, the clima te and the lay of the land all had to be conside red
(Duffy 1996: 28-29). In particular, the nature of the loca l topography usually dictated the
tactica l situa tion ofa given location due to its impact on the mobi lity of troops and the
range of arti llery, both of the enemy as well as the defe nder (Duffy I996 : 30-32) . It is with
these questions in mind that one has to exa mine the reaso ns why the English chose to
build the New Fort where they did .
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the location of Placentia's New Fort is that
it was on Jerseyside on the northern side of the Gut, as can be seen in appendices I, 4 and
5. This site was effective ly a reversal in tactical thoug ht on the part of the British when
compared to their decision in 1717 to construct Fort Freder ick on the south side of the
Gut near the harbour mouth . It meant that the New Fort was , instead , to be built in the
same area as the former French fort of Fort Louis. The decision to move to the Fort Louis
site is also somewhat perp lexing given as Steve Mills has observed , the Fort Louis site
was not only lower than that of Fort Frederick but was also very prone to flooding . This is
a fact which continues to be evident in eac h successive field seaso n of modem day
excavatio n on the New Fort site (Mills Persona l Correspondence 2010/201 1).
Furthermore , a short distance north of the site of the New Fort is Cast le Hill. This
was where the French had built the Royal Redoubt but which was bereft of military
occ upation by the 1740s. The proxi mity of the hill represe nted a major tactical issue for
the New Fort, a fact which was not lost on English office rs much after the construction of
the fort had begun. In fact, in 1751, Robert Smelt wen t so far as to say that the New Fort
was within a "pis tol short" of Castle Hill (Smelt 1751). Worse yet, Smelt suggested that
beca use of the presence of Cast le Hill, the New Fort had, "been pushed so near the sea to
avoid it, as to expose it's Works to al the Violence of that Element" (Smelt 1751). That
said, it is clear that this location must have been chosen for reasons that are less than
obvious at first.
The key question which arises from the evidence that the selection of the Fort
Louis site might not have been the most viab le one is, why? Why did the New Fort 's
designers situate the fort where they did? Also, why did they appear to overlook or
underestimate the tactical and practical disadvantages? Why did they appear to have
consciously ignored the contemporary Europea n fortificat ion principles which dictated
that forts should not be built on soft sandy ground because they would, in time, start to
sink? Why did they not avoid, as tradition dictated , building on sites surrounded by loose
rock, such as those on Placentia ' s beaches, which cou ld lead to splintering, causing
excessive injury to the structure and the garrison when hit by enemy artillery (Duffy
1996: 30)? Since the Jerseysi de beach on which the New Fort was built is made up of
cobblestone on top of sand, there must have been a very strong motivation to use this site
in spite of its physical detractions . What seems to be the most likely reason is that the
English were more concerned with making sure the New Fort would be capable of
preventing enemy vessels from approaching the town and fort and stopping them from
passing through the Gut into the harbour. To ascertain whether this was the overriding
motivation for what appears to be a perplexing choice of site , one must look more closely
at the design of the New Fort itself.
The most informative aspect to the New Fort's construction in terms of
interpreting what military concerns its creators had in mind when they designed it is the
enceinte. The curtain ramparts facing to the west and south were much thicker than those
facing to the north and east. From this fact, one can reasonably deduce , based on the
principle well established by the Marquis de Vauban, that fortresses should be built in
such as way as to ward off the anticipated areas of maximum enemy pressure , the thickest
walls on the west and south of New Fort were so designed to handle the brunt of an
anticipated enemy bombardment. As well , the gate of the new Fort was located in the
centre of the eastern rampart . Here again , based on the fortress design principles
established by Vauban and Straith and others, it was common practice for gates to be
situated in the middle of the curtain that was least likely to come under heavy enemy fire
(Duffy 1996: 84) . After all, a gate was in and of itself a weak point in terms ofdefending
the physical perimeter of the fort.
There are other details of the New Fort's design which can be used as indicators in
interpreting what the primary military concerns of the fort 's designers were . Aside from
simply assuming that the thickest walls of the fort were placed in the areas that were
thought to be the most likely to be attacked , the relationship between the fort 's artillery
and the thickness of its ramparts gives some indication of the kind of attack the English
envisioned. According to Christopher Duffy, it was accepted by almost all military
engineers of the period that the primary weapons of forts should be 16-24 pounders . This
was because these armaments were sufficient to destroy the earthen works of enemy siege
artillery or the hulls of enemy vessels (Duffy 1996: 99). For such guns to be mounted ,
however , it was necessary for a large enough space to be provided on the top of the
ramparts for them to be serviced and the wall itself had to be strong enough to withstand
the forces of the very heavy guns being fired and moved around . These concerns resulted
in a generally accepted minimum width of a rampart bearing cannons to be 40 feet, or
12.2 m (Duffy 1996: 57). While the southern and western ramparts of the New Fort were
easily above this minimum, those on the northern and eastern side were not.
Consequently one can safely assume that these ramparts were never intended to mount
heavy cannon and were never constructed in such a way as to do so. That said, this
evidence simply supports what is already evident from the plans themselves , as none of
them show gun batteries located on the smaller ramparts . However , other design features
of the ramparts provide additional evidence for understanding the military considerations
of the New Fort 's designers .
As noted, the only significant differences between the southern and western
ramparts were the presence of embrasures on the south and a simple parapet on the west.
These differences seem to indicate that the designers of the New Fort envisioned the
batteries on these two walls to serve differe nt tactical roles. It is also poss ible to asce rtain
what their roles may have been by exa mining why military engineers genera lly adopted
these distinct features . Specifically , guns were usually set into embrasures when there was
a risk that incoming enemy musketry could pick otTthe gunners servi ng the pieces of
artillery (Stra ith 1833: 5). While the additional cover otTered by the embrasures was
useful for the gunners, it did severe ly limit the line of fire of the guns (Straith 1833: 5-6) .
By not using embrasures and simp ly firing over the parapet, which was referred to as
"firing en-barbette" , the range firing arcs of the guns were greatly improved. The prob lem
was that, in turn, the gunners were often left with very little cover. As a result , this
arra ngement was usua lly only used when the threat of having the gun crews picked otTby
sma ll arms fire was thought to be minima l (Pasley 1822: 213).
This determination of the kinds and degree of arms fire anticipated may acco unt
for the design at the New Fort. These standard practices seem to make the difference in
function between the south and western rampart very clear. The weste rn rampart with its
guns en-barbette looked out to sea and was likely envisione d as providing long range fire
against enemy vesse ls approac hing the town of Placentia. In such cases the threat of
enemy sma ll arms fire wou ld have been minimal due to the long range of the arti llery .
Clearly in such a case, the benefits of having an increased firing arc for the guns of the
New Fort would have been the primary concern . Howeve r, the southern rampart with its
embrasures looking directly across the Placentia Gut could have done nothing to prevent
ships from approaching the town. Furthermore , due to the limited arc of fire associated
with guns in embrasures, it seems imposs ible that they could have been used to fire at the
Placentia beach to preve nt enemy landings. If this had been the purpose of the southern
rampart, it see ms much more likely that the guns would have been set en-barbette as the
range to the Placentia beach is quite far and the large arc of fire would have been far more
effec tive in warding off enemy attack .
Based on this logic and on tradi tiona l practices, it see ms most likely that the
English outfitted this southern battery with embrasures in anticipation of an enemy vessel
attempting to pass throug h the Gut into the harbour rather than direct enemy attack . Any
vesse l crossing into the harbour would have had to pass very close to the fort and its crew
would likely have been able to fire on the artillerymen serving the guns on the southern
rampart with muskets. With this in mind the New Fort 's desig ners decided that it was
necessary to provide the most cover they could for the gun crews and placed the gun in
embrasures in hopes of doing just that. Also , if this battery was designed specifically to
prevent ships traversing the Gut, the limited firing arcs of embras ures would have
matte red little due to the passage 's short width and length relative to the size of the New
Fort and the range of the guns it would likely have mounted .
One remaini ng point to note is that the accepte d thickness of a wall needed to stop
a 24 pounder cannon ball was 15 feet, or about 4 meters (Duffy 1996: 59) . While the
parape ts of the southern and western ramparts at about 3.7 m of thickness might have
been able to stop such a round, there is no chance that the northern and eastern ramparts ,
at 3.4 meters at their thickest point , would have been able to do so at all. Again , this
seems to indicate that these landward facing walls were simp ly not desig ned to stand up
to any determined enemy attack, while the seaward facing walls were designed
specifically for that purpose.
Not only do the curtain ramparts appear to indicate that the New Fort was
designed almost exclusively to deal with the attack of enemy vessels, but so too do the
bastions. The primary purpose of bastions during this period was to provide mutual
support and prevent to assure that enemy troops could not get close enough to enter any
breaches they managed to inflict in the walls (Duffy 1996: 54). In addition to musketry
fire, bastions were usually made large enough that they could site two cannons on both of
their flanks to engage close range infantry (Duffy 1996: 65). These often led to very
complicated systems of interlocking fire incorporating many bastions, but in the case of
the New Fort, the bastions were only able to support their counterparts to the right and
then left.
While the presence ofa bastion on each corner of the New Fort indicates that its
designers were concerned with making sure the English troops would be able to observe
and fire down on anyone no matter how close they got to the walls of the fort, they do not
detract from the conclusion that the New Fort was designed primarily to fend off a naval
attack and could even be argued to be little more than a sea battery . The bastions were
relatively small , providing very little room for soldiers who would have been firing down
at an approaching enemy . Also the design of the bastions indicates that they were not
designed to mount any guns, especially not designed to mount cannon . In fact, in 1751
after seeing the partially completed New Fort, the military engineer Smelt stated that, "the
Bastions seem rather to have been intended for sentry boxes than for the defence of the
Fort" (Smelt 1751). This assessment of the New Fort's bastions as observation posts from
which to view the lengths of curtain walls seems to lend further weight to the theory that
they were not designed in anticipation of a land attack but rather as part of a complex
intended to fend off naval aggress ion.
Aside from the function of holding off enemy naval vesse ls, there are some
indications that the New Fort's designers had other military concerns in mind as well.
Specifically, the interior structures of the New Fort represent a major improvement over
those present in Fort Frederick, which contai ned only a small laboratory (small powder
magazine), storehouse, officers quarters and a shared barracks for soldiers and gunners.
With the addition of separate quarters for arti llerymen, the provision for quarters for the
Governor and the general enlargement of all the buildings, it seems clear that the New
Fort's designers envisioned the New Fort would serve not only as a stronger defens ive
structure, but also as a better appointed administrative headquarters than its predecessor.
The quarte rs for the officers , men and Governor in Fort Frederick had been inadequate
resulting not only in discomfort for the men, but also the billeting of some of the garrison
in Placentia itself. This situation had made the fort and the community vulnerable to a
surprise attack . It would appear the des igners of the New Fort wanted to remedy that
fault. They did so by construc ting better accommodations thereby removing the entire
garrison from the most populated part of the town. Further protection was provided by
ringing the entire garrison with a protective wall. This combined role of coasta l defence
battery and centralized administrative centre seems to represent the most likely military
concerns the English had in mind when designing the New Fort.
At least based on the features included in the design of the New Fort this
conclu sion seems to be a viable one. Interestingly enough, however, the features that
appear to be missing also support this conclusion that the primary focus of the fort was to
defend again st enemy vessels rather than enemy soldiers. There were several common
aspects of European military architecture of the 1700s which were not included and their
absence speaks volumes abolit the military concerns weighed by the English while
designing the New Fort. The most significant featur e which the designers omitt ed from
their plans for the New Fort was a ditch . According to Muller, for any place to be
defended effectively agai nst a land attack it must have a ditch to hinder and thus slow
down the advance of infantr y (Muller 1757: 193). Though the absence of such a ditch in
this case could be the result of the high water level at the site of the New Fort, it also
support the case that the New Fort was never intended to be able to hold off a landward
attack.
While the absence of a ditch is by far the most important feature of tradition al
European military architectur e missing from the New Fort plans, it is by no means the
only one. In fact, there are many featur es includin g banqu ettes, a glacis and ravelins. All
were common fortification features of the day. The exact funct ions of each of these
features are not important for the purposes of this analysis. Suffice to say that basically
they were all meant to prevent enem y infantry from taking a fort (Muller 1799). That
said, their absence docs seem to indicate that the designers of the New Fort had no desire
to include unnecessary or extravaga nt additions to the fort and only included in their
design the stand ard military feature s they deemed necessary to the task they had in mind,
that of preventing enemy vessels from enterin g the harbour and bombardin g the fort or
community.
4.7 CONCLUSION
Considering the evidence that can be derived from the various plans for the New
Fort, from the contemp orary fortification standards of the 1740s, from the kinds of
armament in common use, from the physical location of Placentia and from the imperial
realities of French English relations in North America, a fairly clear picture emerges of
what military strateg ic concern s motivated the agents, namely the political and military
decision makers and designers responsible for the construction of the New Fort. Tasked
with the strateg ic goa l of securing Placent ia for the use of the British navy and for
valuable fishin g fleets, they believed the greatest threat to these assets was an attack by
enemy vessels. They were not concerned by the possibility of a land-ba sed attack.
Consequently, they designed a fort which was really little more than two enclosed
batterie s, one of which was tasked with firing at long range at ships approaching Placentia
from sea along the Road and the other purposed with engaging enemy ships attempting to
pass through the Gut into the harbour at close range (See Append ix I).
In addition to this tactical role, the English also wanted the New Fort to serve as
an administrat ive centre where the Governor and his soldiers could be assembled as a unit
and protected from any conceivable threat to their person rangin g from a surprise raid to
civil unrest. The admini strative role, in part , emerged as the military concern s facing the
English changed somewhat during the construction of the New Fort owing to changes in
imperial and colonial objectives and circumstances in North America . These changes , not
surprisingly, influenced the manner in which the fort was actually built and the design
plans were realized . In addition to these changes in military priorities , there is evidence
that the local environment of Placentia had a significant impact on the building of the
New Fort in terms of materials, time and maintenance. It is these two factors , changing
military priorities and environment which can best be interpreted by using the
archaeological evidence in partnership with the documentary record . These are the focus
of the following chapter.
Chapter 5: The New Fort as Built
Just as the design of the New Fort can be utilized as an interpretive tool, so too
can its construction, In fact, in some ways, the relatively complex cons truction and repairs
of the New Fort between the 1740s and early 1800s provide even better information for
interpreting the external influences and resulting motivations that the English had to
consider in terms of protecting their imperial interests in Placentia . While the examina tion
of the design of the New Fort largely consisted of discussing the plans of the New Fort in
the context of contemporary writings on standard military architectural technique s, the
interp retation of the construction of the New Fort must consider severa l different avenues
of investigation. The physical evidence of the construction left behind following the
abandonment of the New Fort not only provides evidence regarding its purpose , but also
revea ls much abo ut how the priorities of the builders changed over time and how the
builders adapted to the local environment (for an indication of the sca le of the physical
evidence regarding New Fort 's architecture see Appendix 7) .
These changing priorities and the adaptations made during the various building
phases of the New Fort are most visible in four features of its construction: the materials
used in the construction; the evidence of deviations from the construction plans ; the order
in which various structures were built, or never built ; and, the presence of construction
projects undertaken outside of the body of the fort proper . By comparing the
archaeo logical evidence with the documentary evidence pertaining to these four key
aspects of the New Fort's construction , one can determine what externa l factors
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influenced the English agents during the construction of the New Fort, how they adapted
in order to achieve their own imperial goals, and why and how these goals changed
overtime.
The analysis of the New Fort's construct ion is divided into two sections. The first
addresses the military concerns and the second examines the envi ronmental concerns. As
established in the previous chapter, military concerns involve the threat of physical
aggression by an external enemy and the efforts undertaken to prevent such force from
harm ing the communi ty or its structures . Environmental concerns, on the surface , imply
considerations regarding factors such as climate, wind and water . At a deeper level, they
also refer to such factors as the availability of construction resourc es and pre-exi sting
features of the New Fort's location be they natural or man-made. Environmental
concerns, for the purposes of this analysis, therefore, refer to any influences affecting the
New Fort which were the direct result of the location chosen for the fort.
Some aspects of the New Fort's construction fall into both categories because
sometimes environmental realities influenced military concern s and vice versa. For
example, the wet and sandy nature of the soil on which the New Fort was built can be
discussed under military concerns so that the tact ical motivations behind its use can be
examined. Similarly, the soil can be exa mined under environmental concerns so that its
impact on the actual construction techniqu es utilized may be addre ssed . In spite of the
separation of concerns into two sections, it must be remembered that they are not totally
divorced from one another. This approach dovetails with Byers ' theoretical understandin g
of agency which states that individual s are always cognisant of many different concerns
when making decisions (Byers 1999).
5.1 MILITA RY CONCE RNS
Perhaps the most important aspect of the New Fort's construction with regard to
the military concerns of the English is the fact that it was never complet ed . It appears that
after its construction began, sometime between 1741 and 1743, and its effect ive
abandonment by the military in the I770s, work was carried out in fits and starts. At no
time did the English succeed in bringing the New Fort up to its full operational potent ial.
Nevertheless, in addition to ident ifying the parts that were never complet ed, one can
discuss in some detail the structures that were realized . Consequently, one can determin e
the kinds and levels of prioritization the English gave to the role of the fort at different
times , which in turn, are related to the changing military concerns they faced over this
time period .
Using archa eologica l and historical docum entation , one can identif y what areas of
the New Fort were begun, what areas were finished and what feature s, althou gh begun,
were never completed . This is best done by examining the separate areas of the fort in
two subsec tions: the curtain and bastion rampart s, and the interior structures .
5.2 THE CURTAIN AND BASTION RAMPA RTS
Based on the available documentary source s and archaeological data , construction
had begun on all of the planned curtains and bastions before the New Fort was
abandoned . To what degree they were completed is, however , a matter for debate . The
documentary evidence suggests that the smaller northern and eastern ramparts were never
completed as designed and were , instead , simply completed as palisades so as to enclose
the body of the Fort (Graves 1762a). This evidence is further supported by the
archaeo logical evidence which shows that , while the foundations of these ramparts are
present , the palisades were in fact constructed along their outer edge (Mills 2007 : 5).
Nevertheless, although it is clear that the foundations of these curtains were certainl y
completed, it is not currently possib le to ascertain whether completion was achieved
before or after the palisades were put in place . One interesting observation is that while
the palisades along these ramparts were included on a set of engineer 's plans drawn after
the New Fort was begun , they were shown to be on the interior of the fort rather than on
the exterior of the walls (Mills 2007 : 5). Moreover , the foundations of the eastern rampart
included what could only be the gate shown on several plans of the New Fort and which
was discussed in the previous chapter (Simmonds 2009 : 16). Beyond this, little is known
regarding how close to completion these ramparts ever came .
The larger western and southern ramparts of the New Fort, judging from the
available evidence , if not completed were at least built up much more than their smaller
northern and eastern counterparts. The archaeological data and documentary record
regarding the western rampart is the most complet e of any of the features of the enceint e.
There are several references to this wall being completed (Smelt 1751; Grave s 1762) .
The Placentia Newfoundland Historical Sites and Monuments: Agenda 1962--1
states that no gun batterie s were placed on the western or the southern rampart (Canada
1962: 8). It is possible, at least by 1751, that this was , howe ver, no longer the case. By
comparing the ordin ance return s submitted by the garrison in Placentia before the most
likely start date of the New Fort ' s construction around 1737 with the return s submitted
around 1764, one can observe some correlation between construction and ordinanc e, if
not the presence of a causative event (See Table 5.1). All of the available return s from
this period for the iron ordinanc e listed in Placenti a, which are drawn from the CO 194
series of docum ents, is tabulated in the below chart. Unfortunately, the record of return s
for this period of 1737 to 1764, is somewhat fragmentary , especiall y during the critic al
period immediately after work on the New Fort is assumed to have begun . Nonethele ss,
the report of Engineer Smelt from 1751 and a plan of the New Fort from 1749 state that
the western and southern rampart s were complete . This information can be correlat ed
with the rise of the number of guns in Placentia shown in 1749 and which was maintained
at a reduced but steady level until 1764.
Table 5.1: Ordinance by Year in Placentia, drawn/rom avai lable CO 19-1and
195 records series










1764 16 4 6 6
Admittedly, there are several flaws in using this evidence as proof of the New Fort
having been armed at this time. Clearly, the 1749 report shows many more guns than any
of the other returns until 1764, with the total being 32 as opposed to the 20 between 1753
and 1758. It is difficult to account for the sudden more than doublin g of ordinance in
1749 from the three previous reco rd dates. It could be the result of a man-of-war
shipping its guns during maintenance in the harbour. It is possible that the guns were just
being stored in Placentia before being shipped elsew here. Regardless, what is noteworthy
in terms of the arming of the New Fort is the increase from 1743 to the sustained levels
from 1753-1758 . This increase from 12 to 20 and the fact that this was sustained implies
that the New Fort mounted some ordinance , especially when one considers the overa ll
heavy armament of the Placentia fortificatio ns.
According to the plans of Fort Frederick from 1749, this fort had two gun
batteries, one of which mounted four guns and one of which mounted nine. There must
have been a recent additio n as it is clear from the returns that as of 1743 the total strength
of artillery in the garrison was eight 18-po unders and four 9-pounders (Byng 1743). There
is a third battery, " the Earl of Hal[ifax?],s battery", included on the same plan of Fort
Frederick but, it seems far too sma ll in comparison to the other two for it to have mounted
more than a single gun. Therefore, the grea test number of guns that could have been
installed in Fort Frederick was fourteen, nine 18-pounders, four 9-pounders and a single
lone gun which must have also been an 18-pounder as all of the 9-pounders reported in
the return s are already acco unted for. Discountin g the erroneous 1749 returns and,
instea d, utilizing the 1751-1758 numbers , there sti ll remain six guns for which there are
no accounting of their use.
While it is possib le that these guns were simply un-mounted, either being left in
storage, in reserve or in maintenance, the fact that the 1737-1743 returns suggest that all
avai lable guns were mounted seems to make the case that these six unaccounted for guns
were indeed mounted. Although there is no indisputable evidence of this, it still remains
likely that these guns would have been mounted on one of the two completed rampar ts of
the New Fort. This supposit ion is furthe r supported by the fact that no further increases in
the number of ordinance at Placentia were reported in the ava ilable return s until 1764.
The increase of 12 guns at this time was most likely the result of Gove rnor Graves '
reoccupation and the reconstruction of the old Royal Redoubt. This further implies that
wherever the unaccounted for guns were , they stayed (Pe nny 2009 : 28) .
That said, there are two strong pieces of documentary evidence which do not
support this position . The first is a report by Cap tain Cook in 1762 in which he reports
that, "the New Fort hath never been finished or had any Cannon mounted therein " (Penny
2009 : 28) . The second is provided by Governor Graves himself in 1762 when he wrote ,
" It [the New Fort] had two very good ramparts next the sea which only want platforms to
be fitted for Cannon " (Graves 1762) . Furthermore, no archaeological evidence has been
found to indicate that any guns or platforms were ever mounted . These sources certainly
seem to support the case for the unaccounted for guns simply not being mounted , but
there still remains some uncertainty in this matter.
Unfortunately, despite the western rampart having been the site of intensive
excavation in 2009 and 2010, there is little archaeological data to assist in clearing up this
question of armament. Nevertheless, archaeological evidence does confirm that the
ramparts were built . The amount of structure uncovered during these two seasons of
excavation matches the documentary record in showing that this rampart , at least, was
built up to a much greater degree those to the north and east. Also , although no
excavation of the southern rampart has been undertaken due to it being located on private
land and having had several modem domestic structures built upon it, a purely visual
inspection of the area shows that it is built up in a manner which matches the dimensions
provided for this rampart on the plans . With all of this taken into consideration, it seems
that both of these ramparts may have been completed as the documentary source stated .
In terms of the bastions of the New Fort, little can be said. While the north-eastern
bastion and a small section of the north-western bastion have been excavated, it is
difficult to ascertain how built up these structure were when construction ceased. It is
equally difficult to estimate at what point during construction they were created . This lack
of information is compounded by the absence in the documentary record of any explicit
discussion of their condition. In fact, the only time these bastions were express ly
mentio ned was in 1751 by engineer , Leonard Smelt . This record, however, says nothing
about what condition they were in at that time (Smelt 1751). Aside from this reference ,
the only other document is a map of the New Fort from 1749 which seems to show that
all of the bastions other than the one in the north-east are complete . Archaeological data
shows that this north-eastern bastion was at least started (Mills 2007 : 5). It also shows
that the foundations of this bastion were deeper in some places than others and that its
interior was filled with sand and rubble (Mills 2007: 5). Beyond this, little else can be
said about the bastion ramparts and curtain wall.
5.3 INTERIOR ST RUCTRES
Of the New Fort's five interior buildings, the foundations of three have been fully
uncovered , a fourth has been partially excava ted and the fifth remains untouched.
Unfortunately , the material culture recovered during the excavation of these four
buildings , which were the powder magazine , storehouse, gunners ' and storekeeper s'
quarters and the governor 's and officers ' quarters , provide little evidence of eighteenth-
century English military occupation of these sites (Mills 2006; Mills 2007; Fry 2009 ;
Simmonds 2009) . The reason for this lack of artefacts has been attributed to the creation
of a softball field in the area during the twentieth century (Mills 2006 : 9). Another reason
could be that these structures were never actually occupied during the English military
presence in Placentia. To determine the viability of this latter reason, one would have to
fully excavate the interiors of these structures and conduct work on the soldiers ' barracks,
which at present remains untouched . Nevertheless , by comparing the archaeological
remains of these structures with the available historical documentary descriptions of
them, it should be possible to offer a modest interpretation of which were completed
and/or occupied and which were not.
The earliest report about the state of the New Fort's construction comes from
1743. This report by Governor Smith states only that the recently started fort was
nowhere near completion (Smith 1743a). It is not until 1748 that any real evidence of the
state of the interior structure s is available . In a map from that year, the soldiers ' barracks
is listed as "quite finish 'd ." The storekeepers ' quarters and gunners' quarters , as well as
the storehouse are listed as "not covered" (See Appendix 6). The officers ' quarters are
described as being raised to the second plinth and the magazine as having been, "taken
down to the first plinth" . Following this map, Engineer Smelt's 1751 report states that just
that year a lobby and laboratory had been constructed within the New Fort. He makes
mention of no other structures (Smelt 1751).
Six years after this report, Dawson 's map of 1757, "A Plan of the Town and
Harbour of Placentia , Section Shewing the Hill and Forts" seems to indicate that some of
the planned interior structures of the New Fort were not yet completed . In fact, the two
visible interior buildings are labelled only as " Intended Barracks" to be located on the
eastern side of the fort and "Barracks", located on the western side of the fort adjacent the
western rampart . Establishing what these structures were supposed to be like is difficult .
The same year that Dawson ' s map was created , Governor Edwards pleaded that a new
barracks needed to be built in the New Fort as, "the old Barrack now in being was never
designed to hold above 30 to 40 men" (Principal Officers of the Garrison at Placentia
1757). This statement seems to add credence to the idea that at least one of the barracks
buildin gs was complete by this point. Perhaps the incomplete structure shown on
Dawson' s map was the result of Edwards ' requests.
Not until 1763, after the English had moved their colonial capital from St. John ' s
to Placentia, is there another detailed account of the state of the interior build ings. It
appears that some constructi on had taken place for Governor Thomas Graves reported
that the New Fort had "a magazine and three pretty good Barracks in it" (Graves 1762b).
However, nine years later, Governor Shuldham reported that only one barrack was ever
completed in the New Fort which casts Grave ' s report in some doubt, particularl y as it is
the only available documenta ry source stating that so many buildings were complete
(Shuldham 1772b).
There is archaeological evidence that lends some plausibility to Graves ' comment
that the magazine had been complete. Extensive excavations were conducted in and
around the powder magazine in 2008. These uncovered large (7m X 50-80 em wide)
wooden boards (Fry 2009: 17). Such boards were commonly used in the construction of
powder magazine floors to aid in keeping the powder stored within dry. Although those
found in the New Fort's magazine were not directly associated with any artefacts that
could be used to directly date the boards to the period of the New Fort, they were overlaid
by events which produced an arte fact assemblage dating to a slightly later period. The
presence of these boards seems to support the case for this structure having been , at least,
partially completed at some point , althou gh to what degre e and more preci sely when , it is
currently impossible to determ ine (Fry 200 8: 17). That said, it is still possible to draw
some interpretations about the military concerns the English had during the construction
of the New Fort as well as how they chan ged throughout this period .
5.4 ANALYSIS
Despite the fact the order of construction, the completion dates and even the status
of several component s of the New Fort remain shrouded in confusion and mystery , two
things regardin g the military concerns faced by the English durin g this time are clear
based on the evidence. The first is that certain components of the New Fort were given
priority in the construction proce ss. The second is that the tactical and strategic concerns
which underpinn ed the design of the fort must have changed while it was under
construction. The reasoning beh ind these two assessments of the New Fort as it was built
is rooted in two prima ry h'f OUPS of evidenc e. Firstly, certain parts of the New Fort were
completed before others and secondly, the fort was never completed to fulfill the func tion
for which it appears to have been designed .
Based on the design and location of the New Fort and taking for granted that the
primary purpose behind the decision to construct the fort in the first place was to provide
gun fire to prevent enemy vessels from approaching the town or passing throu gh the Gut,
it is easy to understand why the first components of the fort completed were the southern
and western ramparts . Clearly , if motivated by the threat of an enemy vessel coming into
the harbour with the purpose of attacking the town and garrison, the primary military
concern would have been to ensure the ability to ward of such an attack . Therefore , it
seems only logical that the features of the fort most directly associated with this
endeavour would be given priority during construction and, as a result, be completed first.
This does not, however , explain why the other features of the fort were not completed
after the ramparts were done or why the ramparts themselves may never have been armed
with the cannon necessary for performing their intended function. To do so, it is
necessary to contextualize the construction process within the strategic and tactical
situation of the time. This will enable one to establish the changes in the military concerns
which occurred at the time and to determine how these changes influenced the actions and
decisions of those agents responsible for the New Fort's construction .
The earliest possible date for construction to have begun on the New Fort is
sometime in 1742. With war with France looming on the horizon, only to break out in
1744, its seems that Governor Thomas Smith in October 1743 decided that there was not
enough time to make the New Fort ready to defend Placentia . For that reason, he ordered
Gledhill to cease construction (Smith 1743). This delay in construction , clearly motivated
by fear of imminent enemy attack , appears ironically to have then continued due to a
sudden end to this concern . With the fall of Louisburg in 1745, the most direct threat
facing Placentia was removed . This change from the sudden threat of French attack to a
strategic situation in which an attack was unlikely, explains why the construction that did
occur at the New Fort after 1745 appears to have been conducted at a very slow pace .
This lethargic attitude toward the need to finish the New Fort in light of the much
diminished threat of enemy attack is further supported by the fact that the garrison at
Placentia in these post-war years was undermann ed and left in a state of ill supply
(Gledhill n.d.). Of course, since renewed conflict between old imperial rivals was never
far off, war again faced Placentia in the mid l750 s and the New Fort again received some
additional attention .
That said, with the signing of the Treaty of Aix fa Chapelle in 1748, the New Fort
effectivel y had lost its tactical purpo se. Because the New Fort could not be finished
quickl y enou gh, Fort Frederick had been chose n as the favoured one. It had been partiall y
rebuilt and was now capable of defending the Gut. This change in the potential of Fort
Frederick combin ed with Smelt ' s report in 1751 which stressed the weakne ss of the New
Fort in the event that an enemy should land and capture Castle Hill, effectively depri ved
the New Fort of the function it was designed to serve, as well as the conditions under
which it was intended to do so. This change in the primary military considerations facing
the English is clearl y visible in the treatment of the New Fort received from this point
onwards .
When the Seven Years War broke out in 1756, once again pitt ing English and
French colonial possessions against each other in North America , Placentia was protected
by the small, inadequate Fort Frederick and the half finished , effectively redundant New
Fort. Placentia need not have worried for long. The English captur e of Fort Louisburg in
1758 and the subsequent English push up the St. Lawrence River into New France
removed any urgency on the part of those respon sible for defendin g Newfoundland to
focus on fortifying Place ntia. Certainly, there is little evidence to show that the New Fort
received much attention at this time. Comp lacency, however , had its own consequences.
It was sharply rewarded when the French turned their attention to Newfoundland , taking
St. Joh n's in 1762. It was this event which brought about what appears to have been the
fina l spurt of work on the New Fort, as well as on the defe nces of Placentia as a whole.
Now faced with the imminent threat of a French attack and with the effects of a
land- based assa ult on an unprepared defe nder newly etched in his mind, Gove rnor
Graves created his plans to defend his new capita l of Placentia . Effec tive ly, Graves
proposed building up the old Fort Roya l, now called Cast le Graves , building more
barracks in the New Fort, arming the New Fort and then abandon ing Fort Freder ick
(Graves 1762a). His reasoning for doing so was simp le. The New Fort wou ld be easier to
defend from a ground attac k than the very low and sma ll Fort Frederick. Also, the larger
New Fort cou ld hold more barracks and , therefore , men and by moving the garrison
entirely onto the northern side of the Gut, the English forces would no longer be divided .
The New Fort and Cast le Grave would be rendered capab le of mutua l support against
threa ts from both land and sea (Graves I762b) .
Governor Graves appears to have abandone d the sing le fort system of seaward
defence which had initia lly underpinned the New Fort's, as well as Fort Frede rick 's ,
design . He had chosen to return to the two fort system the French had adopted when they
built Fort Louis and the Royal Redoubt. While it is difficu lt to j udge exactly how much of
the construction propose d by Graves was ever actua lly conducted, what is important is
that in his writings as well as those of Engineer Smelt and Governor Edwards, it is clear
that the English had changed their assessme nt of the role that the New Fort was to play in
the defence of Placentia , going from virtually no role at all to one requiring the support of
Castle Hill.
In summary , the New Fort was constructed on and off between 1742 and 1762.
These years were ones of contrast , shifting between periods of relative activity and
inactivity . Such shifts reflected the threat level which the English felt regarding their
strategic situation in the region and the role Placentia should play. The priority given to
constructio n in general and to specific structures in particu lar appears to have coincided
with the English perceptions of the threat level and potential for French attack . These in
tum necessitated changes in the role of the New Fort from that for which it was origina lly
designed . For example , the early prioritization of comp leting the seaward facing
ramparts of the fort, the later refocusing on the constr uction of barracks and magazine and
the enclosure of the fort while the ramparts were most likely unable to perform their
originally intended function due to lack of artillery each demonstrated a particular
military concern shaped by changing imperia l relationships, financial resources and
military strategy.
5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONCER NS
For the purposes of this study, two kinds of environmental concerns are
addressed : those to do with the climate and ground conditio ns of the site and those related
to the avai lability of local resources useful in the construct ion of the New Fort. Both of
these concern s influenced the actions of those responsible for the construction of the New
Fort. The impact of both is revealed in the archaeological remains and the documentary
records.
In discussing the climate and site condit ions of the area in which the New Fort
was constructed, there are three primary influences which the English appear to have
considered during the building process: the harshness of the weather; the eros ive action of
the sea; and, the softness and wetness of the ground . Each of these influences is clearly
visible in the construction of the New Fort and the ways in which they impacted the
decisions of the English are easily recognized once the physical remains of the fort are
compared with traditional European thought on how to adapt to such harsh condition s.
Because of the close interaction of these factors, all three are considered together in this
analysis. As well, this approach reflects the way the various agents processed information
to arrive at a decision. The division of the military concerns into two distinct sub sections
in the previous chapter was done to aid in the understanding of the somewhat complicated
architectural concepts and terminology. Otherwise, the more holistic approach used for
the environmental concerns would have been applied . In fact, the first example of the
influence of climate and site conditions on the construction of the New Fort makes it clear
why it is impossible to consider separately the weather, the sea and the available
resource s when discussing the overall influence of environmental consideration s on the
decisions and actions made by the English during the construction of the New Fort.
Perhaps one of the stranger aspects of the New Fort's construction is that its
ramparts were built with revetments of stone. The documentary and archaeological data
are in complete agreeme nt on this. Howeve r, building these ramparts, which were to take
the bn mt of any attack , out of stone had severa l disadvan tages . Europeans were well
aware by this point that stone was much less effective than earthen works at stopping
incoming ordinance . More significantly in terms of the climate of Placent ia, noted for its
rain and fog, European builders also knew masonry was nearly impossi ble to maintain in
wet and cold clima tes (Duffy 1996: 61) . This was due, not jus t to the fact that wet and
cold wea ther caused water to pene trate the stone and mortar, causing them to expand and
contract, thus readily breaking apart, but also because it was very hard to get the mortar
used by Europeans at the time to set unless it was allowed to dry properly in warm, dry
cond itions (Duffy 1996: 44) This raises the question of why, when they knew of these
disadvantages , the English used stone for construc tion of the ramparts in a place where
wet and cold are the best adjectives to descri be the weather much of the year? Having had
vario us contacts with this part of North America for some deca des, the English certainly
were aware of the weather co nditions of the north Atlantic .
The answer is related to the proximity of the site se lected for the New Fort to the
relentless wave action of the sea. In fact, the Englis h may have tried to copy the French
construction in Placentia . In the closing days of the French occupation of the site, an
extensive effort was made to reface the earthe n ramparts of Fort Louis in stone so as to
protect them better from the actions of the sea . It seems that the English likely built the
New Fort's ramparts in stone for the same reason. Why select a site that was subject to so
much harsh wave action? As the military concerns revea led, the English probably
selected the site of the New Fort largely beca use it suited the tactical concerns they had at
the time. These concerns trumpe d the fact that the site they selected necessitated
constructin g the fort out of a material known to be be difficult to maintain in the cold and
damp climate of the area . Cognisan t of the fact that they had to conten d with severa l
enviro nmental factors , the English clearly chose the course of action which they believed
would best allow them to meet their military goa ls. Nevertheless, the military concerns
did not always over-ride the environmental ones. Having made the selection of a site , its
enviro nmental conditions played a significa nt role in influencing the builders ' subsequent
decisions.
One of the most common features of the New Fort encountered during
archaeo logica l excava tions was a I - 2 meter thick rubble layer which separated the
earlier French occupation of the site from that of the later English New Fort period (Mill s
2006 ; Mills 2007 ; Fry 2009; Simmon ds 2009). This rubb le layer correspo nds to the
raising of a large area utilizing stone rubble from the New Fort site during the
cons truction process (Mi lls 2006 : 3). However , excavation had uncovered this rubb le fill
in all areas of the fort while the plans of the New Fort show it only to have been utili zed
in fairly specific areas . It is also interes ting to note that even dur ing modern excava tion at
the site of the New Fort, the water table rarely rises above the top of this rubb le fill, which
appears to aid in drainage . This can be attested to by any of the field crew who attempted
to pump out their units after a heavy rain only to see more water coming in like waterfalls
thro ugh the rubble layer.
Why did the Englis h make more use of a rubble layer than the designers had
indicated? The evidence indica tes that during the construc tion process, the builders found
the ground around the New Fort to be wetter , lower and/or softer than they had
anticipated. As a result , they decided to extend the fill throughout the majority of the site.
While this fill layer is useful for archaeologists toda y as it effectively seals off the earlier
French occupation from the later English occupation, it is clear that the amount of labour
that would have gone into creating it must have been massive . Judging by the excavations
conducted so far, almost , ifnot all of the New Fort 's 102 m X 80 m area is covered to a
depth of 1-2 meters of rubble resulting in a minimum of 8160 m3 and a maximum of
16,320 m3 of fill having been moved . Of course , that is assuming that only the areas
inside of the fort 's walls were filled . It is also interesting to note that one map of the New
Fort shows that the rubble was being removed from the face of Castle Hill which makes
sense as it would have been the closest readily available source of large quantities of
stone . An incredible amount of rubble was obviously transferred. With a modem
wheelbarrow, assuming a capacity ofO .7m2, it would take somewhere in the range of
11,500-23 ,500 trips to move that amount of stone. Clearly the English, mindful of the
weather and ground conditions at the site they selected for the New Fort , were willing to
put in a huge amount of labour to be able to use that site . This should not be taken ,
however, to mean that the English were blindly willing to put in large amounts oflabour
when there were easier solutions available. The removal of rubble from Castle Hill
illustrates that they made a conscious decision to take this course of action to meet their
needs .
Given the softne ss and wetness of the ground on which the New Fort was built
and the amount of time and effort the English put into building the area up with rubble , it
is very strange that they d id not utilize a commo n European fort ification technique for
sec uring wall s in such condit ion s: the plac ing of pil ings and grates und er stone
foundations (D uffy 1996 : 47) . Excava tions along the interior of the western rampart have
been exten sive and de spite bein g conducted to a depth great er than the base of the wall ' s
foundation, no evi dence of such featur es has been unc overed . Furthermore, whil e only
se lect areas of a numb er of the interio r structures in the New Fort have been exc ava ted all
the way down to the bott om of the ir foundat ion s, those that have been pro vide no
ev ide nce of pil ings or gra tes .
Thi s is especially interesti ng when one not es that Enginee r Smelt ' s report of 1751
states that the ramp art s of the New Fort were alrea dy bulging by that point , sugges ting
that either the foundations were sinkin g unevenl y or that the mortar and stone wer e failin g
due to the un favour abl e clim ate (Sme lt 1751). Th is is exactl y the kind of co llapse that
pil ings and gratings were meant to prevent and their inclusion here sure ly would have
assisted in preventin g these failur es . The question then is: wh y did the English decid e to
not include them ? After all, it would have reduced the amount of rubbl e that had to be
carted from Castle Hill.
One possibl e explanation has to do wi th time. The builders may have conclud ed
that the length y proc es s oflayi ng pilin gs would have prevented the fort from bec omin g
op erational in time to be used in the anticipated war with Franc e. At first this
interpretation see ms to mak e sense when comb ined with what app ear s to have been the
urgent pri oriti zat ion of the comp leti on of the southern and western ramp art s ea rly in the
co nstruction proc ess . However , on furth er con sideration it seems unlikel y that time was
the reason given the fact that pilings were used j ust outside of the New Fort to build a
breakwater to protect the rest of the structure from the action of the sea .
It is imposs ible to say much about these pilings and their assoc iated breakwater as
no archaeo logica l evidence of them has been uncovered. In fact, a test pit sunk in 2010 in
hopes of uncovering the exterior scarp revetment of the western rampart found no trace of
the breakwater wall's prese nce . It see ms likely that between the constant pounding of the
sea and the construction of a large breakwater in the twentieth century any evidence of
the English breakwater or the pilings has long since been destroyed or washed out to sea .
Nevertheless, documentary evidence does exist. The breakwa ter and pilings are present
on several plans of the New Fort and were express ly mentioned by Smelt. This suggests
that they were in fact put in place early in the construction of the New Fort (Smelt 1751).
Aside from this, the huge amount of work that went into bringing in the rubble fill all
around the site remains a bit ofa mystery , though it is possible that the rubble was not
moved at one time but was moved in on an ad hoc basis. Still, the question remains as to
why there is no archaeo logica l ev idence of pilings or gratings present in any of the areas
which have been excava ted when their use was common practice at the time under those
environmental conditions .
Perhaps the best expla nation is simply that the English jud ged them to be
unnecessary and the rubble was readily ava ilable. This then raises the question: why did
they reach that conclusion when they already had recognized the difficult ies of bu ilding
on the site and had taken other steps towards overcoming them? Clearly, there must have
been some part icular motivation for this j udgemen t call, perhaps some pre-existing factor
which tipped the decision making in favour of not using pil ings or gratings to support the
walls. One possibil ity is that suit trees for creati ng pilings were not avai lable, though this
is conjectur e. Perhap s the best case for such a pre-existing factor would the existence of
alread y stable foundation s which could have served the same purpose as pilings and
gratings .
There is evidence to suggest that at least one location in the New Fort was indeed
built on top of the French Fort Louis foundation . A decision to not use pilings to support
the various walls of the New Fort in favour of emplo ying readily available old, firm
foundations, which were likely from Fort Louis, to serve the same purpose represents a
premeditated choice on the part of the English to use what resource s were at hand in the
most efficient manner possible. It see ms that this was exactly what the English did as the
evidence of them utilizing pre-exist ing, likely French, foundations in the construction of
the New Fort was uncovered in the governor 's quarters. This techniqu e may also have
occurred elsewhere on site . After the excava tion of a relatively small area of the western
wall of the governor ' s residenc e in 2007, Steve Mills concluded that , due to the
architectural feature s and associated arte facts unearthed, it was possible the footings of
the foundations were actually of French origi n. Further excava tion conduct ed in 20 I0
under the superv ision of Matth ew Simmonds added further credence to this conclusion.
The evidence uncovered in 2010 is extremely strong. It can be best understood
when explained by making reference to the photos below (Figure 5.1). The image on the
left shows the interior of the eastern wall of the governo r's quarters, adjacent to the
triangular hearth featur e visible on the left side of the image which is visible in many of
the plans of the New Fort. The right image is a close-up of the bulk present on the left
side of the first image. The presence of a definite lip separating the top and bottom phases
of the foundations is clearly visible in both images .
Figure 5.1: Photo ofEnglish reuse ofFrench fou ndation
Howeve r, this by itself is not sufficient to conclude that the lower section is an old French
foundation while the upper section is English. Indeed, all of the excavated foundations of
the New Fort's interior structures show such an offse t and even the plans of the western
rampart clearl y show one. Further evidence fortun ately is present.
To begin , the rubble visible in the top left of both of the images is the fill layer
which was previously discussed. Its presence is very good evidence that any struc tures
below it are from an ear lier period than the constructi on of the New Fort. Furthermore ,
below the fill layer there is a layer of mortar which penetrated into the wall and separated
the upper and lower sections. Such a layer of mortar or cement was commonly used to
level off the top of old foundations in order to provide a flat building surface for new
structures (Duffy 1996: 48) . In fact, the reuse of old foundations and even entire
structures was an established part of European fortifications at the time (Duffy 1996: 30,
48) . Therefore , the English, faced with the task of building a new fort and finding that
they had pre-existing, firm foundations available to them, opted to incorporate themin the
construction (Duffy 1996: 30,48). This is especially true given the poor soil condition s of
the site.
The best evidence for the lower section of the foundation being of French origin
can be found in examining the associated stratigraphy. As seen in the right-hand image ,
the lower section of the foundation is abutted by a thick , dark organic layer , which was
labelled as event 221. As well, there is a smaller event below this labelled 242. The
artefact assemblages, including glass and pottery shards , produced by these event s were
deemed to have originated from the French occupation of the site by both the project
leader Matthew Simmonds and the lab supervisor David Fry. This conclusion was met
despite the presence of several wares more typically associated with the English during
the eighteenth century . However , their presence was deemed to be accounted for by the
English military occupation of Fort Louis from 1713 to 1717 and the fact that the site then
remained effectively open to civilian use from 1717 until the construction of the New Fort
began in the early 1740s. For the sake of completeness, the following table (Table 5.2)
shows the raw shard counts for these events separated by ware type . As these events abut
the lower section of the wall and as there is no builder 's trench present , which is usually
associated with the construction of stone foundation s, these event s and their associated
artefacts must have been depo sited after the foundation was built (Duffy 1996). Given all
of this evidenc e, it see ms safe to interpret these lower foundation s as being of French
construc tion.
Table 5.2: Ceramic assemblages associated with French Foundation
Ware Type Event 221 Event 242
Beauvais 18 34
Bristol Stafford shire I 9
English Salt Glaze I 0
Iberian 33 17
Jackfield 2 0
Merida 4 1 16
Normandy 124 60




Rhenish Brown Salt Graze I I
Saintange 62 65





While the governor's quarters present the best evidence for the reuse of old
French foundation s by the English, it is by no means the only structure of the New Fort
which may do so . Amanda Crompton and Blair Templ e, after their excavations at the site
in 2005 and 2006, theorized that the three structur es present in almost all the historic
plans of Fort Louis might be the same structures as the barracks, store room and powder
magazine present in the plans of the New Fort (Crompton 2005) . Although this
interpretation has esse ntially been abandoned by the current Placentia Archaeo logy
Project Team at the time that this analysis is being conducted , it may be time to
reconsider. Interestingly enough, superim posing the set of three structures found in plans
for Fort Louis and those for the New Fort yields unexpected and intriguing results. As
Cro mpton and Temple sugges ted, the three structures present in the New Fort and Fort
Louis appear to be perfectly matched to one another in size and shape . Furthermore, the
main bastion of Fort Louis and one of the New Fort's bastions, while not identical in
shape or size, line up very closely . Simila rly, while not matchin g as closely, a significant
portion of both forts ' seaward curtain walls also overlap (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2: Map illustrating position ofFort Louis resulting fro m
Crompton/Temple theory of reuse
Steve Mills has put forward another interesting theory regard ing the reuse of
French foundations by the English. This theory runs slightly counter to that of Crompton
and Temple. It stipulates that the powder magazines of Fort Louis and the New Fort are,
in fact, the same structure or were , at least, built on the same founda tions (Mills
20 10/20 11 Personal Correspondence). The initia l stage of testing this theory, the
overlay ing of the powder magaz ines, produces encourag ing results as the dimensions of
the buildings on both plans match very well. However, in other respects the results of this
overlay are not encourag ing as a large section of Fort Louis, an entire bastion in fact, ends
up in the
Figure 5.3: Map illustrating position ofFort Louis resulting for m Mill 's theory of
water (Figure 5.3) . Whi le this could be dismissed as a result of erosio n over the last two
centuries, a quick consultation with the available plans of Fort Lou is makes it clear that
the entire orien tation of the Fort prod uced by this ove rlay is incorrect.
Neither of these theor ies should be taken as gospe l for assessi ng to what degree
the English reused the foundations of Fort Louis. The first is poorly supported by
archaeo logical data and the second simply seems incorrect when compared to historic
maps. Nevertheless, recent archaeo logica l excava tions conducted dur ing the 2009 and
2010 field seaso ns suggest that some sections of the wes tern rampart of the New Fort
were constructed on old foundations which , due to the occupa tional history of the site,
imply that they must have been of French origin .
Afte r excavating a 5 metre wide sectio n of the western rampart 's interior
revetment in 2009, Matthew Simmonds concluded that there were two phases of
construction present. The top phase he determined was similar to the other known English
masonry work on the site and the bottom phase he judged to be of French origin .
(Simmonds 2009 : 26) . However , after studying standard fortificat ion founda tion
construction techniq ues of the 1700s as well as the plans of the New Fort's rampart
revet ments, it seems more likely that these phases are actually the differe nt levels of the
foundations shown in these plans and that the rubble hardcore at the botto m represen ts the
footings which underp layed the foundations.
Figure 5.4: Drawing of interior of western rampart wall showing the possibility of
two phases of construc tion by Malt Simmonds
Previous test pitting at the northern extreme of the western rampart ' s interior,
however, had not uncovered this rubbl e hardcore. As a result , during the 2010 excava tion
several test pits were sunk along the length of the rampart ' s interior as well as another 5
metre unit directly north of that excavate d in 2009 . Unfortunately, beyond being able to
conclude that the southern half of the western rampart is construct ed on top of a rubble
hardcore while the northern half is not, neither the test pits nor the larger units provided
any further evidence to sugges t whether these variations are due to the reuse of old
French foundations or not. Nonetheless , j ust as in the case of the governor's quarters, it
does seem likely that if presen ted with the opportunity to reuse pre-existing foundations
as a means of stabilizing or expediting the construction of the New Fort, the English
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might well have seized the opportunity as a means of ove rcoming the other various
enviro nmenta l concerns which they faced .
There is another type of reuse which appears to have occurred during the
construc tion of the New Fort which also illustrates that the English were willing to make
use of whatever reso urces were ava ilable to them on site . The foundations of all of the
northern struct ures of the New Fort show a cons iderab le varia tion in the size, shape and
quality of the stones utilized for both facing and filling of the walls. There does not
appear to be any architec tural reasoning behind the relative location and use of these
stones so an explanation must be sought elsewhere. The variat ion in quality can be seen in
the following image (Fig ure 5.5) although it should be noted that in other areas of the
foundations the good qua lity stone was not used at the comers as quoin stones which, if it
were the case everyw here, could be explained as a means of securing the buildin g. One
possible reason for the presence of both good quality and poor quality stone is that the
large, well-dresse d stones in the foundations were taken from any number of other large
maso nry struc tures which were present in Placentia at the time. The most likely
candidates were Fort Freder ick and the Royal Redoubt, although if there had been any
stone left over from Fort Louis' late reconstruct ion it is possible that some of its stone
cou ld have been used as well. In fact, it may even be possible that some stone from the
Fortress of Louisbourg while the English held it was shipped over and utilized (Peter
Pope Personal Correspondence 20 I0/20 II ).
Figur e 5.5: Possibly reused stones in New Fort storehouse
The reuse of such stones was common place not only for military purposes but
civilian (Duffy 1996: 42) . The motivation behind doing so is easy to understand .
Militar y engineer s and masons knew that hard stones, irregular boulder type stone s and
stones which had been exposed to the elements before being quarried were of poor quality
and were susceptible to the forces of weather and water. They also provided a poor
bonding surface for mortar (Duffy 1996: 42) . Since the English were mindful of the
havoc the local climate and sea conditions would undoubtedly play on their construction
materials , it is easy to understand why they might decide to remove good qualit y stone
from unused buildings in order to improve the quality of what they thought was going to
be the primary defensive structure of the colony . Furthermore , Engineer Smelts in his
report had indicated that construction in Placentia , in order to last any length of time, had
to use stone and lime imported from England or New England as there were few suitable
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raw materials available locally or the means to extract those that did (Smelt 1751). Based
on this observa tion it makes even more sense that the Englis h were inclined to pilfer good
quality stones from wherever they could.
Despite this, it does appear that local stone, similar to that extrac ted from the face
of Cas tle Hill and which was largely utilized as fill, was also incorpo rated into the New
Fort's ramparts as well as the foundations of many of the interior structures . While this
judge ment is based entirely on visual inspec tions and, therefore, would requir e
geochemical analysis to provide ultimate confirmation, their inclusion would sugges t that
even give n the knowledge of the poor quality of the stone, the English were motivated by
some over-riding factor to utilize them. Give n the presence of good quality reused stone,
as well as poor quality locally quarried stone in the same foundatio ns, the most like ly
motivatio n for the English to use both types was a desire to build the New Fort as quick ly
as possible. Once again , time was a considera tion driven by military exige ncies and
imperial rivalries .
Clearly, if time was of the essence the English builders would have turned to
whatever construction materia ls were readily ava ilable. They would not have waited for
shipments of materials from England or New England. They wou ld not have tried to rely
on only new materials. True, cost may have been a factor, but time was an even greater
one if attack seemed imminent. This justification of the reuse of old stone and the use of
substandard local stone as a means of expediting construc tion supports the earlier
interpretation of the priori tization of construction presen ted in the first half of this
chapter.
5.6 CONCLUSIONS
In summary , all aspects of the construction of the New Fort retlect the actions and
decisions made by its English builders in light of the many environmental and military
concerns which they faced . Everything from why structures were built in a particular
order, to the materials used and even the reason why the fort was never completed are
based on how the various environmental factors of the site and military concern s of the
time were processed by the English and embodied in the decisions they made to best meet
their immediate goals and priorities . As this chapter and the one which preceded it have
outlined , it is impossible to fully understand the reasons behind all of the design of
construction features of the New Fort without first fully contextualizing them within the
historical and environmental condition s in which those responsible of their creation
existed and acted .
Once this has been done it becomes possible to examine these features , compare
them to traditional practices of the time as well as the available documentary sources of
the period in order to ascertain what the exact motivation s behind the actions of the
English in Placentia were, and then from this interpret what external factors most directly
intluenced these actions . This proces s of analysis, based in the understanding of agency
discussed earlier in this work, has allowed us to form interpretations of the reasoning the
English used while creating the New Fort based solely on the material and documentary
remains of the fort and which at no point resorted to a comparison of modern day
counterfactual discourse nor judgement al modern day moralization . This aspect of the
analysis is key to its use the study of coloniali sm and will be further outlined in the next
and final chapter.
Chapter 6: Conclusion
From the start, this thesis had three goals . The first was to produce an original
study and analysis of a subject worthy of academic examination. In this case, the subject
chosen was rooted from the military history of Placentia and related archaeological work
which, even today, generally receives scant attention from either the local populace or the
academic community . The second goal was to draw greater academic and public
awareness to the ongoing archaeological project underway at Placentia . This project ,
begun in 2002 and headed now up by Mr. Matthew Simmonds , has and will continue to
produce data that is of considerable significance in tenns of studying and interpreting the
approaches and experiences of European imperial habitation and military activities in
North America, especially Newfoundland . The third goal demonstrate the value of
utilizing an agency based method combined with archaeological evidence for studying
colonialism and imperialism introduction as a means to overcome the sometimes
contradictory and heated debates which can arise when such topics are discussed using
more traditional historical approaches .
The achievement of the first goal lies in the fact that there is a limited body of
secondary academic literature , in French or English, about the New Fort and its interplay
with the foundations of Fort Louis . Any contribution to the historiography of Placentia
and its imperial role during the English regime, in light of the limited work done so far, is
of necessity original to some degree . Perhaps only time can provide evidence of the
success of the second goal. It may take awhile for people to process the importance of the
archaeological findin gs and the continuin g work at Placentia in term s of the acqui sition of
historical knowledge and the development of the touri sm potential they can stimulat e.
The satisfaction of the third goal , however , requir es closer consid eration as realizing it is
a far more comple x chall enge.
For the third goa l to be met, this analysis must meet two crit eria . Firstly, it must
success fully integra te archae ological data into an historical anal ysis. Secondly, it must
illustrate how doin g provides a viabl e method of approaching the study of European
Colonialism which allow s contentious topics in that field to be discus sed with out falling
into the traps of counterfactuals and inflated moralization . The topic o f this study is
clearl y histor ical in focus and context. Becau se it is based on primary docum ent research
as well as secondary wri tings and because the related archaeo logical data is an integra l
source of first-hand evidence upon which the thesis ' arguments and interpret at ions are
ba sed, the first requirement of the third goal has been met.
The crucial question regardin g whether the third goa l of the thesis has been
real ized lies in answering whether the analysis of the New Fort' s design and construction
proves that the theoretical and methodological approac hes which were used offer a viable
means of studyi ng colonia l/imperial topic s which overcomes the traditi onall y highly
controversia l natu re of discour se in that field . In answerin g this question , one need s to
briefl y review what the thesis cover s and what it argues in terms of how imperial agents
responded to mil itary and enviro nmental concerns wh ile they were building the New Fort
to meet and protect British colon ial aspirations in the second half of the eig hteenth
century. Then, one can determine to what degree the thesis is successf ul in presenting
these arguments in the wider context of British imperial historiography.
With the exception of some of the historical background provided in order to
contextualize French-English imperial relations prior to as well as after 1713, the entire
thesis focuses on analysing the design and construction of the New Fort at Placentia . The
documen tary and archaeological evidence related to the design and construction make it
possible to identify the specific goals of those responsible for the fort's creation and to
interpret how the influence of external factors , namely military and environmental ones,
determined the actions and decisions these agents made in their efforts to meet these
goals. Never forgetting the general purpose of the fort itself in the larger imperial context ,
the builders of the New Fort constantly had to weigh the often changing military and
environmental concerns against each other and settle on the most practical, the most
viable, or the most affordable solution to the problems presented to them. The degree of
threat and the nature of the threat often shifted through the decades. The weather and the
sea were constantly changing realities. Features were omitted and features were added to
the plans. Sometime s inferior materials were used, sometimes new ones were used and
sometimes previous ly used ones were used again . Sometimes work forged ahead and at
other times it came to a grinding halt. Sometimes traditional building methods were
adopted and sometimes new techniques were developed. Virtually nothing about the
building of the New Fort followed what, under perfect circumstances, would have been
expecte d pract ice in the construction of a mid- eighteenth-century fortress, even one in a
remote part of Briti sh colonial territo ry . The militar y and environmental factors ensured
that the circum stance s were far from perfect.
How then is this analysis useful as a mean s of illustrat ing how this method of
approaching the study of colon ial histories can be utilized by historians and
archaeologis ts as a means of ove rcoming many of the difficulti es which are faced when
dealin g with this divisive issue? At the root of all the arguments and analysis of the New
Fort' s construction is a single conc ept who se centr al premise is that individual s generally
act in ways which they believe are most likely to achieve the result s they desire given the
situation in which they find themselves. This conc ept is referred to as "agency".
As discussed in some detail in Chapter 3, the conc ept of agenc y holds to a
Giddens ian view wh ich states that, "human beings are neither to be treated as passive
objec ts, nor as wholly free subje cts" (Giddens 1979: 150). From this key under standin g of
the nature of human agency more complex concepts have evolved . The most import ant
one in term s of this thesis is Byer s' concept of " intentionality" which provides a means of
conc eptuali zing how individua ls actually go about makin g deci sions and thereby exe rcise
their agenc y (Bye rs 1999). This conce ptual model of how ind ividuals, or agent s, weigh
mult iple externa l factors when makin g a decision was incorporated into the methodogy
used to determin e why things wer e done as they were don e in the construction of the New
Fort , particul arly when some of the action s, on the surface, might appear to be unexpected
or inappropriate. One example of this was the deci sion to use as reinforcin g fill thousand s
of meters of rubbl e in lieu of new pilings and gr ates. By using the concept of
intentiona lity within the larger contex t of the theory of agency, it was possible to develop
reasonable interpretations of how the perceptions and views of the relative importance of
military and environmental concerns held by the English designers and builders changed
during the time the New Fort was being built.
It is the ability to examine the motivations and contributing factors which caused
colonial agents , such as the English at Placentia , to make the decisions and take the
actions they did , which makes this method of examination valuable in the broader
discussion of colonialism and imperialism . By adopting an approach which contextualizes
the actions of colonial agents within their historical and environmental conditions and by
using Byers ' model for understanding how individuals make decisions , this work has
successfully avoided the pit falls of counterfactual debate and moral accusations which
often accompany studies of colonial history by reflecting what the actions of these
individuals means to them and not contributing modem , post-colonial ideals and concepts
onto them . Consider this approach in comparison to Niall Ferguson 's 'balance sheet' in
Empire and the advantages are all but too clear (Ferguson 2002) .
The goal of this thesis was to determine whether the methodology and theoretical
approach outlined above would provide . If it was unable to produce the kind of results
and interpretive scope which was desired , then it clearly would not have been of use at all
and would have been a failure . Based on the amount of information that has been deduced
from the archaeological work and from the documentary record regarding the decisions
made by the designers and builders constructing the New Fort, what was built and what
was not, what was used and what was not, where the fort was located and so forth , and by
the colonial representatives such as the governors, it seems fair to say that the
methodology and theoretical approach worked well .
It appears that given the set requirements for its use which were outlined in
Chapter 3, this method can be applied to any colonial situation . It can help to determine
and understand the intersectionality, the points of intersection between the agents and the
internal and external factors which shaped the decision making of the various agents . The
fact that this study of the New Fort did not include a discussion of interaction between
colonizers and colonized does not diminish the fact that the concept of agency can be
successfully applied to situations which do as well as those that do not. This theory is
applicable to the study of any colonial /imperial setting and topic given the existence of
the necessary kinds of archaeological and documentary evidence . It is safe to say that this
analysis of the construction of the New Fort at Placentia during the British colonial
regime in Newfoundland provides an example of how and why this historical and
archaeological agency-based approach to the study of colonial histories can and should be
utilized for the study of colonialism.
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